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Abstract 
Business associations represent the interests of business to government and seek to 
influence public policy outcomes. The interest group literature that analyses the role of 
business in, and its contribution to, the policy-making process has found that business 
associations can influence policy outcomes. However, existing research has largely 
focussed on the consolidated democracies of the United States and the European Union, 
and relatively little is known about business associations in other major regions and 
continents. The interest group literature extensively explores, inter alia, advocacy 
strategies, whether and how interest groups secure access, resource exchange 
mechanisms, whether success is venue dependent, whether coalitions make a difference 
and whether interest groups lobby people who already agree. This body of knowledge 
implies a need for business associations both to manage themselves effectively and to 
make cogent arguments if they are to influence policy. Many researchers stress the need 
to be professional, but there is a paucity of research on the impact of interest group 
competence or what it actually means to be professional. Accordingly, this thesis 
addresses two major research gaps which together comprise the research question. 
Firstly, it investigates and explains the competences necessary for business associations to 
influence public policy. Secondly, it focuses on business associations in the consolidating 
democracies of Kenya and Tanzania. It analytically explores many of the possible 
competences and empirically considers which are the most important. It adopts a case 
study approach by reviewing the work of four business associations over more than six 
years, covered through 150 face to face interviews with business associations, 
government officials and other stakeholders. This study makes contributions to the 
literature in terms of the nature of relationships developed by African business 
associations, through gaining insights on the process of public private dialogue, through 
understanding what it means for a business association to be professional and identifying 
stages of development through which business associations progress. Further, it provides 
additional evidence that business associations can indeed influence policy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Interest groups provide access to the political system (Grant 1995) yet we know little 
about the competences that lead to success, by which we mean securing policy 
outcomes closer to their preferences than might otherwise have been the case 
(Bernhagen et al. 2014). Jordan & Maloney (2007) argue that interest groups fill a gap that 
would otherwise exist in allowing for the possibility of direct influence over public policy 
and allowing more people than just politicians to become involved in the process. They 
further argue that “opening up of decision-making processes to a wider, diverse and 
larger number of groups is seen as contributing to democratic representativeness” (2007: 
8). Pluralists argue that interest groups making their case strengthens democracy because 
it ensures that more evidence and countervailing arguments enter the public domain and 
more debate takes place (Jordan & Greenan 2012). There is much debate over the extent 
to which interest groups influence public policy (Heilman & Lucas 1997, Lowery 2013, 
Pederson 2013). Some scholars, however, argue that the study of interest groups is 
important not just because they add to democratic debate but precisely because they 
influence public policy (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, Dür 2008, Braun 2012, 
Binderkrantz 2014). Grant claims that “much of the pluralist case rests on the assumption 
that access to the political system is relatively easy, that forming a group which will be 
listened to is not particularly difficult” (1995: 30). Whilst these assumptions may not hold 
everywhere, it does appear that they have a strong resonance in many countries of sub-
Saharan Africa where politics and policy formulation tend to be more consensual and 
more collaborative (Wiredu 2015, Vigtel 2015, Galperin et al. 2017). 
If we accept the argument that interest groups should be allowed to argue their case, and 
that they are influential, and thus successful, at least some of the time, then we should 
also consider the determinants of that success. Researchers examine closely the many 
possible factors, such as strategy, access and choice of venue. Researchers agree on the 
need for competence (Wilts & Quittkat 2004, Klüver & Saurugger 2013, Gallai et al. 
2015, Bernhagen et al. 2015). Moreover, the ability of interest groups to access policy 
makers and influence public policy appropriately requires that they are competent and 
credible, but there seems to be an implicit assumption that interest groups are 
competent. As a result, competence is largely ignored as a factor contributing to success 
in policy reform.  
2 | P A G E  
 
Both the narrow literature exploring interest group competence and the wider interest 
group literature focuses on the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Indeed, 
Mahoney (2008) asserts that few researchers examine interest groups in other national 
contexts and there is limited research about such groups in sub-Saharan Africa, 
supporting similar claims by Thomas and Hrebenar (2008). Little is known, for example, 
about whether interest groups in sub-Saharan Africa adopt similar strategies to interest 
groups in consolidated democracies or whether they have similar levels of success. 
This aspect is important because the development partners (DP) – the aid agencies of 
developed countries, previously called donors – are active in many developing countries. 
Moreover, they fund support programmes to assist a type of interest group, business 
membership organisations (BMO), to build their capacity so that they can engage more 
effectively in dialogue and advocacy. 
This thesis aims to address these two gaps of limited understanding of BMO competence 
and limited understanding of the effectiveness of developing country BMOs. First, it 
examines interest groups in East Africa by reviewing the work of four business 
associations in Tanzania and Kenya during the period from 2011 to 2016. Second, it 
examines the characteristics, attributes and competences that they perceive have led to 
their success. This is important for four reasons. (1) There is a notable lack of empirical 
evidence to address these gaps, despite the considerable amounts of donor aid provided 
to support BMOs in developing countries. (2) The governments of many developing 
countries claim publicly that they want to work collaboratively with the private sector to 
improve their investment climate (URT 2011c) but need credible organisations with 
which to work. (3) Wider participation by BMOs in the policy process, at least in 
developing countries, can improve public policies and legitimacy (Bettcher 2015). (4) 
Political scientists need to gain a greater understanding of whether interest groups 
become more influential as they build their knowledge and expertise. 
Unlike much of the contemporary interest group research, this thesis takes a qualitative 
approach. This method and research design allows greater consideration of the effect of 
culture (which, in East Africa, tends to be consensual) and political context (which, in East 
Africa tends to be more neopatrimonial or clientelist (Kuada 2015) or authoritarian 
(Kimenyi & Datta 2011)). Culture and political context may be different but the objectives 
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of the four BMOs considered here, like their counterparts in developed countries, 
includes an intent to represent their members and to seek to influence public policy. 
This thesis makes two broad contributions: it explores analytically the nature of 
competences required to influence public policy outcomes and it examines empirically 
business associations in East Africa. It draws conclusions about the nature of relationships 
developed by African BMOs, what it means for a BMO to be competent and professional 
and which competences are most important. It further concludes that BMOs progress 
through distinct stages and thus makes a contribution in assessing how BMOs develop 
over time. Furthermore, it provides evidence that BMOs can indeed influence policy. 
This introductory chapter defines the term interest group and explains their importance 
and relevance in relation to advocacy. It explains the role of business associations, and 
why it is important to examine business groups in East Africa. It offers a conceptualisation 
of business associations as advocates making a positive contribution to developing 
economies. Following Vogel (1996), who argues that academics, practitioners and 
policymakers need to understand better how public and private sectors interact, it 
explores government/ BMO interaction, whether business groups are successful and, if 
so, whether that is due to their approach to their dialogue and advocacy activities. This 
chapter describes the research question, explains why a case study approach has been 
adopted, and then explains why the chosen business associations were selected and how 
the interviewees were chosen. 
1.1 Defining business membership organisations 
Interest groups are not defined consistently in the literature (Baroni et al. 2014). Truman 
asserted that, when individuals care enough about public policy, “a significant interest 
group will emerge and greater influence will ensue” (1951: 36). Walker (1983) suggested 
that interest groups arise ‘spontaneously’ in response to a common frustration. The 
evidence from Africa reflects that belief: associations of businesses are catalysed by a 
handful of businesses who have a particular grievance. 
Some academics use a behavioural definition. Truman, for example, defined an interest 
group as “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain 
claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or 
enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes” (1951: 33). 
4 | P A G E  
Walker (1991) focused more narrowly on associations which are open to membership 
and are concerned with aspects of public policy. Berry (1997) defined interest groups as 
associations that are not part of government but are trying to influence it. Jordan & 
Maloney (2007) added the rider that they should be lobbying on a restricted range of 
issues. Baumgartner & Leech (1998) used the term to cover membership organisations, 
advocacy organisations without members and, indeed, any organisation that seeks to 
influence public policy. Broadly, there are two types of interest group: cause groups, in 
which the cause is the driver, and which seek ‘collective goods’ for the improvement of 
society; and, sectional groups, that is groups representing a specified section such as 
business and which aim to defend their members’ interests (Stewart 1958). 
My focus is on business interest groups, described in many developing countries as 
business membership organisations (BMOs). BMOs unite businesses, rather than 
individuals. Whilst larger businesses may have a degree of power and may also have the 
resources and inclination to lobby government directly, many businesses (especially 
smaller businesses) see the need to come together to press their case. 
In this thesis, I define a business membership organisation as one that unites businesses 
with something in common, such as sector or geography, through voluntary membership. 
They are independent of government and not party political. They may offer selective 
benefits, such as a market intelligence service or training, to members, but they will have 
representation, dialogue and advocacy among their primary objectives.  
1.2 Studying interest groups is important and relevant 
The study of business groups is important and relevant at three levels. Firstly, there is the 
question of whether BMOs contribute to the policy making process? Secondly, do they 
succeed in influencing public policy? Thirdly, if they make a difference, what are the 
determinants of that success? 
For interest groups to be able to influence public policy, they need to demonstrate to 
government that they genuinely represent their defined constituency. Generally, this 
means that they need members but there is a challenge for business associations in that 
businesses will reap the benefits of policy reforms irrespective of whether they join an 
association. Olson (1971) argued that groups that seek to generate public goods will only 
survive if they can additionally offer selective benefits because rational individuals will not 
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join as they will receive the benefit without paying the costs of membership. The 
consequence is that “membership and power of large pressure group organisations does 
not derive from their lobbying achievements but rather is a by-product of their other 
activities” (Olson 1971: 3). Olson recognised, however, that his logic may not apply to 
smaller organisations which he accepted were more viable. In East Africa, BMOs tend to 
be quite small with, at most, a few hundred members. 
Walker (1991) not only claimed that shared interests about public policies, as noted 
above, lead businesses to create associations but also observed that formation was often 
prompted by the public sector (1991: 11), because they need an appropriate 
organisation with which to consult (Walker 1983). The Tourism Confederation of 
Tanzania, which represents 12 tourism associations, is an example where the 
Government of Tanzania wanted one body to which they could talk (and also some co-
ordination of positions). The Kenya Chamber of Mines was created with encouragement 
from the Government of Kenya. Government encouragement to form associations 
perhaps poses a question about whether BMOs exercise “disproportionate influence” 
(Vogel 1996: 158) though Vogel (1996) noted that business interests are not 
homogenous, which dilutes business interest group effectiveness. 
Wilson (2003) suggested that a key question in the study of politics and business is 
whether the power of business is compatible with democracy, though the question now 
perhaps is how much influence is exercised by business interest groups. Binderkrantz 
observed that some researchers think interest groups “distort the political process” (2014: 
526). However, Lowery & Gray asserted that “the formation and operation of organised 
interests supports rather than undermines the effective operation of democratic 
government” (2004: 165). Dür and de Briève (2007) agree, arguing that interest group 
participation in policy making improves public sector decision making. Jordan & Maloney 
argued that interest groups fill a void vacated by political parties (2007: 2) and, in 
particular, maintain that interest groups representation achieves public policy that is 
better than would otherwise be the case. This view is supported by Saurugger (2008) 
who argues that participation in policy formulation is good for democracy with interest 
groups providing knowledge and expertise to policy makers and Dür & Mateo (2012) 
who assert, in relation to the EU, that interest group participation brings a range of voices 
and expertise that enhances the legitimacy and quality of policy making. 
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Bettcher et al. claimed that developing country “governments that listen to the private 
sector are more likely to design credible reforms and win support for their policies.” 
(2015: 1). Anderson et al. agreed, arguing that “institutional and regulatory frameworks 
that are designed through public private dialogue are better conceived and more 
effectively implemented because they result from mutual understanding between 
government and the business community” (2017: 63). 
These assertions reflect a pluralist view in which power is distributed and politics is less 
about domination by privileged elites and more about small, politically autonomous, 
groups, with particular interests aiming to influence policy. They also reflect a view that 
BMOs do, indeed, contribute to the policy process. In consolidated democracies, with 
many interest groups, there is often contestation and competition to be heard by policy 
makers; in sub-Saharan African, where there is “no tradition of political pluralism” 
(Thomson 2010: 276), pluralism nevertheless fits quite well with the ethnic nature of 
society. Thomson (2010) calls this type of pluralism ‘social pluralism’. Goldsmith asserts 
that the evidence supports the perception that business associations in Africa conform to 
the pluralist model (2002: 39). Allied with the importance of groups to African society 
(Chazan et al. 1999) and a desire to seek compromise, one might indeed expect better 
policy to emerge from the arguments of groups with different positions. 
The second question relates to whether interest groups are ever influential. Most 
researchers concur that interest groups can secure access, though access is not the same 
as influence (Bouwen 2002, Eising 2007). Heilman & Lucas (1997) claimed that finding 
clear cases where business associations have been able to influence policy is difficult. 
Specifically referring to Tanzania, Temu & Due asserted that associations have had “little 
impact in influencing policy formulation or civil service behaviour” (2000: 705). More 
generally, Pedersen wonders about “which groups are influential and to what extent” 
(2013: 28), while Lowery asserts that “we look for [influence], but rarely find evidence of 
it” (2013: 1). 
Taking a contrary position, and based on empirical evidence in consolidated 
democracies, some researchers claim that groups can be influential (Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998, Dür 2008, Braun 2012). Moreover, Braun (2012) asserts that business 
interests have a higher degree of success in influencing regulations than other interest 
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groups. Extant empirical evidence suggests that interest groups can make a difference 
and the case studies explore that assertion.  
The third question relates to the factors that might make a difference to whether BMOs 
are successful in influencing policy. Being in the right place at the right time, talking to the 
right people and good evidence and arguments are important factors contributing to 
influencing success. However, they are not sufficient. The ability of a BMO to succeed is 
crucially dependent on individual and organisational capability. Capability is a 
combination of resource and competence (Johnson et al. 2014). Broadly speaking, 
competence is the application of knowledge and skill to achieve intended results. This 
applies not only to individuals but also to organisations. Competences might include, for 
example, the ability to gather intelligence about proposals for policy reform, the ability to 
undertake research, the ability to use the evidence to formulate a compelling proposition 
and the ability to engage with policy makers and express that position persuasively. 
Most interest group researchers do not specifically link degree of competence to degree 
of success. Brinckmann (2007), however, makes an explicit link, in his writing about the 
competence of management teams and the success of new technology-based firms. He 
argues that it is the competences of the founders (of such firms) that determine the 
activities that they undertake, how they perform and whether they are ultimately 
successful. He notes that “founders lack the necessary experience and knowledge to 
handle all the different tasks necessary for establishing and growing their business” (2007: 
3). Importantly, he observes that competence is not only acquired academically but also 
reflects skills and knowledge acquired practically (ibid: 21). Those views could equally be 
applied to BMOs, especially in Africa. 
It might be argued that examining competence focuses on the management of a BMO 
rather than the political science but actually both are important: BMOs need, for 
example, to have some idea not only of when and where but also of how to intervene in 
the policy process.  
Vogel noted that “the study of business-government relations has suffered from a lack of 
communication between political scientists interested in business and students of 
management interested in politics” (1996: 159). This study has been undertaken by a 
researcher coming from a background of small business and who considers business 
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associations to be enterprises with a social purpose and whose work includes supporting 
business associations to become better advocates. Competence is defined in detail – and 
the need for specific competences is explored – in Chapter Two. 
1.3 Conceptualisation of business association advocacy 
In essence, businesses come together to form associations either within a narrow sector 
(such as mango farming), or a broad sector (such as horticulture or agriculture), or 
geographically (as in a Chamber of Commerce). Associations engage in dialogue and 
advocacy in an attempt to influence policy. Businesses and associations in East Africa 
rarely have power beyond their ability to provide research evidence and reasoned 
argument, though there may be degrees of patronage (Chazan et al. 1999). Thus, donors 
support BMOs in developing countries to develop their competence in the hope that 
they will aim to improve the business enabling environment, reduce the cost of doing 
business and ensure a business environment that is stable and predictable. 
Beyers & Hanegraaff (2016) ask what characterises and explains the interactions of non-
state advocates with policy makers – and then answer it by looking specifically at their 
advocacy strategies, which they label as cooperative or confrontational. Whilst this 
typology covers all strategies, it only partly answers the question. 
Beyers et al. (2008) observe that interest group scholars have tended to focus on the 
process of group formation and have rather neglected interest group interaction with 
government and the influence of interest groups on policy (2008: 1105). As a result, 
interest groups have been “largely treated as black boxes without any attention to their 
internal configuration” (Klüver 2012a: 505). Klüver et al. (2015) later argued that interest 
group activities are shaped by policy related factors, namely complexity, policy type, 
status quo, salience and degree of conflict characterising policy issues all of which are 
outside the control of the interest group.  
My assertion, based on practical experience of working with business associations across 
nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa over several years, is that there are four major factors 
that affect the likelihood of success – one external and three internal (Figure 1). First, 
there has to be a willingness within the public sector to engage and, ultimately, to act. 
This is affected by political leadership, by the salience and contentiousness of the issue, 
by the effectiveness of existing partnerships between private and public sectors and by 
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the credibility of the business association or coalition seeking the policy change. 
Secondly, the business association must be sufficiently competent that it can engage 
effectively in dialogue and advocacy. If it cannot frame an issue appropriately or gather 
objective and comprehensive evidence or develop and communicate a compelling 
proposition, it will not secure access to policy makers, and is unlikely to succeed. Thirdly, 
the association needs a more general ability to organise, manage and develop itself. 
Lastly, it needs at least some resource.  This is summarised in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Factors impacting on a BMO's advocacy success 
 
 
Whilst it is easy to talk about the need for a BMO to be competent, it does not exist 
independently of the people who work for it, whether staff or volunteer. So, they need to 
be competent, professional and well-managed if the BMO is to be successful. However, 
skills can be held by different members of the team, provided they work together. 
1.4 Research question 
The starting point for this research is the assumption that processes exist in which policy 
makers are willing to listen to the views of parties outside government, in particular 
business associations, both to put issues on the agenda and to respond to those issues 
(Jones and Villar 2008). This requires that associations are competent, collaborative and 
credible and thus able to secure access in order to adopt an insider approach (Maloney 
et al. 1994). It is these assumptions that pose the question that this research addresses – 
what are the competences required for a business association to be successful in 
influencing public policy? 
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These assumptions lead to two further assumptions. Firstly, that state and business are 
independent (Sen 2015) with many, sometimes competing, voices vying to be heard 
(Schneider 1985) rather than some associations having an institutionalised role 
irrespective of their competence. Secondly, business associations have a key objective in 
seeking to represent their members and influence public policy (Brautigam et al. 2002). 
The research question then is which competences set apart the associations that secure 
reform of public policy? Practitioners and academics argue that necessary skills include 
research skills, analytical skills, the ability to frame an issue clearly, the ability to make a 
compelling argument, negotiating skills, and public relations and communications skills. 
However, there may be other mechanisms at work – such as trust, social capital, resource 
exchange, persistence and the possibility of more investment and more jobs – and those 
mechanisms may be affected by the socio-political context. Understanding context is 
important and is considered in Chapter Three. 
Much of the current interest group research examines issues in which a policy outcome 
matched the objectives of one or more interest groups rather than exploring individual 
attempts to influence and then looking for evidence of influence. For BMOs with a history 
of apparent success, the question is what are the specific characteristics and attributes 
they perceive as leading to their success? Can these be identified? Can they be verified? 
Moreover, can they be developed and generalised? What are the lessons for 
practitioners? And for policy makers? Improving understanding of the factors that lead to 
success might enable development partners to target their support more precisely and, 
importantly, would assist the practitioners who are working to improve associations’ 
competence by identifying the attributes and behaviours that have the biggest impact. 
Interest groups in consolidating democracies are largely overlooked in the literature and it 
is not known whether they operate in similar ways to those in consolidated democracies 
or whether they behave quite differently. This study seeks to address that gap also and 
thus focuses on the work of BMOs in Tanzania and Kenya. 
1.5 Why business interest groups in East Africa 
There are a number of reasons to examine business interest groups in East Africa. Interest 
groups in developing countries have been under-researched in the academic literature. 
Mahoney (2008: 218) confirms this view, claiming that an area where more research is 
required is interest group advocacy in consolidating democracies. She poses several 
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questions including whether advocacy processes in more communal societies behave in 
a similar way to individualist consolidated democracies. The case studies will suggest that 
business associations in Tanzania and Kenya adopt a collaborative approach as do many 
business associations in developed economies. 
The populations of interest groups in East Africa are much smaller and fewer issues are 
contested by opposing groups, so it should be easier to isolate the factors that contribute 
to success in influencing policy. In some countries, there are literally thousands of lobby 
groups – Dunleavy (2017) estimates that there are almost 8,000 groups in the UK; 
Schlozman (2010) identifies almost 14,000 in the US – not to mention countless 
professional lobbyists (Mahoney 2008). It is not unusual to find them taking contrary 
positions. Many of the business associations in countries such as Tanzania and Kenya 
have good access and so this provides an excellent opportunity to examine the more 
fundamental requirements for success. Kenya and Tanzania both have a relatively small 
but sufficient number of independent business associations, so that effective (and 
ineffective) cases are easier to observe and potentially to see causal mechanisms at work. 
Chapter 3 outlines the political context of Kenya and Tanzania. Along with the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa, they came into existence with borders drawn by the colonial powers, 
which largely ignored tribal boundaries. They avoided military takeovers. They have, over 
the last couple of decades at least, had elections deemed to be reasonably fair and have 
allowed transfers of power to succeeding administrations. Both inherited systems and 
laws from the British and have only changed them slowly. In both countries, whilst English 
may not be the first language, it is widely spoken. This political context is quite different to 
that in many developed countries. Moreover, the development partners give large 
amounts of grant aid to countries like Tanzania and Kenya. This includes investing millions 
of dollars in the work of BMOs. 
The DPs’ logic is: (a) DPs support economic growth and job creation which not only 
alleviates poverty but also reduces conflict (Collier 2009). (b) DPs promote the private 
sector as the engine of growth (ILO 2007), now largely accepted by many developing 
countries and specifically accepted (GoK undated, URT 2005) on the basis that economic 
growth brings societal benefits. (c) One approach is to improve the business enabling 
environment which, the World Bank (2005b) asserts, makes a difference to all businesses, 
encourages the private sector to invest and leads to economic growth. Indeed, the DPs 
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see this as so important that the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development stresses 
that “reforming the business environment is a priority for development agencies and 
governments because of the significant influence the business environment has on the 
development of the private sector and therefore on economic growth and the generation 
of livelihoods and jobs” (White 2008: 3). (d) The DPs share the view that business 
involvement leads to better policy outcomes and thus promote public-private dialogue 
(PPD) as an effective means for the private sector to contribute policy ideas and 
proposals for regulatory reform. (e) Involving the private sector requires that they are 
organised and the DPs see BMOs providing that organisation. (f) The DPs see a need to 
build the capacity of the stakeholders which they believe will lead to making reforms 
sustainable (White 2008). 
Development partners (including the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID)) have, therefore, chosen to 
support BMOs directly. As a result, there is now considerable activity by business 
associations across sub-Saharan Africa. 
1.6 Case studies 
1.6.1 Case study approach 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the approach and competence of selected 
business membership organisations, which are the unit of analysis, and whether these 
attributes make a difference to their ability to influence policy. A case study approach was 
adopted since it gives a chance to examine broadly and in detail the factors that might 
impinge on success. Qualitative research is more likely to tease out the generative 
mechanisms that lead to success in influencing public policy. This will give a more 
comprehensive overview and ultimately lead to more insight. Harris and Booth (2013) 
make the point that applied political economy analysis is almost entirely qualitative, not 
least because the raw data that feeds the analysis is derived from interviews that gives 
both information and perspectives. 
It is recognised that a small number of case studies does not provide a representative 
sample, though George & Bennett (2005) claim that only small numbers are required to 
test even probabilistic claims. They provide a more complete approach through 
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triangulation and offer the potential for generalisability (Christie et al. 2000). The objective 
is to maximise the learning and, as Stake asserts, “a case study is expected to catch the 
complexity of a single case” (1995: xi). A combination of within-case analysis and cross-
case comparison offers the best route to drawing inferences (George & Bennett 2005: 
18). They have the potential for high conceptual validity, allow examination of causal 
mechanisms, and have the capacity to address causal complexity (George & Bennett 
2005: 19). A case study offers the chance “to tease out and disentangle a complex set of 
relationships” (Easton 2010: 119). They are especially useful when examining the 
relationships between the actor and the context (Christie et al. 2000) which is difficult to 
accommodate in statistical studies (George & Bennett 2005). Case studies provide 
opportunities for inductively identifying complex interactions and results (George & 
Bennett 2005: 212). 
1.6.2 Case study selection 
The case study BMOs were selected to cover the range of BMO types. Broadly speaking, 
there are three types of BMO, all of which are represented in the case studies. However, 
professional associations, which represent individuals engaged in business, and civil 
society organisations, which include businesses or business associations amongst their 
members, often also class themselves as BMOs (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Types of business membership organisation 
Type of BMO Membership 
Business association Businesses (only) and represent a sector such as Tanzania 
Horticultural Association or Kenya Chamber of Mines or a geography 
such as Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture. 
Apex association BMOs (only) such as Tourism Confederation of Tanzania (and 
described in Africa as ‘apex’ rather than ‘peak’ organisations). 
Mixed membership association BMOs but also individual business membership, such as Tanzania 
Private Sector Foundation. 
Professional institution Individuals such as the Tanganyika Law Society. 
Organisation membership 
bodies 
BMOs, businesses or other organisations but not regarded as apex 
bodies and often represent a constituency wider than business such 
as Agricultural Non-State Actors’ Forum. 
Whilst this categorisation may seem familiar to observers of BMOs in developed 
countries, there are differences too. For example, in Africa, BMOs are generally weak, 
with a small number of members and low revenue. In Tanzania, the median membership 
is just 123. For comparison, the Confederation of British Industry has 190,000 members 
and the US Chamber of Commerce some three million. A small number of members, 
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unless it covers most of a sector, not only results in resource challenges but also fails to 
confer credibility when seeking to influence government. In sub-Saharan Africa, as 
explained in Chapter 3, there is greater acceptance of hierarchy, less respect for the rule 
of law, elections that are less obviously fair and greater levels of corruption. At the same 
time, there is a tendency towards collaboration and consensus. 
The nature of the membership of the associations may determine the ease and extent of 
access. Nevertheless, irrespective of structure, attempting to influence policy requires that 
BMOs think about where, when and how to intervene in the policy process. This may 
require that they consider the following, which will affect the way in which they frame 
their issue and plan their approach to dialogue and advocacy: 
 Objective of the policy proposal; 
 Stage in the policy process; 
 Target audience(s); and 
 Degree of contestation. 
The first step for a BMO is to think clearly about their ultimate objective and about the 
steps necessary to achieve it. Many BMOs in Tanzania and Kenya follow the five steps of 
identifying an issue, researching the issue, preparing a policy response, dialogue 
advocacy and follow-up. BMO advocacy usually aims to achieve one of: 
 Creating new policy or legislation or regulation; 
 Amending or simplifying existing policy or legislation or regulation; 
 Abolishing existing policy or regulations; 
 Averting proposed policy or regulations; 
 Delaying proposed policy or regulations; 
 Amending proposals for new policy or legislation; or 
 Enforcing existing legislation or regulations. 
The case studies cover most of these objectives. 
Advocacy success could be dependent on the stage of policy formulation when the BMO 
starts to lobby. Jones (1970) defined the steps as perception, definition, aggregation, 
representation, formulation, legitimation, application, reaction, evaluation and resolution. 
Dunn (2004) puts it more simply with agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, 
policy implementation and policy review. BMOs target all these steps. 
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Figure 2: Stages in policy process 
 
Source: adapted from Dunn (2004) 
There are as many target audiences, or venues as they are typically called, as there are 
BMOs including Ministries, Agencies, Parliament and intermediary bodies such as 
Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils. The case studies examine approaches at 
different stages and different venues. 
The degree of contestation affects the likelihood of success: some issues are political, 
affecting the principles on which a policy is predicated; in some cases, proposals for 
change recognise the policy imperative and seek only technical reform. BMOs can 
choose to take an insider approach or an outsider approach and then have a range of 
tools and techniques at their disposal. 
The three Tanzanian case studies chosen for this research were selected because they 
covered the different types of BMO (as described in Table 1). Between them, they 
covered (a) the different lobbying objectives, (b) the policy stages (except for the creation 
of new legislation), and (c) all the venues. They were consulted by the government, or 
succeeded in securing reform of public policy, or formalised their relationship with 
government. Furthermore, they provided a mix of size, of leadership experience, and of 
resources devoted to dialogue and advocacy. 
Two of the case studies are a subset of seven case study BMOs selected as part of a five-
year longitudinal impact assessment of BEST-AC. For that assessment, cases were selected 
on the basis of four ‘entry’ criteria (that is, features exhibited by all the case studies) and 
six ‘portfolio’ criteria (features exhibited by at least one of the selected cases). The entry 
criteria were: (i) the scale of the potential impact of advocacy projects underway at the 
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time of selection; (ii) prior effort to build their own capacity; (iii) evidence that they had 
already influenced public policy; and (iv) the likelihood of engagement with the case 
study process. The portfolio criteria were: (i) evidence of working in partnership with 
other BMOs or government; (ii) a concentration on a small number of sectors; (iii) 
different time periods; (iv) geographic diversification; (v) had been reviewed in an earlier 
evaluation (to give a historical perspective); and (vi) a mix of type of BMO. 
The research for the longitudinal impact assessment included interviews with the BMOs 
and others, the undertaking annually of an advocacy competence diagnostic assessment 
and a survey of around 50 of their members. The Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT) 
was chosen for the group of seven but, because they are primarily an apex for the 
agricultural centre, ACT suggested that members of Tanzania Horticulture Association 
(TAHA) be surveyed for the purpose of the LIA. As a result, TAHA was interviewed each 
year for the LIA as well. TAHA was also regarded as a better choice than ACT for this 
research since, as the case study explains, there is perceived to be a high level of 
corruption in agriculture generally (Cooksey 2011a) but horticulture has largely avoided 
this (correspondence Cooksey 2015, Sen 2015). By its nature, corruption is hard to spot. 
Whilst there is no evidence that ACT itself is implicated, and Lucas (1997) claims that 
corruption is unlikely to persist in a formal organisation such as a BMO, I was keen to 
review the approaches and progress of BMOs that relied on competence and to minimise 
the possibility that any actions by the case study BMOs involved corrupt practices. 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation is an apex with many other BMOs in membership. It 
might be expected to take the lead on ‘cross-cutting’ issues (cutting across the whole of 
the private sector), as opposed to issues which are clearly sectoral, and to support other 
BMOs through opening doors. It might be expected to lobby government with the 
intention of reforming policy and legislation. If it was in a developed country, it would be 
well resourced and have a professional policy and advocacy team. It is likely that the 
Government, assuming it wanted to consult at all, would see TPSF as a conduit to the 
private sector. The Tourism Confederation of Tanzania is an apex BMO representing a 
single – albeit important – sector of the economy. It might be expected to have a good 
relationship with the government departments and agencies responsible for supporting 
and promoting tourism and to make proposals to develop the sector. The Tanzania 
Horticultural Association is an association of businesses clustered in the north of the 
country. Horticulture is a major exporter and thus earner of foreign exchange. Therefore, 
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TAHA may seek to influence policy and legislation that affects its sector specifically and 
to work closely with other agricultural associations on wider agricultural policy. The case 
studies explore these expectations. 
One association was chosen from Kenya, partly to offer a comparison with Tanzania, and 
partly because their key venue during the period of the case study was Parliament with an 
objective to amend proposed legislation. However, they were also chosen because of a 
degree of serendipity, in that I was asked to do a policy position workshop with them in 
advance of the publication of an expected Mining Bill. In fact, the Mining Bill was 
published five days before the workshop and I was then able to follow their progress over 
the next two years as they lobbied to amend the bill. However, there are other reasons to 
include the Kenya Chamber of Mines (KCM). It is an association of businesses, but the 
mining business members are mainly inward investors and so are quite large. The sector is 
currently a small contributor to GDP but is anticipated to become much more important. 
So KCM might be expected to be well-resourced and able to lobby at all levels of 
government. On the face of it there appears to be a difference in the way that KCM was 
assessed but it was also assessed through regular meetings and through review of 
documentation, though over a shorter period. However, KCM was focused on only one 
issue during the period of the research. 
The study did not include associations of professionals and excluded organisations who 
work with private businesses and lobby on their behalf but do not have members and 
professional lobbyists of which, in fact, there are very few in Tanzania and Kenya. 
The case study BMOs were followed – through interviews with key personnel in each 
BMO, document reviews and interviews with informed observers such as public officials 
– over a number of years providing the opportunity to explore how each progressed and 
developed over time. The cases thus all offer the scope for longitudinal comparison. 
(Whilst it could not have been a factor in selection, in all four cases, the key people 
remained in post throughout the period of my research, meaning that any improvement 
was not simply due to a change of personnel.) 
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Table 2: Summary of case study BMOs 
 Tanzania Private 
Sector Foundation 
Tourism 
Confederation of 
Tanzania 
Tanzania 
Horticultural 
Association 
Kenya Chamber of 
Mines 
Type of 
BMO 
Mixed (covering 
most BMOs), but 
also with corporate 
members (largely 
inward investors) 
Apex, with only 
associations as 
members 
Businesses as 
members (and a mix 
of indigenous and 
ex-patriate) 
Businesses as 
members (including 
inward investors) 
Commenced 
operations 
1998 2002 2005 2000 
CEO 
appointed 
1998; 2007; 2012 2003 2009 2010; 2014; 2016 
Number of 
staff (policy) 
15 (3) 5 (0) 46 (3) 3 (1) 
Initiated by Development 
partners with tacit 
support of GoT 
Government of 
Tanzania 
Members Government of 
Kenya 
Reasons for 
selection 
Lobbied for all 
objectives 
Lobbied across all 
policy stages 
Lobbied across all 
venues 
Lobbied in 
contested areas 
Lobbied for all 
objectives 
Lobbied across all 
policy stages 
Lobbied Ministry 
and Agencies 
Lobbied in 
contested areas 
Lobbied for all 
objectives 
Lobbied across all 
policy stages 
Mainly lobbied 
Minister, Ministry 
and Agencies 
Regarded as free of 
corruption 
Focussed on 
lobbying to amend 
proposed legislation 
Lobbied at stage of 
policy formulation 
Lobbied across all 
venues but focus on 
lobbying Parliament 
 
1.6.3 Interviewee selection and interview approach 
I was fortunate in that I already knew many of the people working for BMOs in Kenya 
and Tanzania, largely because I had undertaken earlier evaluations of the work of BEST-
AC in 2006 and 2008 and because, as a result, I had become an adviser to BEST-AC on 
their overall approach and service offer. However, I had no role either in deciding 
whether individual BMOs should receive financial support or in advising individual BMOs 
on their approach to their advocacy and so our relationship was built on neither power 
nor dependence but rather on trust and respect. Moreover, as they saw that I was not 
abusing what they shared with me, appeared to trust me more and to share more. In the 
case of the Kenya Chamber of Mines, I did facilitate a policy workshop immediately after 
the draft bill was published, but the workshop design was such that options were 
explored together and then decisions were taken by participants, largely after the 
workshop had ended. I may have posed questions, and they may have stimulated thought 
amongst participants, but I did not offer solutions. Subsequent mentoring was provided 
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by a member of BAF staff and not me. I do not believe, therefore, that knowing the 
organisations and people resulted in them giving unreliable responses or giving the 
answers that they thought I wanted to hear; indeed, on the contrary, it meant that 
interviewees were more likely to give me honest answers. Moreover, wherever possible, 
answers were evidenced with written materials, including reports and minutes, many of 
which would not have been given to me if the interviewees did not know and trust me. 
This leaves open the possibility that I was myself biased towards people who appeared to 
listen to me. I do not believe that this was the case, but in any event, wherever possible 
triangulated what was said, not only through seeking documentary evidence, but also by 
interviewing informed observers as noted above. Since I knew the key people, it is 
perhaps arguable that I might pull my punches in the analysis but, given a desire to offer 
honest feedback to help the BMOs improve, there would have been little point in being 
less than honest.  
Interviewees in BMOs were generally either the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the 
Policy Director, though occasionally I also interviewed board members. The aim was to 
interview the people with the best overview of the BMO’s approach to advocacy. The 
BMOs were interviewed on at least an annual basis for a period of six years as part of a 
DFID funded longitudinal impact assessment (LIA) of BEST-AC. Those interviews were 
supplemented by interviewing other stakeholders, including other BMOs, Ministries and 
government agencies, development partners, non-governmental organisations, etc. 
Interviews were undertaken using a semi-structured approach. Interview protocols were 
prepared in advance. Detailed notes were taken during interviews and a meeting report 
written within a day of the interview to provide a record. In most cases, meeting notes 
were shared with the interviewees to allow them to comment and correct and thus 
ensure accuracy. Interviews were not recorded because it was felt that recording would 
make participants (in countries where levels of personal trust are low) warier about the 
information that they were willing to share and less open about their activities and their 
relationships. This aspect is also important as many people imply that they are already 
doing something when, in fact, they only have plans to do something. An experienced 
interviewer, however, can quickly spot when this is happening and encourage the 
interviewee to explain the plans and, importantly, separate the future from the 
completed.  
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This approach is supported by Stake (1995) who asserts that the exact words of an 
interviewee are not usually important, so there is no need to record. He recognises that 
audio recording can capture exactly what was said, but is not convinced that the 
“annoyance for both respondent and researcher” or the effort in transcription is 
worthwhile (1995: 56). Indeed, he recommends that, “rather than tape record or write 
furiously, it is better to listen, to take a few notes, to ask for clarification” (1995: 66) and 
then promptly to write a detailed meeting note. 
The advantage of visiting business associations annually (and, in some cases, more 
frequently) is that it is possible to review previous responses. This was important as there 
is a tendency in countries such as Kenya and Tanzania for interviewees to tell you what 
they think you want to hear. Being able to go back and re-question events, timings and 
outcomes made it much easier to pin down what actually happened as well as allowing 
an exploration of how organisations were enduring and developing. 
As far as possible, questions were asked in a non-leading, non-threatening way because 
that is the best way to achieve open, non-defensive responses. There is a danger in both 
evaluation and research of asking questions in such a way that the interviewees proffer 
answers that they think are wanted or expected by the interviewer, which is very 
common in sub-Saharan Africa. Care was taken, as far as possible, to eliminate such bias. 
In relation to factual responses, interviewees were asked for copies of minutes or 
research or policy papers to support their answers. The interviews with other stakeholders 
allowed for a degree of triangulation. 
I aimed to be non-judgemental, but subjects were aware of my experience, so often 
asked for feedback – indeed, that was part of the ‘contract’: they were happy to talk 
about their activities and their progress but they were looking for advice and guidance as 
well. It is likely that subjects would give broadly consistent answers to any researcher 
asking the same questions (but a priori knowledge made it much easier to ask probing 
and follow-up questions). 
The interviewees are listed in the appendices. There were 92 interviews with BMOs, of 
which 26 were with the three Tanzanian case study BMOs. In addition, there were 37 
interviews with public officials and 8 with other stakeholders. In Kenya, there were six 
interviews with KCM (as well as the initial workshop) and three interviews undertaken on 
my behalf by a colleague (using questions that I had prepared). 
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The only limitation in access was diary clashes; no one refused to talk or express a view. 
With those people who were being interviewed regularly, it became clear that they 
became more open as they became more confident in me and that I was not going to 
abuse their trust.  
The case study BMOs each reviewed their respective thesis chapters and, in all cases, 
additional questions have been asked to clarify dates and facts. I additionally revisited 
three of the BMOs after preparing the drafts (and after the end of the LIA). 
1.7 Ethics and confidentiality 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012: 95) outlined clear principles for research ethics largely 
intended to protect the interests of participants but also to ensure accuracy. These may 
be more important in some fields, such as medical research, than in others. The principles 
are reproduced in Table 3 with a note of how each has been addressed. 
Table 3: Research ethics 
Principle Met by 
Ensure no harm comes to participants The interviewees are used to dealing with interviewers. They are not 
vulnerable or young. Information sought is about the association or its 
relationships and not generally about individuals. The LIA associations 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the LIA research team and 
BEST-AC setting out roles and responsibilities of each party, including an 
undertaking by the researchers that certain information would be kept 
confidential or reported on a non-attributable basis. Participants quoted in 
this thesis were subsequently asked to consent to their inclusion and no 
one refused. 
Respect the dignity of participants 
Ensure fully informed consent of 
participants 
Protect the privacy of participants 
Ensure the confidentiality of research 
data 
Attributable data will only be published with the consent of the 
organisation. Draft chapters have been shared for comment and correction. 
Protect the anonymity of individuals 
and organisations 
The nature of the individuals and organisations is such that they do not wish 
to be anonymous. 
Be honest about the nature or aims of 
the research 
The business associations understood that research was being undertaken 
to explore their effectiveness and were always willing to co-operate. All the 
BMOs are aware that I am doing additional research for this thesis. 
Declare affiliations, funding sources 
and conflicts of interest 
The author has undertaken evaluations of BEST-AC and BMOs funded by 
DANIDA and DFID. There is no conflict of interest, however, since the 
research described here complements a much larger research project and 
DPs will be delighted if the research leads to more insights. 
Be honest and transparent in 
communications about the research 
I have been clear with the BMOs that I am writing up what I have learnt for 
my thesis and secured their co-operation. I have tried to give a complete 
picture of the BMOs and not glossed over the areas where they could 
perform more effectively. They appreciate this as it is another means of 
helping them to improve their effectiveness. 
Be honest and transparent in the 
reporting of research findings 
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1.8 Structure of thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and 
concludes by summarising a wide range of potential success factors. Chapter 3 describes 
the political context of Kenya and Tanzania and concludes that, whilst there are more 
constraints than in developed country democracies, interest groups are able to form 
freely and to secure access to policy makers. Chapters 4-7 cover the four case studies. In 
Chapter 8, I discuss the finding from the case studies, compare them to what might be 
expected from the literature. In Chapter 9, I draw conclusions, highlight my contributions 
and make suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2. The Black Box of the BMO 
2.1 Introduction 
A range of factors might contribute to the likelihood of a business membership 
organisation (BMO) successfully influencing public policy. Factors include, inter alia, (i) 
whether a BMO can access key policy makers, (ii) whether a BMO can provide evidence 
and persuasive argument, (iii) whether a BMO allies with others including government 
departments and agencies, (iv) the salience of the issue, (v) the level of contestation, and 
(vi) the strategies and tactics that the BMO adopts. Many of these are questions of 
competence and approach, so the first objective of this chapter is to review what is 
known about the competence and professionalism of BMOs. The second objective is to 
explore and set out the competences that might make a difference when BMOs seek to 
engage public policy makers to discuss – and potentially to influence – public policy. 
This chapter draws primarily on the academic literature, though occasionally supplements 
from the practitioner literature, to set out a theoretical framework which is used to 
examine the work of four BMOs described in the case studies. As explained in the 
introduction, academics have discussed extensively whether BMOs are ever successful in 
influencing public policy, though there are also researchers who have argued that interest 
groups – many authors do not differentiate between interest groups in general and 
business associations in particular – “wield significant influence” (Walker 1991: 7). Moran 
was more emphatic, claiming that business has “the potential to exercise overwhelming 
power” (2009: 4). Vogel (1996) and Wilson (2003), however, both argue that business is 
just another interest group without any power over government. As will be seen in 
Chapter Three, at least in Africa, close links often exist between the political elite and the 
business elite. However, it is because businesses generally lack serious power that they 
come together in business associations to “aggregate the collective power and interests 
of the private sector” (Heilman & Lucas 1997: 142). The political context in Kenya and 
Tanzania means that the private sector has no significant control over policy outcomes 
(see Chapter Three). 
If the private sector had enough power always to persuade policy makers, academics 
would not need to explore whether more competent associations were more successful. 
If, however, business associations lack the power of “control over political outcomes” 
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(Dür & de Briève 2007: 3), then the question about whether business membership 
organisations are ever successful is pertinent. Even for developed countries, Woll argues 
that one should not assume that business power dominates and instead should examine 
interdependence – especially the idea that both government and business are pulling in 
the same direction (2007: 157). The question about what determines that success is also 
critical. Sometimes, businesses create associations with prompting from the government, 
because the government needs a representative organisation with whom they can 
consult (Walker 1983) often for reasons of legitimacy but also because they genuinely 
want to hear a private sector view. Furthermore, politicians and officials sometimes lack 
information and seek support from interest groups (Beyers et al. 2008) to bolster their 
position and to produce better public policy. 
One possible reason is that the state collaborates closely with a small number of business 
associations with privileged access, perhaps in a corporatist arrangement. Binderkrantz 
explains, however, that much of the interest group theory has relied on a pluralist 
assumption in which the best political outcomes arise from group conflict (2014: 528) 
and thus that policy makers would be well-served by listening to different views. It is then 
possible that government selects the option that satisfies its own objectives and uses 
selected interest group views to justify its decision; alternatively, it accepts the views of 
those it considers persuasive and acts accordingly. This dichotomy then poses questions 
about the groups to which government should listen and whether it should limit the 
number of groups to which it listens. 
Smith (1990) explains that pluralists do not necessarily consider that all interest groups, 
including BMOs, can access the policy process and, indeed, recognises that some interest 
groups will not only form close relationships with government agencies but also will then 
tend to exclude other groups. To some extent, the relationships may become 
institutionalised with government consulting specific groups and business representatives 
obtaining privileged access to government (Walker 1991). Smith (1990) describes this 
approach as reformed pluralism. Others, such as Wilson (2003) and Moran (2009), 
proffer similar arguments. In consolidated democracies, the large number of interest 
groups makes it almost inevitable that not all groups can secure access; in the countries 
of East Africa, there are relatively few groups, though amongst business associations there 
is a wide diversity which allows for more plurality. 
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Smith argues that “whether a policy area is pluralistic is an empirical rather than an 
ontological matter and can only be considered by examining the context in which 
pressure groups operate” (1990: 322). Whilst some people in government in Kenya and 
Tanzania would like to restrict their relationships to one or two apex organisations, in fact, 
both are willing to talk to a large number of organisations and so appear predominantly 
pluralist, a view supported by Goldsmith (2002). There is scope for new organisations to 
emerge at any time and start to lobby. Lobbying, in consolidated democracies, implies a 
relationship in which the target audience is not yet convinced of the need for an 
alternative approach (Woll 2012), though in Africa it tends to imply face to face 
interaction (int. Mkindi 2011b, int. Simbeye 2015). Since there are good reasons for the 
public sector to involve the private sector in policy discussions, both public and private 
sectors seek to engage in what is known as public-private dialogue, which implies a 
consensual, collaborative approach. Moreover, it seems that interest groups who pursue 
an insider strategy are likely to have better access, are more likely to be consulted and so 
are more likely to be able to influence policy than outsider groups (Page 1999: 206). 
Hall & Deardoff (2006) expect that associations will be asked by policy makers to offer 
evidence and argument, and that occurs in East Africa, implying that associations need to 
be competent to do so successfully. The case studies will explore BMO competences and 
demonstrate that, at least occasionally, BMOs can influence public policy. 
In Chapter One, it was postulated that there are four major factors that affect the 
likelihood of a BMO being successful in its advocacy – one external: the willingness of 
the public sector to act in response to third party lobbying, and three internal: the 
capability of the BMO to engage in dialogue and advocacy, the operational competence 
of the BMO and the availability of resources. Understanding the venues and mechanisms 
for dialogue and the strategies and tactics adopted by BMOs to influence policy makers is 
important, but the strategies and tactics depend on the BMO’s competences. The three 
internal determinants, all aspects of competence, have not been studied in detail and only 
briefly considered by practitioners. 
It is necessary to define competence, since the concept is not used consistently by all 
researchers.  The next section explores the competences, and the mechanisms employed 
by BMOs as they seek to engage with policy makers. I commence the section with a brief 
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review of possible characteristics, identified by practitioners and academics and then 
explore the role of BMOs in communicating information and opinion to policy makers. 
I then examine in more depth the competences necessary to choose the strategies that 
can be employed by BMOs, to build relationships, to prepare evidence and 
argumentation, to form alliances, to mobilise resources and to engage in public-private 
dialogue. The chapter concludes with a conceptual framework outlining three prime 
areas of competence – evidence, engagement and expression – to be considered further 
in the case studies that follow. 
2.1.1 Defining competence 
Before I discuss competence and professionalism, and other terms such as capacity and 
capability that occur in both the competence and interest group literature, we need to be 
clear what those terms mean. 
Walters (2007) defines capacity as the ability to perform and quotes the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee which states “capacity development involves much 
more than enhancing the knowledge and skills of individuals. It depends crucially on the 
quality of the organisations in which they work.” (OECD 2006: 3). The original continues: 
“capacity is not only about skills and procedures; it is also about incentives and 
governance”. Together, this implies that not only is there a need for knowledgeable and 
able people but also that there is an organisational structure that supports them, implying 
that the organisation itself needs to be professional. Lester (2014) uses the word 
competence, instead of capacity, and defines it as the ability to do, which is almost 
identical to Walters’ ability to perform. However, Lester explains that competent people 
will undertake tasks, delivering to an expected standard and will apply their knowledge 
and skills to achieve intended results. This implies that failing to achieve could imply that 
the person is not competent, without consideration of whether the failure is due to 
something outside the person’s control. Lester (2014) also describes capability which he 
sees combining judgement, ethical practice and self-efficacy. Capability, in Lester’s 
definition, thus suggests that a person knows what to do as well as how to do it, which 
encompasses more than competence as defined above. 
Mulder (2014) explains that competence is the ability to apply knowledge and skills at a 
specified level of independence and autonomy, which echoes Lester’s description of 
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capability. Mulder explains that professionals are competent when they act responsibly 
and effectively and are able to deliver an effective performance. He suggests that 
competence combines capability, behaviour and accomplishment. This definition seems 
consistent with Lester’s definition of capability, except that Lester would have said that 
capability combines competence, behaviour and achievement. 
Professionalism is rather harder to pin down. It is often used to describe the behaviour of 
professionals, that is, members of a specified profession. The Association for Project 
Management defines professionalism as “the application of expert and specialised 
knowledge within a specific field and the acceptance of standards relating to that 
profession” (http://iga.fyi/professionalism). This relates professionalism back to 
competence, confirmed by Brown & Ferrill (2009) who describe professionalism as 
comprising three domains of individual performance related to competence, connection 
and character. 
I intend to use the word competence to describe an individual’s ability to know what to 
do and their ability to do it. A professional organisation is then an organisation that 
provides appropriate organisational structure and support for specialists. 
Professionalisation is thus defined as the process of becoming professional. Capacity is 
only used when citing other authors and generally implies a combination of ability (that is, 
competence) and resource. Grønhaug and Nordhaug (1992) call this capability and 
describe how organisations must make strategic choices to match their capabilities to a 
constantly changing external environment. They argue that strategy is how organisations 
deploy their resources most effectively and that this is inextricably linked to their 
competences, which they observe is required to choose, implement and coordinate all 
their activities. Strategy and competence are therefore closely linked and, moreover, the 
ability to think strategically is itself an important competence. 
Despite the references in the literature to professionalism and competence, our 
understanding of BMO competence is currently limited. In claiming this, however, I urge 
a note of caution. Competence is not a holy grail and there is no assumption that meeting 
a single set of characteristics (Hollenbeck et al. 2006) will confer success. Furthermore, 
there is recognition that more of one competence may make up for lack of another. 
Nevertheless, the intention of this chapter is to explore elements of BMO competence 
that have been identified as possibly important, to tease out what is meant by 
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professionalism or competence, to note possible elements of competence that 
apparently have not been addressed by previous research and to consider how they 
might fit together to create a professional organisation. 
2.2 Competences of business associations 
Whilst there is apparently little discussion in the interest group literature on what it means 
to be competent, researchers do draw attention to the importance of competence. For 
example, Gallai et al. (2015) say some scholars have focused on capacity and 
competence as key determinants affecting influence, though without detailing the specific 
competences that might make a difference. Bernhagen et al. say much the same, 
suggesting that the political success of interest groups depends on “their capacity to 
provide helpful information” (2015: 570). Beyers & Hanegraaff (2016) argue that it is 
important to understand the characteristics and features that explain the interactions of 
non-state advocates and policy makers – and then attempt to explain the interactions by 
looking at the advocacy strategies that they adopt, which they divide into cooperative 
and confrontational, rather than looking more rigorously at all aspects of how they work. 
Doner and Schneider (2000) claim that business associations can make significant 
economic contributions. However, the necessary institutional strength needed to perform 
positive economic functions is rare. They further argue that there is little information 
about their basic organisational attributes but that three factors – high membership 
density, extensive selective benefits and effective internal interest mediation – are what 
builds real capacity. 
None of these researchers begin to specify the competences that they think are 
necessary. Bräutigam et al. (2002) make some effort to be specific and say that, inter alia, 
the capacity of interest groups to “engage the state in technical policy discussions” is one 
of their most important characteristics (2002: 522). This implies, though they do not 
specify, several competences: building relationships, securing access and preparing 
evidence to have a sensible dialogue on the issues. They also use the word ‘technical’, 
though it appears to be in the sense of being able to have detailed discussions rather than 
suggesting discussions are limited to more technical as opposed to political issues. 
Wilts & Quittkat state that “representing business interests in an increasingly complex 
system of public decision making requires the development of professional skills” (2004: 
397), that is, competence, though they give few clues about the nature of the necessary 
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skills. However, a complex system of public decision making suggests a need to 
understand both the process and the topic in some detail; being able to represent 
business implies an ability to communicate effectively and persuasively. 
Before exploring competence in detail, it may be helpful to examine generally the efforts 
of interest groups to influence policy and the broader factors impacting on their success. 
The second half of the 20th century saw seminal work on interest groups, their role in the 
political landscape, and their attempts to influence public policy (see, for example, 
Truman 1951, Dahl 1961, Olson 1971, Berry 1977, Lindblom 1977, Walker 1983). That 
did not stop Schmitter and Streeck (1999) from suggesting that the efforts of business 
interest groups had attracted little attention from academics. They claimed that reliable 
information about business interest groups was rare and that explanations of whether 
and, if so, how they affect policy was even rarer (1999: 9).  
The early 2000s saw a growth in interest group research but, still, Beyers et al. (2008) 
observed that interest group scholars tended to focus on the process of group formation 
and neglected interest group interaction with government and the influence of interest 
groups on policy (2008: 1105). Klüver asserted that “interest groups have so far been 
largely treated as black boxes without any attention to their internal configuration” (2012: 
505). Having set up the challenge, Klüver & Saurugger (2013) then aimed to open the 
black box and explore the professionalisation of interest groups in the European Union. 
They recognised that not all groups are the same and, quoting Stewart (1958: 25), 
differentiated ‘cause’ groups and ‘sectional’ groups, such as business associations. They 
argued that to create more efficient groups, it was necessary to professionalise and that 
that interest groups must act professionally to secure access and to represent their 
interests effectively. (Klüver & Saurugger 2013). They went on to explain that their 
definition of professionalism referred to the hiring of professionals (or specialists) whose 
competences have been certified by a specific profession (such as lawyers or 
economists), a high level of qualification in terms of educational training and relevant 
working experience. 
Whilst employing lawyers and economists allows organisations to apply certain expertise, 
employing them does not alone make an organisation professional. To be professional, 
they need to be competent in their profession and they need to know how to apply what 
they know in preparing evidence and argument. Klüver & Saurugger recognised that their 
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definition was partial and did not include the social process by which an occupation is 
transformed into a profession, but they justified their partiality by their desire to analyse 
the degree of professionalisation and not the process of professionalisation.  
It is not clear, however, how counting qualifications and staff numbers indicates whether 
an organisation is professional or, indeed, whether the staff are competent. Qualifications 
do not equal competence. A professionalised interest group is characterised by the way 
that it behaves rather than by the education level of its staff. Klüver & Saurugger (2013) 
explained that professional groups lobby institutions (instead of engaging in more 
contentious behaviour), organise conferences, undertake expert studies and build up 
formal and informal networks. These are activities rather than competences, though they 
require competence and, indeed, the case studies that follow will highlight the 
importance of gathering evidence and building relationships. There appears then to be a 
considerable gap in our knowledge of what makes an interest group competent. I am 
particularly interested in the competence of business associations, a subset of interest 
groups, and it is this gap that this thesis addresses. 
BMOs who wish to influence policy, intuitively, need to choose an engagement strategy, 
to frame clearly one or more issues, to prepare evidence and argumentation, to access 
policy makers, and to persuade policy makers to introduce or reform policy or maintain 
the status quo or monitor implementation. This implies that they need to be politically 
astute, to understand how the policy process operates, to have good inter-personal and 
communication skills, to be able to gather and use research and technical information, 
and to be good negotiators. They also need at least some level of resource. Studies of 
interest groups in the US and EU implicitly take these competences for granted, often 
using large-N surveys to seek more intangible mechanisms like access to explain interest 
group activity. 
There is no blueprint for the range of competences required of BMOs for them to be 
considered professional. However, Maloney et al. (1994: 23) quote Rose (1985) who 
identified three factors he thought important: (i) the ability to organise members such that 
the organisations could legitimately represent their demands (for example, in relation to 
policy reform); (ii) the commitment of members to the group (for example, exemplified 
by member retention) allowing the leaders to speak confidently on behalf of their 
members; and (iii) the control of resources needed by society (for example, the potential 
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for investment and job creation), which confers a degree of leverage. The first of these 
sounds like a competence; the second confers legitimacy, but is not a competence. The 
third implies the need for a competence, that is, the ability to secure the necessary 
resources. This is an interesting list, however, because it says nothing about the ability to 
undertake research and prepare a compelling argument, I would argue both necessary to 
influence policy makers. 
Maloney et al. (1994) quote May & Nugent (1982: 7) to suggest four characteristics of 
interest groups that have achieved a degree of success: (i) the perception of whether the 
goals of the interest group were moderate or radical and the extent to which they fitted 
with the goals pursued by policy makers (suggesting that the closer the group is to 
supporting the government’s underlying policy imperative, the more likely that their 
demands will be met); (ii) the strategic power of the group (effectively, its ability to hold a 
government to ransom); (iii) the nature of the membership (how much of the sector they 
represent and how unified the members are); and (iv) the way in which the group is 
organised. Although they are not explicit, these observations imply a need for 
competence in recruiting, retaining and involving members and in being able to develop 
a sufficient relationship with policy makers to be able to assess how to match interest 
group goals with public policy goals. Policy makers are often under pressure to ‘do 
something’, so BMOs that understand and accept the policy imperative, and then 
propose reforms to minimise the burden on business rather than fighting the proposal 
completely, can find that they are more successful. 
Different researchers focus on different characteristics including the need for members 
(Gray & Lowery 1996), the need to offer selective benefits, that is, benefits that are only 
obtainable by virtue of being a member, (Olson 1971, Moe 1980), the need for resources 
(Walker 1983) and the need for access to the policy making process (Binderkrantz & 
Pedersen 2016). Lutabingwa & Gray (1997) specifically note the importance both of 
developing relationships with policy makers and of technical competence. 
It is not clear, however, how important these are in African countries. There is a need for 
members. Not only does membership confer credibility – being able to say that an 
association represents 80 or 90 per cent of a sector makes a big difference to the 
legitimacy of an association – but also the wider the association’s representation, the 
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more likely it is to support policies that will be good for the economy rather than 
narrower, rent-seeking1 goals (Bräutigam et al.  2002).  
Olson (1971) argued that businesses will only join associations to secure selective 
benefits, that associations need members for credibility and, therefore, associations have 
to offer selective benefits though, as noted in Chapter 1, he understood that this might 
not apply to smaller organisations. In Africa, many associations see the offer of selective 
benefits not as a way to attract members per se but as a way to generate resources, often 
without sufficient thought about whether services will generate any surplus. There is a 
need for resources, but these rarely come through offering selective benefits. There are 
examples of associations in African countries offering services such as workspace, 
training, accreditation and joint marketing, but this tends not to be the norm, and even 
fewer of them generate enough of a surplus to cover the costs of advocacy. The Tanzania 
Horticultural Association (Chapter 6) is one of the few business associations that has 
been able to set up a profitable service. For many associations, businesses join simply to 
support the association’s efforts to advocate policy reform. Furthermore, many 
associations operate with minimal resources.  
Klüver (2012a) suggests a number of characteristics that help interest groups to be more 
effective: a decentralised decision-making structure which enables them to respond 
quickly to new policy initiatives; functional differentiation allowing staff to focus on 
specific policy fields in which they become specialists and members of policy 
communities, enabling them to find out early about new policy developments and to 
develop expert knowledge; and a high degree of professionalisation making it “much 
easier to provide information to decision makers than interest groups that largely rely on 
untrained volunteers” (2012a: 505). This characterisation seems to suggest polar 
opposites – either you provide information in a professional way or you rely on 
volunteers who have no expertise. Few associations, at least in African countries, rely 
solely on volunteers. Many associations have policy committees comprised of member 
representatives and aim to give them some training. They also learn through experience. 
Moreover, the volunteers are usually people running their own business. They may be on 
                                                 
1 Rent-seeking occurs when an individual or organisation uses a resource to secure economic gain without reciprocating benefits to 
society through wealth creation. More specifically in relation to this thesis, Henderson (iga.fyi/rents, accessed 1 May 2018) explains 
that people are said to seek rents when they seek to obtain benefits through the political arena, typically by securing a subsidy for a 
good they produce or for being in a particular class of people, or by getting a tariff on a good they produce, or by securing a regulation 
that hampers their competitors. 
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the board of the BMO, and usually they will go with a member of staff to meet policy 
makers, but crucially they provide an authentic voice (int. Mkindi 2013). It is not clear 
why a decentralised decision-making structure allows faster response: this implies that 
staff can take decisions without reference, say, to the CEO or a policy committee. 
However, mechanisms also need to be in place to ensure that the association does 
genuinely reflect the consensus view of the members, which requires more than 
decentralised decision making. Functional differentiation may stimulate the development 
of sectoral expertise but may also mean that some issues pass by unnoticed, if they are 
not anyone’s responsibility. The consequence, then, is that these three characteristics, at 
least in the African context, do not offer an adequate definition of professionalisation.  
In their later effort to open the black box, Klüver & Saurugger (2013) suggest that 
different definitions of professionalisation float through the literature. They quote, inter 
alia, Zald and McCarthy (1987[1994]: 375) who defined professionalised associations as  
entities characterised by (a) a leadership that devotes full time to the 
association with a large proportion of resources originating outside the 
constituency the group claims to represent, (b) a very small or non-existent 
membership base or chapter membership where membership implies little 
more than allowing the use of one’s name upon membership rolls, (c) an 
attempt to represent or to speak in the name of a potential constituency 
and (d) attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency.  
Zald and McCarthy, however, were examining social movement organisations and, whilst 
this definition may be reasonable for interest groups in general, it is not a good 
description of business associations. Business associations would certainly expect to have 
members and the more they represent a defined sector, the more legitimate they appear. 
More to the point, however, it does not actually explain the competences or capabilities 
perceived to be required for associations to be successful. Interestingly, McCarthy and 
Zald later observed that “the need for skills in lobbying, accounting and fund-raising leads 
to professionalism” (1997: 1234). I would argue that this description still does not go far 
enough, but it is a step towards defining professionalism. 
Klüver & Saurugger (2013) also quote Jordan & Maloney’s (1997) and Maloney’s (2008) 
claims that professionalised groups are those that are bureaucratically organised and 
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staffed by lobbyists, scientists, lawyers and communication experts. However, Maloney’s 
original writing refers to “protest business-type organisations, i.e., professionalised, 
bureaucratic, interest groups staffed by lobbyists, scientists and public relations…” (2008: 
71). In other words, the professionalisation is in addition to the other characteristics rather 
than the other characteristics defining professionalisation. 
To expand further their description of professionalism, Klüver & Saurugger (2013) quote 
McGrath (2005) who they say suggests four criteria that characterise professionalisation: 
membership of professional organisations, adherence to professional norms, a body of 
knowledge and technical skills acquired through training. However, McGrath (2005) is 
referring to the characteristics of any professional person in a recognised profession, 
rather than to the organisation itself and so, once again, Klüver & Saurugger fail to give a 
convincing description of professionalisation. 
Jordan & Maloney suggest two thoughts not identified by Klüver & Saurugger: that the 
group should be seeking to influence policy relating to a restricted range of issues and 
that members should be individuals (2007: 28) though they recognise the difficulty of 
distinguishing between individual and business in very small businesses. The first of these 
points is important. Empirically, those associations who prioritise a small number of issues 
are more likely to make headway than those with too many competing demands. This 
implies that effective associations are able to weigh up priorities and focus on those with 
the greatest chance of success. Jordan & Maloney (2007) see type and number of 
members as important because it demonstrates support and provides resources. 
Mahoney (2008) says that the characteristics of an advocate, in general, affect their 
chances of lobbying success – and then suggests that the key characteristics are financial 
resources (for which level of staff is a proxy), membership size and organisational 
structure (that is whether direct membership or federation etc.). Firstly, these are 
institutional characteristics rather than individual characteristics; secondly, having 
resources, recruiting members and defining organisational structure are not 
competences, though they imply the need for competences, such as the ability to attract 
resources (if not from subscriptions, then from services and sponsorship); the ability to 
recruit members (implying skills in marketing); and the ability to create an effective and 
supportive organisational structure. Consequently, Mahoney’s characterisation, as it 
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stands, is unlikely to help a business association develop specific skills or give clues to 
those organisations set up to support business associations develop advocacy skills. 
Baumgartner led a major research project in the US, which looked generally at interest 
groups, and which culminated in the publication in 2009 of Lobbying & policy change. 
Baumgartner et al. (2009) identified four factors which they think explain what they 
perceive to be their most important and most surprising findings, though their focus is on 
consolidated democracies and consolidating democracies may be different:  
 Lobbying is about changing existing public policies: at first glance, this does not look 
especially insightful, since the point of lobbying is to reform public policy or, as they 
observe, seeking to maintain the status quo; the key word here is ‘existing’ – their 
point is that interest groups on the whole do not lobby for policies in areas where 
none exist and, by implication, do not lobby to influence proposals for new policies, 
though in countries such as Tanzania and Kenya, often BMOs do lobby for new 
policies and do so successfully (Irwin & Githinji 2016). 
 Policies are complex, with multiple and contradictory effects on diverse 
constituencies: this would appear to be true, not least because the public sector is 
rarely good at looking for ‘unforeseen consequences’. 
 The "sides" that mobilise to protect or to change the status quo tend to be quite 
heterogeneous: at least amongst business associations, that would also appear to be 
true, because different sectors are represented separately so that even an apex body 
such as the Tourism Confederation of Tanzania is representing associations ranging 
from hotels through tour operators to hunters.   
 Attention in Washington is scarce: it is not clear how well this translates to African 
countries. Rather, it seems that policy makers are keen for input from associations 
and, indeed, many constitutions now require consultation with the private sector). 
Despite a by-line of “who wins, who loses and why”, the study does not look in any real 
detail at the part of the “why” to do with characteristics, knowledge, experience and 
competence. However, these findings do begin to hint at several strategic choices facing 
BMOs. Should they focus their attention on existing policy or rather focus on areas 
without any policy? Baumgartner et al. (2009) tell us that changing the status quo is hard; 
Varone et al. (2017) go further saying that advocates of substantial policy change face the 
problem of attracting attention from policy makers. If one regards the absence of 
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legislation as the status quo, then BMOs might not bother. However, often BMOs in 
developing countries perceive that they will benefit from formulating policies in areas 
where none exist. Policies are, indeed, complex, but effective BMOs focus on narrow 
areas that will make a difference to business and frame the issues as simply as they can. 
“Sides” are not always obvious, and when they are, they may pit private sector against 
private sector – for example, importers versus manufacturers – so securing agreement 
across BMOs can lead to more constructive dialogue with the public sector. These are all 
aspects of strategy and so, in the next sections which look at other aspects of 
competence touched on by academics, I start with strategy. 
It seems, then, that many researchers recognise the need for competence without being 
clear about the nature of the competences required. Given this apparent lacuna in the 
academic literature, it is appropriate to broaden the search to organisations that have 
attempted to conceptualise this beyond academia. One organisation that has considered 
this aspect is the World Bank. They argue that, to be effective, business associations must 
have sufficient capacity to advocate on behalf of their members (2005a: 25), which I take 
to mean both the availability of people and the technical skill of those people, they must 
have proper governance arrangements (2005a: 23) and must deliver appropriate services 
and information to their members (2005a: 25). One might immediately question what is 
meant by effective. However, the World Bank is one of few organisations that has 
attempted systematically to describe the characteristics of business associations – and has 
then gone further to describe stages of development (see Error! Reference source not 
found.).  
Table 4: World Bank view of phases of development of business associations 
P
h
a
se
 
Club 
 
Small secretariat 
 
Professional 
secretariat 
 
Knowledge supplier 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 
 Forum for 
networking 
 No or limited 
staff 
 No organisational 
structure 
 Managed by 
board members 
 Networking and 
advocacy 
 Few trained staff 
members 
 Efforts in membership 
recruitment, but not 
retention 
 Lack of resources 
and experience 
 Several services & 
advocacy 
 Capable and larger 
secretariat 
 Diversified 
membership base 
 Recognised partner 
for government 
 Active in all 
important areas 
 Professional experts 
 Can set the agenda 
for discussions  
 High reputation 
and influence 
Source: World Bank (2005a: 55) 
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They suggest that associations progress through four phases: starting as a ‘club’, before 
progressing to employing a ‘small secretariat’, and then to a ‘professional secretariat’ and 
then becoming a ‘knowledge provider’. They characterise an organisation at each of 
these stages, combining competences such as ability to network and advocate, or to set 
the agenda with other determinants such resources, recognition and number of staff. 
This characterisation was based on empirical evidence gathered by the Confederation of 
Danish Industries (Danish Industries, undated: 4), with no reference to the interest group 
literature or the competence literature and no real justification beyond an assessment of a 
small sample of business associations. It is thus easy to be critical of its conclusions. For 
example, a small secretariat can be very professional with considerable experience in 
dialogue and advocacy and can be effective. A large secretariat allows for more 
specialisation but, unless it is competent and well-managed, it does not make an 
association more effective. Recognition by government (fourth point under professional 
secretariat) or high reputation are recognition of status rather than competences. The 
relevance of diversified membership (third bullet point under professional secretariat) is 
not clear – and is not a competence. Being ‘active in all important areas’ (first point under 
knowledge supplier) means little if it does not achieve anything. In any event, being 
‘active’ describes behaviour as opposed to being ‘professional’ which describes skill and 
approach. Being able to ‘set the agenda’ (third point under knowledge supplier) is not 
solely in the hands of the association, though it is an important capability. 
Despite its lack of rigour, this approach is quite thought-provoking, implying that there are 
stages of development and that associations that are strategic can progress through them. 
Moreover, understanding the features of each stage and thus being able to assess the 
stage reached by an association would help in preparing an organisational development 
plan to raise the effectiveness of the organisation as a policy influencer. 
One author in particular, Bettcher (2011), who works for the US based Centre for 
International Private Enterprise and crosses the academic/practitioner divide, has 
attempted to set out the skills needed by business groups to advocate effectively – such 
as analysis, communications, planning and resource allocation – and thoughts on what 
associations need to do to be effective, including promoting market solutions, deriving 
recommendations from member input, utilising good research and framing messages 
carefully to demonstrate public benefit. Bettcher does not attempt, however, to describe 
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stages of development and omits some of the competences that might be regarded as 
key to advocacy success, such as argumentation and relationship-building.  
2.2.1 Strategies of BMOs 
The purpose of private sector advocacy is to ensure that government understands how its 
actions impact on the private sector and to encourage government to act in a way that 
improves the enabling environment. The starting point for a BMO wanting to influence 
public policy is to think about its strategy to access and influence policy makers. It is not 
always clear how much time BMOs in Africa devote to planning their advocacy; often it 
appears ad hoc. However, being able to make an informed choice, to think strategically 
and to deploy the BMO’s competences is a core competence. 
Associations engaging in policy advocacy tend to choose between two broad advocacy 
strategies: working “inside” government – seeking directly to influence officials and 
politicians – or “outside” government – essentially through mobilising public opinion 
(Walker 1991: 103). Walker poses a pertinent question: “what are the principal factors in 
the organisational structure and environment of interest groups that determine their 
operational priorities?” (1991: 104). Walker says that the first priority is to develop a 
strategy to ensure that the group continues to exist. He suggests that the character of a 
group’s membership is a factor in determining the strategy “because the members 
determine the goals of the association” (1991: 105). Whilst technically this is true, in 
reality, key individuals, be they staff or board members, drive the organisation forward 
and aim to take the members with them. Dür & Mateo (2013) suggest that the choice of 
strategy depends on group type, with BMOs being more likely to pursue an insider 
strategy and citizen groups and professional associations being more likely to pursue an 
outsider strategy. Empirical evidence, at least in African countries, suggests that BMOs 
and professional associations tend towards insider strategies but do not wholly rule out 
outsider tactics from time to time. Furthermore, Ansell et al. (2017) claim that 
collaborative policy making leads to better policy and effective policy implementation. 
The alternative to collaboration is confrontation but this is more likely to be an outsider 
strategy. 
Jones and Villar (2008) note that some authors claim that politics trumps research but, 
nevertheless, argue that interest groups need research evidence to support their 
advocacy. Keck and Sikkink (1998), in their work researching transnational advocacy 
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networks, concluded that interest groups can be good sources of information which can 
raise awareness and help to reframe debate. Jones and Villar build on this to argue the 
importance of “evidence-based policy influence” (2008: 31). The need for evidence, and 
its use in preparing effective arguments, is reviewed further below. 
There is a tendency, at least in African countries, to use the word advocacy to describe all 
attempts to influence policy and to use the word lobbying to describe face to face 
communication (Smith 2010, int. Mkindi 2011b, int. Simbeye 2015). In consolidated 
democracies, the words advocacy and lobbying are often used interchangeably though, 
taking a normative stance, Mahoney (2007) says that she prefers the word ‘advocacy’ 
because of the negative connotations of the word ‘lobbying’ in the US and EU. Indeed, 
the press tends to refer to lobbying in a negative way (Murse 2018) and, even in African 
countries, there is a tendency for the press to use the word lobbying when they disagree 
with the activity. Leech uses the terms interchangeably though confesses that the “most 
narrow definition of lobbying focuses on direct contacts of legislators by interest group 
representatives” (2010: 535). So, the argument is that advocacy is broad and lobbying is 
narrow, but neither is specifically insider or outsider. 
The options of collaboration and confrontation are not dichotomous but a continuum – 
and the insider approach implies a predominantly collaborative approach. Efforts to lobby 
policy makers using outsider strategies are not necessarily confrontational and not all 
insider strategies are necessarily collaborative – and policy makers sometimes want 
pressure. 
Thinking about evidence versus interests is also problematic. It implies that groups 
choose one or the other though effective arguments are likely to embrace both evidence 
and narrative. Interest groups do sometimes fall back on arguments like fairness, without 
providing evidence to shore up their position. It is the case that some corporates – 
particularly those well connected to the political elite – will engage in special pleading 
because they are rent-seeking or looking for protection from foreign competition or 
subsidies for inputs. But it is not always the case. However, there are occasions when 
interest groups feel that they have to indulge in direct action, just to grab the attention of 
politicians. They might resort to this approach for several reasons. They may find that they 
are getting nowhere with their evidence-based arguments. There may be no common 
understanding of the evidence. They may not trust the evidence that is available. They 
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may not have evidence. They may not like the evidence or prefer not to use it because it 
does not support their argument. 
In some instances, the choice of strategy will be determined by the political environment, 
that is, the arrangements and precedents which allow for the structured interaction of 
interest groups and government (Kitschelt 1986). For technical issues, it may be enough 
to influence a government agency or a department within a Ministry; for more political 
issues, it may be necessary to influence the Minister or a government committee (as will 
become apparent in the case studies). Lutabingwa & Gray note that, to be effective, 
interest groups have to understand the broad policy environment and the policy making 
process, including a need to understand the power relationships (1997: 44). 
These are examples of insider strategies and groups that have access tend to adopt such a 
strategy. Maloney et al. (1994) suggest that interest groups with non-controversial 
proposals are more likely to advance them through insider strategies though also claim 
that the state only accepts as insiders groups with which it is predisposed to agree (ibid: 
22). This view is supported by Baumgartner et al. (2009) who suggest that an important 
factor in securing access is the degree of support an organisation already enjoys among 
policy makers, implying that organisations whose views correlate will gain greater access. 
Perhaps confusing cause and effect, Page (1999) suggests that interest groups that pursue 
an insider strategy are likely to have better access, are more likely to be consulted and so 
are more likely to be able to influence policy than outsider groups. So, one way of 
assessing the competence and experience of business associations might be through 
examining their strategic approach, as Beyers & Hanegraaff (2016) suggest, but that is 
likely only to offer a partial picture. The case studies develop this point. 
Berry (1977, quoted in Baumgartner & Leech 1998: 162) suggests that interest groups use 
four different strategic approaches: 
 law, including litigation and administrative interventions;  
 confrontation, including protests, whistle-blowing, releasing research results and 
public relations; 
 information, including such tactics as releasing research results, engaging in public 
relations campaigns, presenting to government decision makers; and 
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 constituency influence, including such tactics as letter-writing campaigns, publicising 
voting records, and making campaign contributions 
These is, however, a critical approach that is completely missing. Resorting to the courts, 
protesting and constituency influence all imply a degree of confrontation; the provision of 
information sounds collaborative. But policy makers need more than information: they 
need specific and precise proposals for policy reform and, importantly, they need sound 
arguments for adopting those proposals. So, an important strategic approach is one 
predicated on collaboration to reform policy or the way in which policy is implemented. 
Indeed, Ansell et al. (2017) argue not only that collaboration will lead to better 
understanding of the problem but also more innovative policy solutions and thus more 
successful implementation. A strategic approach, closely related to collaboration, but 
missing from Berry’s list is dialogue: the concept of a conversation in which both parties 
seek to understand the needs of the other and look for suitable compromise. Dialogue is 
considered in more detail later in this chapter. 
Having decided on a strategy, BMOs need to think about the specific activities and 
tactics that they will employ. These will, to some extent, be determined by the overall 
approach. Baumgartner et al. observe that groups “use a wide variety of lobbying tactics” 
(1998: 147) and that the choice depends on the context, but that this “has seldom been 
the focus of systematic study” (1998: 147). Dür (2008), too, suggests that there has been 
little research into which interest group strategies maximise influence. 
Lowery & Gray (2004) criticise Baumgartner et al. (1998: 166) for saying that the choice 
“depends [on the environment]” yet clearly it makes sense for a business association to 
choose its tactics carefully. Indeed, Baumgartner et al. make the same point, asserting that 
“all survey researchers agree that the external political context is an important 
determinant of interest group decision making, and yet surveys it seems do not 
systematically collect information about that context” (ibid). 
Irrespective of whether an interest group has access, it may be a stakeholder in an issue. 
This can be used to advantage. Some academics turn to stakeholder theory to explain the 
relationships between organisations and “those individuals, groups and other 
organisations who have an interest in the activities of [the] organisation and who have an 
ability to influence it” (Savage et al. 1961: 61). In this case, it is the BMOs that are 
stakeholders of government. 
42 | P A G E  
Mitchell et al. (1997) consider the extent to which stakeholders exhibit attributes of 
power, legitimacy and urgency. They consider how legitimacy (in this case, the ability 
genuinely to represent a sector) and power (the ability to get one’s own way irrespective 
of resistance) combine to create authority (1997: 866). This leads one to wonder whether 
authority is an attribute of effective business associations. In fact, associations have little 
power over governments (Vogel 1983, Vogel 1996). It is true that multi-national 
businesses can up sticks and move but for most businesses that is not easy or even 
possible, though they can choose not to invest further, with consequences for job 
creation and tax revenue. Consequently, businesses have to make up for it through 
legitimacy: ensuring that they formally represent a large proportion of the sector and 
achieve a high level of credibility through undertaking thorough and unbiased research 
and preparing compelling policy positions. BMOs can improve their legitimacy by 
networking closely, communicating similar messages and forming coalitions. I come back 
to this aspect in the case studies. Mitchell et al. define urgency to combine time-sensitivity 
and criticality. This reflects TAHA’s approach as will be seen in their case study. 
Page observes that insider groups with privileged access are routinely consulted – on a 
wide range of topics and at an early stage – and suggests that their views have a much 
better chance of affecting policy making than those of outsiders (1999: 206). Page 
expects insiders to have frequent contacts with at least one Ministry. Such contacts give 
access to thinking and early notice of new proposals as well as allowing them to give 
feedback at an early stage. Indeed, they may even be able to influence policy before the 
debate becomes public. Page certainly expects insider groups to exert at least some 
influence. Early contact is not a competence, but the ability to build the relationships and 
provide the information that secures privileged access is. Before turning to look at 
relationships and access, it is worth exploring concepts of dialogue, not least since it is the 
approach favoured and promoted by many of the development partners (Herzberg & 
Wright 2006, Herzberg & Sisombat 2016). 
2.2.2 Dialogue 
Arguably, the most effective approach to influencing public policy is dialogue. Dialogue is 
different to deliberation, in which people come together to devise solutions to specified 
problems (Sanders 1997). Elstub, too, explains that deliberation is more specific than just 
a dialogue or conversation (2015: 102). The World Bank utilises a similar definition: 
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Public-private dialogue refers to the structured interaction between the 
public and private sectors in promoting the right conditions for private 
sector development, improvements to the business climate, and poverty 
reduction. It is about stakeholders coming together to define and analyse 
problems, discuss and agree specific reforms, and then working together to 
ensure that these ideas become a reality (2009: 5). 
This begins to sound like a process of “deliberate, negotiate and bargain” between policy 
makers and selected groups, described by Christiansen et al.  (2018) and which they 
argue characterises a corporatist system.  
On the basis that dialogue is not about deliberation, let alone bargaining, the implication 
is that the political systems in African countries are rather more pluralist than corporatist. 
This conclusion reflects Schmitter’s description of a pluralist system as one in which 
constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, 
voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined 
categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created 
or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the 
state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity 
within their respective categories (1974: 96). 
and that in a corporatist system of interest representation, 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state 
and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of 
leaders and articulation of demands and supports (1974: 93-94). 
On the whole, however, African countries typically have a multiplicity of independent 
and voluntary organised actors, with some overlap of groups, and are thus more pluralist 
in nature (Schneider 1985, Goldsmith 2002). 
Participating in dialogue, sharing relevant information succinctly, eliciting intelligence, 
making persuasive arguments and sharing opinion requires considerable competence. 
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Partners in a genuine dialogue will work hard to understand the position from which the 
other is coming and will tend to look for solutions that satisfy all parties. Anderson et al. 
(2017) claim that the culture of dialogue is underdeveloped in Tanzania. They blame this 
on the “dominance of the top-down approach in families, education and society” (2017: 
61). However, as the case studies will show, some BMOs have been able to dialogue 
effectively.  
The challenge in a more pluralist system, for both interest groups and the public sector, is 
developing relationships which make it easier for both parties to communicate effectively. 
Lobbying implies that a BMO already knows the solution and is appealing to the public 
sector to adopt that solution. Dialogue is different in that it is more like a conversation. It 
assumes that each party wants to learn and understand the views of the other, rather than 
one party trying to persuade the other round to its point of view. It is about sharing facts 
and opinion. It is about exploring the likely implications of a course of action. Public 
policy, or proposed policy, may well be revised as a result. Assessing the party that takes 
the initiative to start a dialogue can tell us something about credibility and legitimacy and 
we will return to this in the case studies. 
Many countries have put in place formal arrangements to promote dialogue. Herzberg 
and Wright (2005) call these mechanisms “competitiveness partnerships”. They stress that 
communication is vital for private sector development and claim that Governments that 
listen to the private sector are more likely to design credible reforms, while businesses 
who understand what their government is trying to achieve with a programme of reforms 
are more likely to accept and support them. 
Doner (2011) stresses the importance of dialogue and consultation in helping 
organisations to gather information and intelligence about other organisations 
preferences in relation to particular issues. Majone, too, stresses the importance of 
debate and argument over influence and bargaining in arriving at moral judgements and 
policy choices (1989: 2) – implying the need both to prepare persuasive argument and 
then to engage in debate and discussion.  
2.2.3 Relationships & access  
Having concluded that researching influence is difficult (Dür & de Bièvre 2007), 
researchers have tended towards examining access (Binderkrantz & Pederson 2016). 
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Indeed, BMOs can only engage in dialogue if they have access to policy makers. Once a 
BMO has decided to follow an insider strategy and, in effect, committed to dialogue, it 
needs policy makers to whom to talk and who are willing to listen. Those people need to 
be interested, or can be persuaded to be interested, in the issue. Identifying appropriate 
people and engaging with them in a meaningful way requires considerable competence if 
the engagement is to lead to a long-term relationship. Page (1999) has questioned 
whether interest groups ever gain attention; Beyers and Braun (2014) have noted the 
challenge for interest groups even to get a foot in the door with government. In both 
cases, they are looking at the challenges facing BMOs in developed countries. BMOs in 
Kenya and Tanzania do not generally perceive access to be a problem, at least if the 
BMO is credible, and, as explained in the next chapter, dialogue is encouraged by 
government. Baumgartner et al. (2009), say that lobbying requires long-term commitment 
or, in other words, persistence. Persistence is certainly needed in Kenya and Tanzania, 
but more around moving policy makers to a particular point of view than around access. 
Walker suggested that business leaders may get privileged access to government and so 
prefer to operate inside government and out of the public view (1991: 124), though this 
poses the question of whether they secure access by virtue of being business leaders or 
by earning it through demonstrating credibility and competence. Vogel (1996) quotes 
Lindblom’s argument that policy makers are pro-business because of BMOs’ access to 
resources but also because corporate leaders have privileged access. It may be that they 
are granted access because of recognition that the private sector creates jobs and wealth 
and that governments want, indeed need, businesses to be successful. Many business 
associations choose a low visibility strategy perhaps because they do not need to seek 
publicity for their actions but, at least sometimes, because they do not wish to alert others 
to their activities. 
Intuitively, it seems likely that BMOs will only secure access to policy makers if it is 
perceived by both parties to be advantageous. Indeed, many researchers argue that there 
is a resource exchange mechanism – and thus a theory to explain public agency/ interest 
group interaction – in that public agencies need policy goods – technical expertise, 
research information, political support, legitimacy, support in implementing policy – and 
interest groups need access to policy makers (Poppelaars 2007, Braun 2012, Beyers & 
Braun 2014). Dür & Mateo (2012) argue that business associations’ ability to provide 
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information and expertise should confer access to political institutions that need these 
resources. Furthermore, Braun (2012) argues that the main predictor of access is the level 
of policy goods offered to policy makers. 
Maloney et al. (1994) suggest that policy makers are likely to look for groups who can 
help in policy formulation. The consequence is that legislators and policy makers turn to 
interest groups for opinions, data and analysis. Truman believed that the ability of an 
interest group to supply policy makers with information is ‘one important factor among 
the informal determinants for access’ (1951: 334). However, policy makers have limited 
time to gather the information that they require and to meet with interest groups. 
Consequently, Braun (2013) argues that public officials will work with selected interest 
groups based on the quality of their policy information. BMOs, therefore, need to 
understand what information could be of use to the policy makers and then ensure that 
they are able to provide it. The ability to provide information, expertise and opinion hints 
at several competences required of BMOs, including the ability to collate evidence and 
prepare persuasive argument. 
Fraussen (2013) suggests that policy makers benefit from interacting with interest groups 
through securing support for particular causes or constituencies (implying that it is the 
politicians who primarily benefit from the exchange) or that it is to secure backing from a 
respected or credible group for a particular policy proposal and thus gain some 
legitimacy (again implying that it is the politicians who benefit). However, whilst interest 
groups do target Ministers and Parliamentarians, often their targets are public officials 
who are drafting policies and advising Ministers.  
If BMOs are particularly helpful, it is easy to see that public servants will develop a 
positive relationship with them and then be proactive in consulting them. However, 
consultation has as much to do with exclusion and bias as it has with inclusion and 
balance (Maloney et al. 1994: 19). Fraussen (2013) suggests that recognising certain 
interest groups is a form of patronage which legitimises the interest group and may help it 
attract members and additional resources. He also notes, however, that interest groups 
need enough members, resources and well-educated staff to fulfil their role effectively. 
So, BMOs need to be able to attract members, to secure resources and to think about the 
skills required of the people whom they recruit. 
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It is argued that policy makers do not have time to form relationships with all the interest 
groups who might have a view on a particular topic so many groups will never get direct 
access (Beyers & Braun 2014). In the US and EU, with their thousands of interest groups, 
this is clearly true. However, in countries like Kenya and Tanzania where there are far 
fewer interest groups than in the US or Europe, this is less likely to be the case. 
Nevertheless, policy makers in Kenya and Tanzania do not want to waste their time 
either, so will be reluctant to form relationships with interest groups that do not offer 
them something worthwhile. 
This raises a question about what will happen when an interest group does not provide 
information of sufficient quality and, indeed, Braun (2013) observes that this scenario 
ought to lead to interest groups being dropped. However, she argues that this reaction is 
often over-ridden by two logics: of “habitual” behaviour (that is, because they have 
always had a relationship) and of “anticipatory” behaviour (that is, in case they are useful 
in the future). If these logics are always evident, it might suggest that becoming one of the 
select few is difficult but that once a group has broken through it is relatively easy to 
maintain a relationship. There is some support for this in the observation that policy 
making is “biased towards some powerful interest groups whereas others are largely 
ignored” (Klüver 2012b: 1130). However, power does not just derive from size or the 
ability to threaten the economy. Writing about developed countries, Berry & Wilcox 
(2015) suggest that concerns about the role of interest groups have come about because 
of their increased involvement in elections. In sub-Saharan Africa, interest groups not only 
lack the resources to influence elections but also do not try. Arguably, therefore, they 
have no real power, except that derived from their ability to provide independent and 
comprehensive research evidence and persuasive argument, to be perceived as credible 
and professional, and to represent a specific interest, which probably reflects the position 
of most interest groups in developed countries as well. But it also suggests that BMOs 
need always to be thinking about the next big issues. Indeed, Klüver (2012a) argues that 
interest groups need to organise themselves in such a way that they are abreast, even 
ahead, of public sector thinking and are able to respond quickly to a need for 
information. 
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Policy makers in Kenya and Tanzania will meet with groups that can make a case. There 
is, however, a strong case for BMOs to engage with policy makers regularly, irrespective 
of whether there is a specific issue to discuss (Kohler-Koch et al. 2017). 
Dialogue in an institutional context may have a positive outcome but developing a 
relationship with key individuals – champions (people from both public and private 
sectors who invest in the process and drive it forward) – can make a real difference 
(PublicPrivateDialogue 2006). As Baumgartner et al. (2009) observe, this may need to be 
nurtured over a long period and through a variety of interactions to build mutual respect, 
trustworthiness and credibility. 
2.2.4 Evidence and argumentation 
For Lucas, the most important factor for a BMO is “its command over information” (1997: 
75). Thomas and Klimovich (2014), in their research of interest groups in Latin America, 
note the importance of gathering and providing information, perhaps in the form of 
reports, and raising awareness through media relations – which they ally closely with the 
importance of close contacts and networks. Having collated good evidence, the BMO 
then needs to analyse it and prepare effective arguments. Careful framing is the start of 
effective argument for a different approach to solve or address a particular issue. Being 
able to frame a problem and a solution are core competences for BMOs. Baumgartner et 
al. (2009), only partly in jest, say that ‘framing’ is the political science word for spin. 
However, they admit that careful framing can have huge impacts on policy outcomes. 
This view is widely shared. Framing an issue clearly and simply can indeed make a 
difference to the way in which it is perceived by government (Mahoney 2008, 
Baumgartner & Mahoney 2008, Klüver et al. 2015). 
Entman (1993) explains that framing involves selection and salience, that is, the selection 
of some aspects of an issue and then making them more salient through appropriate 
communication which promotes a problem definition, a causal interpretation, a moral 
evaluation and a recommendation to solve the issue (1993: 52). De Bruckyer reminds us 
that this definition aligns with the idea of advocacy as a communication process (2016: 
3), which is probably true in the US and the EU, but Heilman & Lucas (1997) remind us 
that, too often, influence in Africa is based on personal contact and bribery. 
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Jones & Villar (2008) suggest that there are two requirements to influence policy: the 
quality of the evidence and the political context. Specifically, they suggest that careful 
framing provides a shared definition of an issue and quote Keck & Sikkink (1998) who 
suggest that framing problems carefully can make their solution come to appear 
inevitable. Whilst business associations in Africa and their governments may argue about 
legislation and regulation, they have a common objective in that both want the private 
sector to create more wealth, to create more jobs and to generate more tax revenue 
which is consistent with a perception by the state of the private sector as the engine of 
growth (ITUC 2014). 
Even where an issue is not particularly contentious, it can be examined in different ways. 
For example, the Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (TATO) was keen to persuade 
the Government of Tanzania to establish a tourism division within the Police. Their 
consultant reviewed the legislation and proposed that TATO seek to persuade the 
Government (and Parliament) to make dozens of amendments to the legislation; 
however, they reframed the issue as one of reinterpretation. This strategy and a visit to 
the Inspector General of Police was enough to encourage him to go ahead (int. Remen 
2013, Citizen 2018) without any legislative amendments. 
Having framed the issue, it is necessary to set out the evidence and formulate an 
argument, but this will in turn depend on the approach to be adopted. Deciding whether 
to accept a policy imperative, or whether to seek reform based on minimising the 
potential imposition on business, can make a difference. Opposing ‘political’ or 
contentious issues can be difficult; focusing on ‘technical’ aspects or turning problems 
into technical issues can make them easier to address (Truman 1951, Michalowitz 2007) 
and gives an increased chance of success (Dür 2008).  
There is considerable emphasis in the literature on the quality of information (Braun 2012, 
Klüver 2012a) and the difficulty often faced by policy makers in accessing good 
information (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Indeed, Hall & Deardoff (2006) argue that 
lobbying is a form of ‘legislative subsidy’ in which interest groups effectively subsidise 
policy makers who might be considered allies but need more evidence and perhaps more 
persuasive arguments. Whilst policy makers in Africa generally need good evidence, for 
many issues they do not have a position; even when they do, the legislative subsidy 
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argument assumes that interest groups are able to identify ‘friendly’ policy makers before 
proposals have become law. 
Baumgartner et al. (2009) take a different approach and argue that there is rarely a 
scarcity of information, but rather that there is too much, such that policy makers feel 
overwhelmed. Interest groups can help them to separate the essential from the general 
morass (Berry 1997). Although plausible in the US, it is arguably much less likely to be the 
case in developing countries, where information can be hard to obtain at all (Beguy 
2016). Arguably, therefore, research by BMOs is more important in developing countries. 
Policy makers are often as short of resources to commission research as the interest 
groups, so the ability to provide appropriate, objective and comprehensive evidence will 
likely open doors. 
There seems to be less consideration of the quality of argument, that is, how the evidence 
is marshalled to make a compelling case though Beyers stresses that “argumentation is at 
the heart of interest group politics” (2008: 1194). Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) claim 
that those who are most effective at marshalling their evidence into a clear argument are 
more likely in the long term to be successful than those who do not. 
Whilst they agree that the way in which evidence is presented is of great importance – 
saying it must be accessible, relevant, timely and independent – they claim that legislators 
are looking for more: they want researchers to “narrate a compelling story with practical 
policy recommendations” (2011: vi). This may require a degree of compromise. Woll 
(2012) observes that being constructive is likely to achieve more than arguments based 
on threats or pressure. Policy makers in Africa may have one eye on what they think the 
President would do, but they also appreciate a collaborative style of dialogue (int. 
Rugimbana 2010, MNRT/TCT 2010, Mussa 2011, int. Remen 2015). 
On the basis that much advocacy involves reaching out to potential allies, Beyers & 
Hanegraaf (2016) argue that advocacy efforts are more collaborative than 
confrontational. This could be interpreted as meaning that there is less need to rely on 
evidence and argument and that it is only necessary to express support. Many 
researchers, however, endorse the view of Klüver (2012a) that providing policy makers 
with well-researched evidence is a sine qua non for effective lobbying. In the US and 
Europe, policy makers often work closely with interest groups specifically to acquire 
evidence that supports their policy proposals (Klüver 2012a). Baumgartner et al. (2009) 
   
P A G E  | 51 
implicitly accept the legislative subsidy argument of Hall & Deardoff when they argue that 
interest groups can make a big difference by ensuring that they are able to provide good 
information that policy makers might otherwise find difficult or costly to access. 
Policy proposals need evidence, good analysis and compelling arguments to influence 
policy makers (see, for example, Lutabingwa & Gray 1997). In Africa, often interest 
groups find that they are fighting rearguard actions following a decision to adopt a new 
law or a new policy. However, as the case studies demonstrate, efforts focused on 
technical issues (Michalowitz 2007) are more likely to be successful. Braun (2012) 
suggests that business interests have more success than other interest groups in 
influencing rules and regulations, though it is unclear whether the reason is that business 
interests focus on these issues more or whether they are better at making the arguments. 
2.2.5 Other tactics 
Other tactics adopted by interest groups in developed countries include the creation of 
coalitions and, indeed, some researchers have examined whether alliances contribute to 
the success. Forming coalitions and alliances requires engagement competences. 
Baumgartner et al. (2009) note that, at least in the USA, alliances of business associations 
and policy makers often share policy goals. Such allies are a valuable resource. Policy 
makers and organised interests frequently work in tandem to advocate policy goals that 
they both share. Each can do things that the other cannot: officials within government can 
set agendas, meet with colleagues, and so on. Baumgartner et al. (2009) suggest that 
organised interests outside government may have more staff time, the ability to do 
research, and the luxury of working on just one or two issues at a time. They also observe 
that interest groups that would not normally be allies may collaborate because each holds 
a resource lacked by the other. 
Allying with others offers a low-cost mechanism to bring together diverse interests 
(Whitford 2003). It seems that coalitions secure greater access (Beyers & Braun 2014). 
Sorurbaksh (2016) suggests that coalitions are more influential than interest groups acting 
on their own. However, he then complicates the picture by suggesting that interest 
groups have to be competitive, cut-throat and shrewd to survive. This suggests a western 
view in which there are many interest groups and only the best survive, perhaps by 
working in a specific niche; in African countries, there tend to be far fewer and they tend 
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not to be competing for members, though they may on occasion be competing for the 
policy outcome. Not all are convinced, however, that coalitions are worthwhile 
(Mahoney & Baumgartner 2004, Grossman & Dominguez 2009), though this could be 
because their research does not isolate the impact of salience (which perhaps brings the 
alliance together) and the impact of alliances in less controversial issues. Alliances not 
only unite BMOs, but also unite a BMO with a government agency which shares the 
same goal: indeed, Baumgartner et al. (2009) found government officials who, far from 
being neutral, were collaborating with others sharing similar views, and actively 
advocating their shared position. 
2.2.6 Mobilising resources 
One feature examined by academics, to some extent, is that of resources (see for 
example Salisbury 1969, Baumgartner et al. 2009) and how they find enough. Olson 
(1971) argued that associations had to offer selective benefits to attract and retain 
members – who then pay subscriptions. This may be true in the US and EU but seems to 
be less true in African countries, where businesses often want to collaborate to share 
problems, to feel reassured because they are not alone and to have an organisation to 
represent them both individually and collectively. 
In the US, there is considerable money in the system: it is estimated that interest groups 
spend about $2 billion every year lobbying the federal government (Leech et al. 2007) 
and about $500 million every two-year election cycle in campaign contributions. This 
raises the question whether it is the groups with the most money who have the most 
influence. The answer seems, on the whole, to be no (Leech et al. 2007: 25). This is just as 
well because, in African countries, the resources available to business associations are 
very limited. Based on my interviews and discussions with BEST-AC, I estimate that the 
amount of money spent on advocacy annually in Tanzania is miniscule, even in relation 
to their GDP, probably no more than $3-4m. Heilman & Lucas (1997) noted that 
associations are dependent on donors for their funding and that is still largely true. 
Even in the US, Baumgartner et al. (2009) observe that there is a low correlation between 
monetary resources and policy outcomes. Mahoney, too, admits that empirical evidence 
does not demonstrate a clear relationship between resources and lobbying success 
(2007: 54). However, Baumgartner et al. (2009) suggest that resources help policy 
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advocates gain a better understanding of the political environment and the knowledge 
community in which they operate. 
In Africa, BMOs find it hard to attract members willing to pay a decent level of 
subscription – and subscription income rarely covers their budget. It is interesting, then, 
that Baumgartner and Leech note that subscriptions paid by members, at least in the US, 
are usually only a small part of a membership organisation’s total income (1998: 32) as 
well. Schmitter and Streeck (1999) claim that public authorities sometimes provide funds 
to business associations. Saurugger (2008: 1276) goes further arguing that the state 
should support interest groups which lack the resources to participate and to provide 
knowledge and expertise to policy makers. 
The challenge for BMOs is sustaining themselves beyond an initial desire for action – 
businesses get the benefit of regulatory improvement, irrespective of whether they are a 
member – so BMOs offer selective benefits. This can be beneficial, provided businesses 
join and pay subscriptions. Some associations, in particular associations of professionals, 
have been able to persuade businesses or individuals that membership is a pre-requisite 
to trade which forces them to join and to pay subscriptions. Many BMOs additionally 
seek to raise funding through sponsorship, for example from BEST-AC or from the 
Business Advocacy Fund, and thus need sufficient competence to be able to make a case 
for funding as well as to be able to prepare budgets. 
2.2.7 Leadership 
It is noteworthy that leadership is rarely mentioned as a core competence and, to be fair, 
is not specifically an advocacy competence. But for a BMO whose primary purpose is to 
represent its members, it might be regarded as essential. Kuada (2010) claims that there 
seems to be little research on leadership in Africa. More recently Galperin et al. (2017: 
241) have argued that effective leadership is critical for the growth of Africa, implying that 
it is not yet there. Both Kenya (Senaji & Galperin 2017) and Tanzania (Melyoki & Galperin 
2017) are described as being collectivist, that is, collaborative. However, Kuada (2010) 
argues that leadership is generally weak with a tendency to “supervise” employees (tell 
them what to do), rather than to “motivate” employees (empower them to take decisions 
for themselves). A consequence is that many employees limit the risk by not taking the 
initiative. James (2008) asserts that leaders in Africa, irrespective of whether they work in 
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business, government or civil society, fail to rise to the challenges: in particular, that they 
have too many demands on their time (presumably as a result of taking decisions for 
everybody else) and the corollary that the culture generally reflects the ‘big man’ model. 
Leadership styles tend to be consistent with communal traits rather than with the more 
individualistic traits found in developed countries (Galperin et al. 2017) and conflicts are 
generally resolved through compromise and negotiation (Melyoki & Galperin 2017). 
Senaji and Galperin, discussing Kenya (but equally applicable to Tanzania), suggest that 
visionary leadership can be effective because people are free to innovate, experiment 
and take calculated risks (2017: 121) but observe that it does not occur in what they have 
observed. This implies that a BMO led by someone who can empower the staff is likely to 
achieve much more than one where the decisions are centralised. 
2.3 Summary 
The review of the literature suggests that researchers – beyond a general recognition of 
the need for competence and professionalism – have limited ideas of the specific 
competences (and mechanisms) that are more likely to lead BMOs to successful 
conclusions when they aim to influence public policy. This research gap is important 
since it is difficult to draw conclusions about whether interest groups are successful if the 
research is based solely on access and results. Researchers stress that results depend on 
context – that is true – but they also depend on the approach and competence of the 
BMO. Bernhagen et al. (2014) concur with my identification of this gap when they say 
that effectiveness is probably the least adequately researched aspect of interest groups. 
My original assertion, as set out in chapter 1, was advocacy competence, organisational 
management competence and ability to attract resources are the three crucial 
competences required by BMOs. Later work (Irwin 2015) split the advocacy competence 
into two, separating the ideas that building and maintaining relationships was just as 
important as the advocacy related skills of research, policy preparation and influencing. 
The literature suggests that these could be split further and that a number of determinants 
are important. Moreover, many of these are reflected in what the BMOs themselves see 
as important. BMOs need to be able to identify issues and they need to gather enough 
evidence and prepare persuasive enough arguments to be able to offer something new to 
policy makers. They need access to policy makers – outsider strategies may pressurise 
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policy makers but do little to change what they think – but changing the way that policy 
makers view an issue, and encouraging them to act, requires research evidence and 
cogent argument and the opportunity to discuss with the most appropriate policy makers. 
So they also need an understanding of the venues and mechanisms through which to 
engage in dialogue. In reality, there is a need not only for suitable mechanisms but also 
for BMOs to engage with MDAs over an extended period, forming relationships, getting 
to know each other and understanding each other’s imperatives, and being able to 
separate the business relationship from the personal relationship. Moreover, BMOs need 
to be able to communicate effectively – to express their arguments persuasively – and, 
where there are potentially competing interests, to compromise and speak with a single 
voice if they do not wish the public sector to prise them apart. 
The individual competences identified by researchers and practitioners are summarised in 
detail in Table 5. Some argue that advocacy is all about communication. Communication, 
like competence, covers a broad range. In an initial attempt to focus on what I surmise 
are the crucial competences, I have grouped these competences into four broad areas of 
evidence (what you say), expression (how you say it), engagement (to whom you say it) 
and leadership and governance (of the organisation). Whilst one element of engagement 
– access – has been researched extensively, other aspects of engagement, such as 
dialogue, developing relationships and sharing knowledge have had less attention. 
Table 5: Summary of possible determinants & supporting evidence 
 Determinant Literature reference 
Evidence  
 Compile evidence (that is, collate, analyse and synthesise appropriate evidence) 
  Good at gathering 'intelligence'… Maloney et al. 1994, Dür & Mateo 2012, Walker 1983, 
Streeck & Schmitter 1985, Baumgartner et al. 2009, 
Bouwen 2002, Poppelaars 2007, Braun 2012, Beyers & 
Braun 2014 
  Able to identify, commission or 
undertake relevant research 
“Only the facts count” (Berry 1997) 
Detailed knowledge, including history of the issue and the 
arguments of opponents (Baumgartner et al. 2009) 
Resource exchange relationship (Bouwen 2002, 
Poppelaars 2007, Eising 2007, Beyers & Braun 2007) 
Ahead of public sector thinking (Klüver 2012) 
Quality of information (Braun 2012, Klüver 2012) 
  Analysis Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993 
 Frame issues (that is, effectively explain a problem, ideally in such a way as to imply a solution) 
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  Able to frame issue appropriately 
and succinctly 
(Links to evidence) 
Turn problems into issues (Berry 1997) 
Detailed knowledge, including history of the issue and the 
arguments of opponents (Baumgartner et al. 2009) 
Framing (Beyers 2008, Klüver 2012, Klüver et al. 2015) 
Engagement  
 Connect (that is, identify key people and persuade that have something to offer) 
  Access Access to policy makers (Walker 1996) 
Insider strategy (Page 1999) 
Access goods (Bouwen 2002) 
Policy goods (Beyers & Braun 2014) 
Can be a challenge (Beyers & Braun 2014) 
  Coalitions & alliances Bring together diverse interests (Whitford 2003) 
Secure greater access (Beyers & Braun 2014) 
More influential (Sorurbaksh 2016) 
  Collaboration (linked to dialogue) Leads to better understanding of issue, improved policy 
solution and more effective implementation (Ansell et al. 
2017) 
  Champions Make a difference (Herzberg & Wright 2006) 
Need to be nurtured (Baumgartner et al. 2009) 
Engage in regular contact (Kohler-Koch et al. 2017) 
 Develop relationships (that is, build and maintain relationships with key people from public and 
private sectors) 
  Members Determine the goals (Walker 1991) 
Recruit, retain, involve (Maloney et al. 1994, Bettcher 
2011, Fraussen 2013) 
Organise the members (Lutabingwa & Gray 1997) 
  Networking Develop and nurture personal relationships and 
organisational alliances (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Beyers 
& Braun 2014) 
 Share knowledge (that is recognise that everyone is stronger when they have access to more 
information) 
  Pro-active sharer of information, 
knowledge & policy ideas 
Maloney et al. 1994, Dür & Mateo 2012, Walker 1983, 
Baumgartner et al. 2009, Bouwen 2002, Poppelaars 2007, 
Braun 2012, Beyers & Braun 2014 
Timely, relevant and independent information to policy 
makers (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Datta & Jones 2011) 
Expression & communication  
 Advocate (that is, choose the most appropriate means to influence and then pursue it) 
  Understand the political 
environment & policy process 
Political expertise 
Lutabingwa & Gray 1997, Mahoney 2008 
 
Beyers et al. 2008 
  Professional staff 
Capable staff with specialist 
functions 
Klüver & Saurugger 2013 
Klüver 2012, Fraussen 2013 
  Regular user of wide range of 
advocacy tools/ tactics/ strategies 
Advocacy strategies adopted (Dür 2008) and range of 
advocacy tools used (Baumgartner & Leech 1998) 
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Technical expertise (Beyers et al. 2008) including research 
skills, analysis skills, issue framing, communication skills, 
involving members in policy formulation (Bettcher 2011) 
  Effective communicator Raise awareness (Berry 1997) 
Bettcher 2011 
  Persistence Commitment (Berry 2000) 
Baumgartner et al. 2009 
 Argument (that is, construct effective arguments based on the evidence, the problem and the 
desired solution) 
  Able to prepare compelling policy 
positions; persuasive 
Argumentation & strategy (Beyers 2008, Woll 2012) 
Take different approaches for different audiences (Datta & 
Jones 2011) 
 Dialogue (that is, engage in discussion in such a way that all parties can share views and improve 
understanding) 
  Able to set the agenda with 
government 
Jones & Villar 2008, World Bank 2005a 
  Important to mutual understanding Herzberg & Wright 2006 
Governance & management  
 Leadership & management (that is, leading and managing the organisation effectively) 
  Think strategically Grønhaug and Nordhaug (1992) 
  Accountable to members Governance (World Bank 2005a) 
  Project management skills Technical expertise (Beyers et al. 2008) 
 Resource mobilisation (that is, attracting the resources necessary to undertake the desire activities) 
  Can secure resources Properly resourced (Walker 1983, Dür & de Briève 2007, 
Dür 2008, Mahoney 2008, Beyers & Braun 2014) 
  Provide services to members Exchange of benefits: leadership and members (Salisbury 
1969) 
Selective benefits (Olson 1971) 
Credibility  
  Recognised by government as 
credible partner 
The priority (Berry 1997) 
Credibility (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Fraussen 2013) 
  Good reputation & effective 
influencer 
Profile (Beyers et al. 2008) 
  Diversified membership base, 
representing most of sector, with 
good retention 
Not a political party and not part of the state (Halpin & 
Jordan 2012) 
Membership organisation (Gray & Lowery 1996, Jordan & 
Maloney 2007, Mahoney 2008) 
 
BMOs need to be able to marshal the evidence to frame the issue, taking the evidence 
and expressing it in a way that implies an obvious solution, and to develop a persuasive 
argument rooted in the evidence. Framing and argument both require competence in 
research (or in the analysis and synthesis of research undertaken by others) and 
expression. 
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BMOs need to engage – which requires the co-operation of their target audiences – 
which requires the ability and confidence to forge and maintain contacts, to build 
networks, to develop alliances, etc. One way of maintaining networks within the public 
sector is to share information and knowledge when the opportunity arises. Sharing 
knowledge combines the gathering of evidence with engaging people who might like to 
receive that evidence. 
Effective access is not solely about the opportunity to put one’s arguments directly to 
policy makers: it embraces working with and through others, including, for example, 
making use of champions, creating alliances and engaging with actors which are not part 
of the public sector. 
One area of engagement, though it also falls into expression, is especially important: 
dialogue. Indeed, it is not so much the internal configuration of BMOs but rather the 
mechanisms of public-private dialogue that is the black box though dialogue is promoted 
and praised by the practitioner literature. Engaging in dialogue is perhaps the ultimate 
insider approach and, as Fisker (2015) observes, being an insider confers legitimacy and 
credibility with members and BMOs: it signals to members that the group is important in 
the policy process. 
If a BMO can pull together good evidence, engage with appropriate people and express 
its arguments well, it will be seen by government as credible – even if it is not always 
successful. Being credible will increase its access and will increase the likelihood of it 
being consulted by government. Credibility is not a competence but derives from being 
competent and is central to securing access and being consulted on a regular basis. It is 
important that associations are seen to be credible or, at least, that they do not lack 
credibility. BMOs need to be credible to deliver their objective of influencing public 
policy (Baumgartner et al 2009, Fraussen 2013), though Chapman and Fisher (1999) note 
that this may come from the transfer of practical experience to the policy arena, 
grassroots support, or being involved in alliances and networks. Credibility is closely 
linked to legitimacy. Legitimacy is increased by, for example, being able to represent a 
significant number of businesses in a sector or a significant proportion of the sales value 
in a sector (Mahoney 2007, Fisker 2015); credibility may come from having been 
effective previously or having built a reputation for thorough research.  
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It might be expected that good leadership would make a difference to effectiveness 
ensuring that, like an orchestra, the BMO is working in harmony. Yet, like governance and 
management, it is largely over-looked in the literature. It might be surmised, for example, 
and the case studies will bear this out, that the role of some individuals, such as CEO or 
chair, is crucial in aspects such as building relationships, prioritising issues, and setting the 
overall strategy. The literature on interest groups in developed countries does not, on the 
whole, look at the role of individuals but rather at the impact of the interest group as a 
whole. The case studies, however, touch on the role of key individuals. 
There seem to be some other areas that are also over-looked. One is whether, and if so 
how, staff engaging in policy issues and advocacy are trained and developed. Orsini et al. 
(1996) stress the need to build capacity. So a further competence required by BMO 
leaders is the ability to recognise weaknesses in themselves and their teams and to 
engage in personal development. Leaders need also to be able to motivate their staff. 
Another gap is succession planning, though the case studies do not suggest that BMOs 
are any better at this in developing countries. My wider research amongst BMOs in 
Tanzania and Kenya suggests that there may be some additional competences, including 
the ability to balance competing arguments, to compromise and to use the media 
effectively. It may be, however, that these competences are all less important. Many of 
these depend on the competence of individuals. 
Setting out initial thoughts about likely competences raises a question about whether the 
competences are equally important. Given that most researchers only touch on one or 
two competences, or fall back on the assertion that interest groups must be professional, 
the literature does not give any clues. My prior research suggests that, whilst a minimum 
level of competence is required before a BMO can make any difference, it is the building 
of effective relationships that has the most impact (Irwin 2015). Specifically, it seems that 
BMOs need to achieve a minimum level of advocacy competence to be seen as a 
credible partner. But once that has been achieved, developing relationships with key 
people makes a greater contribution to achieving results (Irwin 2015: 203). Intuitively, it 
seems likely that some competences will be less important. Associations can be influential 
without, for example, forming alliances or without finding champions. Nevertheless, 
framing an issue, developing persuasive argumentation, building relationships and 
engaging in dialogue are all essential requirements. Leadership, including the ability to 
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make strategic choices and to prioritise are likely to be important determinants as is the 
need to keep members on side. 
Advocacy is intended to raise awareness, to change attitudes and ultimately to cause 
someone to act. BMOs hope that the result of that action is a reformed policy but that is 
not always achieved. Regarding success as the achievement of a policy reform may not 
capture the progress made by a BMO. BMOs, when being asked about success, were 
asked whether, as a result of their advocacy, they perceived public bodies: 
 had changed the way they saw the issues; 
 had given a higher priority to the issues; 
 had made a commitment to address one or more of the issues; 
 had programmed a solution to one or more of the issues; 
 had changed policy to address the issues, for example, publishing a white paper or 
secured executive reform in regulation; or 
 had implemented (Parliamentary) legislation to take account of the issues. 
The case studies that follow explore all aspects of competence and professionalisation, 
together with an assessment of the degree of success enjoyed by each of the BMOs. The 
case studies, therefore, draw out which of these competences appear to be the most 
important. 
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Chapter 3. The political context 
This chapter describes key aspects of the political context in which BMOs are active in 
both Tanzania and Kenya. It is not intended to be a comprehensive political analysis; its 
purpose is to demonstrate some of the contextual differences both between Kenya and 
Tanzania and compared to developed countries. An understanding of context is 
important because the political framework in which business membership organisations 
work may affect their ability to influence public policy. Baumgartner & Leech (1998) and 
Hojnacki et al. (2012) criticise interest group researchers for spending too much time 
looking at whether groups have been successful and their lack of attention to context. 
Rather than just trying to measure interest group influence in the policymaking process or 
focusing on tactics and lobbying behaviour, Hojnacki et al. (2012) suggest that greater 
effort should be made to link the study of interest groups to the study of the policymaking 
process and politics in general. As noted in the previous chapter, many researchers focus 
on the ability of interest groups to secure access. Whether a group can secure access 
depends on the political opportunities and structures it faces, so this chapter starts with a 
brief review of the political history of each country. This is followed by a brief description 
of the policy process. The next section reviews the structures for political opportunity and 
the state-business relationships and summarises the opportunities open to business 
associations aiming to influence public policy. 
3.1 History 
Writing in 1991, Fowler asserted that 
Most post-colonial African states have evolved as either single-party, 
patrimonial, autocratic, centralised political systems founded on ethnic 
clientelism or as dictatorial (semi-permanent) military regimes. […] African 
bureaucracies are overdeveloped and unaccountable because of the 
underdevelopment of the formal civil institutions that should control them. 
Urbanised elites monopolise both political and economic power, leading to 
a decreasing equity and transparency in the allocation of natural resources 
[…] the state dominates many aspects of associational life (1991: 53) 
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The depictions of Tanzania and Kenya that follow suggest that much of this remains 
largely relevant. However, it fails to capture more recent developments towards more 
open and consultative governments. 
Chazan et al. (1999) explain that countries in sub-Saharan Africa typically have been 
through three phases of development – pre-colonial, colonial, authoritarian 
independence – and many are now into a fourth: participatory independence. They note, 
however, that the main basis of political and socioeconomic activity is the group (ibid: 76) 
with ties, for example, of blood or identity but also potentially with ties of affinity, which 
would cover for example professional associations and religious communities. 
Before the colonialists, there were none of the trappings of modern nation states, but 
there was a deference to elders and to the ‘chief’. Groups were effectively aggregated 
into larger communities by the colonialists drawing arbitrary boundaries to create states 
(Thomson 2010). Colonial rule – through Governors – was “fundamentally authoritarian” 
(Chazan et al. 1999:29), that is, governance was imposed and instructive rather than 
participatory and consultative. Perhaps it is not surprising that newly independent states 
followed that model even though the western powers pressured newly independent 
African states to adopt multi-party systems. The colonial authorities constrained formal 
political activities and, as a consequence, many anti-colonial ideas were nurtured in 
voluntary organisations and social groups. Indeed, that is where many nationalist leaders 
started their political career (ibid. 77). Following independence, leaders, perhaps not too 
sure of their own position, sought to increase power around the state and to reduce intra-
elite competition (ibid. 47). They had to build public institutions to take on the running of 
newly independent states but, because loyalties were not always clear, they used their 
political party as a means of supervising the bureaucracy, the police, the army and local 
government (ibid. 52) thus blurring boundaries between state and party. At the same 
time, public sector jobs offered an opportunity for political patrons to reward individuals 
whom they thought could be useful, for example, in delivering grass roots support 
(Simson 2016: 6) and build in more loyalty. The parties aimed to limit the opportunities 
for opposition including clamping down on the voluntary organisations that had allowed 
them to oppose the colonial powers and they failed to differentiate between state 
ownership of resources and personal ownership: 
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Authoritarian policies dominated […]. Competition over access to and 
control of state resources nurtured an instrumental view of politics in which 
the public domain was seen as a channel for individual or partisan 
enrichment. […] Zero sum patterns led to the muzzling of loyal oppositions 
and to intolerance of dissenting opinion. (ibid. 12-13). 
The result is that “political life in Africa is conducted through a complex web of social 
forces, institutional settings and inter-personal relationships” (ibid. 75). 
Some countries, at least on the surface, have moved on and sought to involve civil society 
on a more participatory basis. In some cases, including Kenya and Tanzania, political 
participation was initially permitted within a single party set up. From the 1990s on, 
however, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa reinstated multi-party government and 
have opened opportunities for participation (ibid. 63) not least by business associations 
as they pursue market economy policies rather than some version of African socialism. 
One outcome is that interest groups are involved in public affairs (ibid. 86) and indeed 
Kenya and Tanzania both have a growing number of civil society organisations and 
business membership organisations that are willing to engage in dialogue and to seek to 
influence public policy.   
3.1.1 Tanzania 
The mainland of Tanzania, formerly Tanganyika, was part of German East Africa. It came 
under a British mandate following the end of the First World War and gained 
independence from Britain in 1961. The island of Zanzibar overthrew its Arab rulers in 
1963 and merged with Tanganyika in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. 
The Party of the Revolution, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), took power under the Prime 
Ministership, and later Presidency, of Julius Nyerere, who started his political career in the 
Tanganyika Teachers’ Association (Chazan et al. 1999). CCM has been in power ever 
since, though there are now opposition parties in Parliament. This has given the country a 
high level of stability (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012), despite some 120 different ethnic 
groups (Temu 2013). However, it has not delivered a strong economy. Reflecting a strong 
collectivist culture (Melyoki & Galperin 2017), it has resulted in a society which tends not 
to criticise publicly. There was little indigenous entrepreneurship at the time of 
independence. The few businesses that did exist were largely owned by foreigners or 
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Asians with Tanzanian citizenship (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012). The colonial regime, 
and then the post-independence government, discriminated against African 
entrepreneurs (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012). That separation continues, with political 
power dominated by black Africans and business dominated by Asians, Arabs and 
Europeans (Booth et al. 2014). 
Following the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Tanzania launched a socialist economic and 
development agenda, guided by an 'African Socialist' philosophy (based on the culture of 
a traditional African village) characterised by state control of the economy (Temu & Due 
2000: 684) known as ujamaa, meaning unity from the Swahili word for the extended 
family. Heilman & Lucas (1997) assert that the Government aimed to eliminate the 
private sector, nationalising many businesses and increasing regulation and suppressing 
those that remained in private ownership: the “government and specifically civil servants 
considered private entrepreneurs to be mabepari (capitalist exploiters). Any element of 
business acumen or profit-seeking effort was dubbed ulanguzi (conmanship)” (Temu & 
Due 2000: 684). 
Socialism led to low economic growth, bankrupt parastatals and severe deprivation 
(Temu 2013). In 1983, Nyerere concluded that his experiment with socialism had failed 
(ibid.). The government allowed more private enterprise, cut government subsidies and 
started to cut state-run organisations. Nyerere resigned in 1985 and the new government 
started to remove government controls over the economy.  
The lack of business resulted in a lack of organisations representing business, though civil 
society organisations have always had a place in Tanzanian society, with several playing 
important roles in the fight for independence (Elliott-Teague 2008). The British colonial 
regime had prohibited voluntary organisations from promoting political goals and the 
new independent government did not repeal this legislation. By 1970 “most organisations 
outside the central party had ceased to exist” (Elliott-Teague 2008: 104). Indeed, CCM 
brought most associations under its control and crushed those that sought to remain 
independent (Mercer 1999: 248). This changed during the economic and political 
upheaval of the 1980s and early 1990s when CCM “recognised it no longer had the 
strength to control all aspects of Tanzanian society” (Elliott-Teague 2008: 104). The 
government no longer prohibits the formation of associations and there has been a 
   
P A G E  | 65 
growth in NGOs and interest groups (Elliott-Teague 2008) and a de-linking of interest 
organisations from party control (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012). 
Political change resulted in 1995 in the country’s first multiparty presidential and 
parliamentary elections. However, CCM does not plan to lose power: since 1995, they 
have won all competitive elections at the national and local levels (Therkildsen & 
Bourgouin 2012). Therkildsen & Bourgouin observe that “groups that could potentially 
threaten the power of the ruling coalition are almost non-existent” (2012: 9); they assert 
that CCM maintains a grip on the bureaucracy, which employs more than 300,000 
people, and suggest that access to powerful positions is controlled by the president who 
also chairs the party. Temu (2013) confirms that the ruling party and the government 
system have become interwoven. One consequence is that public officials generally do 
not understand the impact on business of delaying a decision. This is exacerbated by 
over-staffing, under-qualification and pay levels too low to support a family (Temu & Due 
2000) and results in a civil service that is prone to corruption and which fails to “to 
articulate and implement private-sector-friendly policies” (Temu & Due 2000: 704). 
This is a challenge for those countries, including Kenya and Tanzania, which see the 
private sector as the engine of growth (URT 2010; GoK undated). So, we have a polity 
which, historically, did not favour or even support the private sector, but now sees 
business as the driving force for wealth creation. Representatives of business are regarded 
as suspect, though the business elite are closely intertwined with the political elite, in a 
way that is largely opaque. Freedom House ranks Tanzania at 124 (out of 209) on its 
freedom index (Freedom House 2018). 
3.1.2 Kenya 
In some ways Kenya seems completely different, though there is much similarity. The 
World Bank described Kenya in 2010 as “politically risky, marked by corruption, policy 
uncertainty and the importance of patronage and political connections in the business 
arena” (Pepper 2010: x). It has made progress, though Wesangula (2017) asserts that 
patronage is the “secret ingredient to the success of any politician” and that though there 
has been considerable change since independence “the politics of tribe and patronage 
persist”. Politically, Kenya is relatively stable. It achieved independence in 1963, with 
multi-party elections, a bicameral legislature and a federal government. There were two 
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major political parties which reflected five large ethnic minorities, though with none 
dominant (Booth et al. 2014: 13): KANO (the larger party, representing the Kikuyu and 
Luo) and KADU. The first President was Jomo Kenyatta. The federal system and the upper 
chamber were abolished in 1966 and opposition parties were banned in 1969 (ibid). 
From independence, there has been involvement of politicians in business and business 
people in politics with the Kikuyu at the centre of both (Booth et al. 2014). Whilst a 
number of individual business people were able to influence politicians, there was little 
scope for independent business associations directly to influence policy and little public 
sector advocacy though the number of groups grew rapidly in the 1990s (Chazan et al. 
1991: 78). In 1978, Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta as President. Opposition 
parties were allowed once again in 1991 and the first multi-party election held in 1992. 
Unlike Tanzania, political parties are formed as vehicles for aspiring Presidential 
candidates (Booth et al. 2014: 26) and so there have been regular changes of name of 
parties, though ultimately, they tend to fall back on tribal divisions and coalitions. The fact 
that political leadership thrives on tribalism rather than statehood presents a challenge 
(Senaji et al. 2017) as there is less continuity. 
Kenyatta and Moi had taken care to involve other ethnic groups (Chazan et al. 1999: 
143). In 2002, Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was elected as the 
third President of Kenya in an election deemed to be reasonably fair. However, the next 
election, in 2007, led to greater tribal division and ultimately bloodshed: Booth et al. 
asserted that Kibaki’s “failure to develop an inclusive political agenda […] widened 
divisions and laid the foundations for the violent conflict” (2014: 18) that followed a 
disputed election contest. This resulted in the deaths of more than 1,500 people. In 2008, 
a government of national unity was formed with Kibaki (leader of the Party of National 
Unity) as President and, for the first time, a Prime Minister, Raila Odinga (leader of the 
Orange Democratic Movement and the opposition’s Presidential candidate) – and a 
commitment to introduce a new constitution. 
A new constitution was approved by referendum in 2010. This introduced a system much 
more closely modelled on the US bicameral system than on the UK system: a National 
Assembly (NA) and a Senate to represent the Counties, collectively known as Parliament. 
Unlike the US, however, the National Assembly has precedence and members of the NA 
are still described by everyone as MPs. The new constitution removed the office of Prime 
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Minister, saw Ministries headed by people known as Cabinet Secretaries who no longer 
sit in Parliament and created 47 autonomous counties, each with a directly elected 
Governor (RoK 2010).  
The new counties came into effect at the same time as the 2013 election which saw the 
election of a new president, Uhuru Kenyatta, leader of the Jubilee Alliance. He reduced 
the number of Ministries to 18 in line with the new constitution (which specified a 
maximum of 22) and largely appointed technocrats with no political experience as 
Cabinet Secretaries (see http://iga.fyi/kenCab). The media gained more freedom and 
willingness to criticise government, especially in relation to corruption, during the Kibaki 
years. It was further liberated by the new constitution, although this subsequently became 
more constrained by the passing of the Kenya Information and Communications 
Amendment Act 2013. Kenya ranks at 95 (out of 180) on the World Press Freedom Index 
(Reporters without Borders 2017). The Economist Intelligence Unit assesses the media in 
Kenya as ‘largely unfree’, scoring it at 6/10 (EIU 2018). 
Whilst occasionally professing to support African socialism, Kenya actively promoted a 
mixed economy and private sector (Chazan et al. 1999: 263). Indeed, the Jubilee 
Government of Uhuru Kenyatta is trying to be business friendly: not only is it more open 
to business than previous administrations, it has promised to consult business and to 
improve the business environment (Booth et al. 2014). 
Consequently, in Kenya we have a polity which is much more supportive of the private 
sector, which tends to be dominated by the Kikuyu, who are determined to dominate the 
country’s politics also. Here too the business elite and political elite are close to one 
another. Kenya is ranked at 129 on the freedom index (Freedom House 2018). 
3.2 The policy process 
As well as looking at the politics, Hojnacki et al. (2012) recommends looking at the policy 
making process, reflecting Lutabingwa & Gray’s (1997) similar belief cited in chapter two. 
Some argue that governance in Africa is based on consensus and compromise (Wiredu 
2015, Vigtel 2015). Supporting the idea that dialogue is important, Wiredu quotes the 
Ashanti as saying “there is no problem of human relations that cannot be resolved by 
dialogue” (2015). Both Kenya and Tanzania offer opportunities for dialogue between 
public and private sectors.  
68 | P A G E  
3.2.1 The policy process in Kenya 
As noted above, Kenya has a President, a Cabinet, a bicameral Parliament and a degree 
of devolution to the Counties, all of which make decisions relating to public policy. The 
Kenya Law Reform Commission has published a detailed guide to Kenya’s legislative 
process (KLRC 2015). This not only offers guidance on the process of legislating in the 
National Assembly but also offers wider guidance on the whole policy process. It takes as 
its starting point the definition of policy offered by Black’s Law Dictionary as “the general 
principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs.” (2015: 
30). 
KLRC sets out nine stages for a new policy to be adopted, though as readers of Kingdon 
(1995) will appreciate, this is somewhat idealised. The first is policy initiation. It notes that 
policy ideas may originate from the Executive but also from political parties, business 
associations, organised groups or individual citizens. It notes that the Constitution gives 
every citizen the right to petition Parliament or County Assembly to consider any matter 
within its authority. They can then choose whether to turn the idea into a policy. They 
advise that it is appropriate for anyone who originates a policy idea to prepare a brief, 
combining a synthesis of the research evidence and strategy recommendations (2015: 
31). If the broad proposal is accepted – by Parliament, an MDA or a County – the next 
stage is research (including an expectation that the relevant MDA will undertake 
comprehensive research noting that “expert opinion should be at hand”). This offers an 
opportunity for business associations to provide good research evidence. The third stage 
is negotiation and public participation. The guidance notes that the constitution requires 
that all legislation is subject to a regulatory impact assessment and that there should be 
adequate public consultation, based on principles of openness, transparency, integrity 
and mutual respect. Thus, even business associations who do not have access to policy 
staff within the Ministry or are simply reacting to government proposals can still have 
their say, though the guidance assumes that, in addition to Parliamentary committee 
hearings, interested parties may be able to set up meetings with the Cabinet Secretary or 
departmental heads, organise workshops, seminars or retreats, use the media and submit 
written opinions.  
The fourth stage is the finalisation of the policy by the relevant MDA, when it crystallises 
the issues and draws up a final policy proposal. The fifth stage is cabinet or county 
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executive committee approval. The sixth stage is the tabling of the policy proposal in the 
National Assembly or the Senate for debate and approval. House committees may 
subject policy proposals to detailed scrutiny and may decide to hold further hearings. 
They may then approve, with or without amendment. The seventh stage is assent, when 
the policy is approved by the President or County Governor. In the eighth stage, the 
policy is published as a white paper and, in the ninth stage, may become the basis of 
legislation. 
Bills go through a process similar to that in the UK, with first, second and third readings 
and committee stages. Parliamentary Committees can choose to have more public 
hearings, and to consult widely, as they consider the wording of the proposed legislation. 
Bills also go through a process of assent and then publication in the Kenya Gazette 
before they become law. In practice, then, as a minimum BMOs can expect to be able to 
engage in dialogue with MDAs and to be able to communicate to Parliamentarians via 
Parliamentary Committees. 
Counties can also generate policy and legislation. In some cases, they have to follow 
guidance from the centre but in others they are free to do as they want. 
3.2.2 The policy process in Tanzania 
Tanzania has a unicameral National Assembly. Most members are elected on a first past 
the post basis to represent constituencies, with additional women MPs elected 
proportionally from Party lists, five members appointed by the Zanzibar House of 
Representatives and eleven members appointed by the President, who is directly elected 
and who is Head of Government as well as Head of State. The President thus has 
considerable opportunity for patronage. Cooksey argues that patronage exists not only in 
the power to appoint people to positions of authority but also that “policies as 
implemented are overwhelmingly patronage driven” (Booth et al. 2014: 43). The 
President appoints the Prime Minister and all the members of the Cabinet. There was an 
attempt in 2011/12 to rewrite the constitution and a further attempt in 2014/5 but this 
was never put to a referendum (Branson 2017). 
Local government in Tanzania was originally set up by the British in 1926 only to be 
abolished after independence, reintroduced by CCM in 1984 (Venugopal & Yilmaz 2010) 
and then reformed several times in the 1990s. There are a variety of district councils, 
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town councils, municipal councils and others. The centre, however, keeps a degree of 
control through the appointment of the Chief Executive of the District Councils, the 
appointment of District Commissioners and the appointment of Regional Commissioners 
(ibid.) Whilst local authorities are nominally able to pass byelaws, the District 
Commissioner and District Executive Director are able to skew the process. Until 2015, 
this was all overseen by the Prime Minister’s Office through the Regional Administration 
and Local Government division, but it has now moved to the President’s Office. 
In Tanzania, there is no official guidance to explain the policy process. However, 
Shemdoe (2013) explains that policies are enacted to address problems with ideas 
originating from individuals, communities, organisations, public and private organisations 
and other interest groups. For major policies, such as the Tanzania National Vision or the 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, the President’s Office or Prime 
Minister’s Office would take the lead; sector policies are the responsibility of the relevant 
Ministry (Shemdoe 2013). In practice, most policy emanates from a sponsoring Ministry 
(Majamba 2018). Having decided that there is a need for a policy, there is supposed to 
be a broad-based participative process including all relevant stakeholders. Elliott-Teague 
suggests that the term ‘policy’ refers to recommendations adopted by the Cabinet to 
guide policymakers as they prepare legislation and is more a statement of intent than a 
mandate (2008: 105). Shemdoe claims that the government drafts policy proposals and 
then decides which stakeholders to consult (2013: 4). Babeiya (2011) observes the 
tendency to rush policy formulation without the careful gathering of relevant information 
or the clear articulation of the problem to be addressed. 
Occasionally, Ministries form task forces or committees and invite stakeholders to 
participate (Shemdoe 2013) as well as seeking views from a wider cross section of 
stakeholders. A policy proposal emerges and is then sent to the Cabinet Secretariat. It is 
first considered by the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee comprising all the 
Permanent Secretaries and then goes to Cabinet. If approved, it is sent to Parliament 
which can comment and offer advice on areas for improvement. Some policies need to 
be referred to Parliament so that they can enact or amend the requisite law. In this case, it 
will be considered by the relevant Parliamentary Committee and they may invite views 
from interested stakeholders. This requires however that the stakeholders know that it is 
to be discussed and are able to prepare a position.  
   
P A G E  | 71 
Legislation goes through a process of first, second and third readings along with 
committee stages in a process similar to that in the UK (URT undated). Draft bills must be 
published twice in the Gazette, the first time in full and at least 21 days before it is to be 
debated by Parliament. This is intended to give the opportunity for interested parties to 
know that new legislation is planned and to be able to provide comment. Bills are subject 
to public scrutiny, except when they are introduced under a ‘certificate of urgency’ 
(Majamba 2018), and this is usually achieved through the Parliamentary Committee that 
scrutinises the bill after the first reading inviting interested parties to appear before it. In 
addition, hearings are usually in public. Bills, once approved by Parliament, go to the 
President for assent and are then published in the Official Gazette before they become 
law. 
So, nominally, in both Kenya and Tanzania, the public – including interest groups – have 
the opportunity in the formal legislative process to comment on policy and legislation; 
interest groups also generally have the opportunity to engage with MDAs. 
3.3 State business relations 
In both Tanzania and Kenya, it is relatively easy for BMOs to meet with Ministries and 
Agencies. If they find their way blocked, they might instead attempt to access the 
government via one of the organisations intended to support or promote regulatory or 
legislative reform such as the Business Regulatory Reform Unit, the Kenya Law Reform 
Commission in Kenya, the Tanzania National Business Council or the Prime Minister’s 
Office in Tanzania. 
Business associations will seek opportunities by which to talk to government and indeed, 
if there are no mechanisms for dialogue, will seek to create them (as we will see with the 
Tourism Confederation of Tanzania). However, governments can also be proactive, 
seeking to consult and even to collaborate. In other words, both parties want to develop 
a relationship and so many researchers look at state-business relations (Sen 2015) which 
can be regular and formal or ad hoc and informal. Sen suggests that effective state-
business relations in low income countries are a determinant of inclusive growth but 
notes that collusive relations, characterised by rentseeking, result in state agencies and 
BMOs benefiting the elites alone (2015: 1). He also suggests that mechanisms to improve 
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effectiveness of state-business relations include, inter alia, public private dialogue, reforms 
to improve the investment climate and support for business associations. 
3.3.1 State-business relations in Tanzania 
There is evidence that the International Finance Institutions, amongst others, have sought 
to encourage effective state business relationships. For example, starting in 2001, the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund set out to encourage African countries to 
establish Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils (Page 2017). Tanzania was one of the 
first, setting up the Tanzania National Business Council, though this complemented other 
activities already underway such as the creation of the Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation. These councils were intended to improve the mechanisms to engage in 
public private dialogue, though have had varying degrees of success (Page 2017). Whilst 
TNBC’s impact has been limited, it has provided opportunities for business and their 
associations to meet with the President and to provide a regular communication channel. 
It legitimises BMOs in the eyes of the MDAs and promotes policy proposals directly to 
the President. It allows the President to get a sense of private sector concerns and 
opinions. Herzberg & Wright (2005) call these mechanisms “competitiveness 
partnerships”. 
It is interesting to note also that the creation of some associations was specifically 
encouraged by government to provide private sector representatives with whom to 
engage in dialogue. This suggests that Kenya and Tanzania genuinely want to hear a 
business point of view and are willing to work with BMOs to improve public policy. 
In Tanzania, however, it is only in the last 15 years or so that entrepreneurs have sought 
openly to influence policy making and implementation, which Therkildsen & Bourgouin 
(2012) suggest is mostly achieved through developing and maintaining informal relations 
with the ruling elite. They highlight that there are few black Tanzanian entrepreneurs and 
that most productive sector companies are either foreign-owned or have Tanzanian 
owners of south Asian or Arab descent. One characteristic of those few entrepreneurs, 
however, seems to be the ease with which they move from private to public and back to 
private. This has implications since these people are clearly well connected across both 
public and private sectors, and probably within CCM as well, and so one can never be 
sure about the extent to which they use their networks to make things happen. Indeed, 
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Useem, who looked at the US and the UK, argues that it is people such as this who 
actually make things happen:  
The inner circle […] possesses the intercorporate connections and 
organisational capacity to transcend the parochial interests of single 
companies and sectors and to offer a more integrated vision of the broader, 
longer-term needs of business. (1984: 59) 
In short, Useem argues that there is an inner circle of elite business leaders that has 
access to political leaders and influences public policy in a way that lacks legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability. This may have been true once but writing some 30 years 
later, it is to some extent countered by Bernhagen, whose research in the UK suggests 
that lobbyists find it difficult to influence policy makers to act in the interests of the 
lobbyist “at the expense of wider constituencies” (2013: 20). 
Temu and Due (2000), like Bernhagen, assert that a few prominent entrepreneurs cannot 
easily make a difference for most business which explains why so many have formed 
associations and why the number of associations, and the evidence of widespread 
consultation, continues to grow. Writing in 2000, Temu & Due said that there were more 
than 100 registered associations in Tanzania, and there are many more now. However, 
Temu (2013) notes the considerable rivalry between businesses owned by Africans and 
by Asians which, he says, ultimately weakens the associations and limits their 
representation. 
Therkildsen & Bourgouin (2012) suggest that there can be a degree of corruption in the 
relationship by arguing that it is in the mutual interest of some of those in government 
and some entrepreneurs to talk to each other though that may be limited to enriching 
one another.  Specifically, they suggest that “ruling elites support the development of 
productive sectors when they perceive that this will help them to remain in power” 
(2012: 10) and that “good economic outcomes depend on (a) close relations between 
the ruling elite and the relevant productive entrepreneurs […] and (b) the ability of the 
ruling elite to create pockets of bureaucratic capabilities to implement specific policies” 
(ibid). In other words, the political elites recognise the need to allow the business elites to 
make money so that the business elites can fund their election campaigns. This has an 
implication for this study in that it implies that the political elites only act when it is their 
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party political or personal interests. As will be seen in the case studies, whilst it is possible 
that close mutual interests open doors, there is little evidence that policies are only 
reformed in return for personal or party political benefits for politicians. 
Developing countries are sometimes seen to have policy formulation processes that are 
remote and inaccessible (Court et al. 2005). In Tanzania, it is relatively easy to meet with 
policy makers, though there is a tendency for government to formulate a policy proposal 
and then to consult, not always effectively (Mercer 2003). Heilman & Lucas (1997) make 
a similar point suggesting that the private sector indeed view the policy making process 
as one of the government formulating proposals and then seeking reaction from the 
business community – rather than being proactive – though the case study of the Tourism 
Confederation of Tanzania will show that this is not always the case. 
Irrespective of the relationships of a few well-connected individuals, business associations 
are working hard to engage with government. In 1997, Heilman & Lucas (1997) 
suggested that a primary goal of the Confederation of Tanzanian Industry, the Tanzania 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture and the Association of Tanzanian 
Employers was to formalise, and ideally institutionalise, the relationship between the 
private sector and the government. At the time they were writing, these associations 
thought “government was moving in this direction” through engaging in dialogue and 
consultation but complained of “government’s attitude towards business as trying to 
create the impression that business is actively involved in the policy making process when 
in fact it is not” (Heilman & Lucas 1997:163). In other words, they argued that 
consultation and dialogue were merely window dressing and government was not really 
taking on board and addressing the concerns of business.  
As the case studies will show, however, there is now much more consultation and 
dialogue and it appears to be more effective. It is interesting to look at the Tanzania 
Private Sector Foundation (TPSF), established in 1998 with support from the World Bank 
and other donors, intended to be the apex body for business associations. TPSF comes 
closest of any BMO to having an “institutionalised” relationship with government. 
Government is keen that they should only have to negotiate with one body (int. Laseko 
2011), perhaps not realising that they could receive better intelligence and better policy 
advice by talking with more specialist associations. Furthermore, it leads to accusations 
that TPSF has been captured by the government, though there is little evidence to 
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support this, and this situation does not stop other associations from approaching 
government directly. 
In Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, President from 2005 to 2015, demonstrated a desire to 
improve the enabling environment. A programme known as Business Environment 
Strengthening in Tanzania (BEST) was launched in December 2003 (URT 2010). The 
programme started with five components of which one, to support the private sector to 
engage in dialogue and advocacy, is notable since it encouraged four of the bilateral 
development partners to provide funding specifically to build the capacity of private 
sector organisations to engage more effectively with government. The GoT made several 
strides forward, including the creation of a Better Regulation Unit. In its economic 
strategy – set out in Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (URT 2004) and the National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (URT 2005) – it articulated a specific 
objective to create a legal and institutional framework conducive to business, on the basis 
that “the private sector is the engine of growth” (ibid: 71). With pressure and support 
from development partners (DP), the government launched Business Environment 
Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) to pursue reforms. However, there was recognition that 
the most appropriate organisations to advise the Government are businesses themselves, 
through their trade associations. It would be easy for the Government simply to listen to a 
few, well-connected businesses or business associations and ignore the rest, many of 
which are weak and under-resourced, so one element of the DPs’ approach, the 
Advocacy Component (AC), was established with an objective to support any BMO with 
a credible proposal to reform public policy. This was quickly followed, in 2006, by 
Tanzania being recognised as a top-ten reformer in the World Bank’s Doing Business 
league table (World Bank 2007). 
In 2009, the President, concerned that Tanzania’s Doing Business ranking had, in fact, 
slipped – from 124 in 2007 (World Bank 2007) to 131 in 2009 (World Bank 2009) – 
challenged the Government, through the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), to improve the 
ranking to 99 or better by 2011. The Prime Minister established a Regulatory Reform Task 
Force comprising selected Permanent Secretaries and the Governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania supported by eight thematic Task Teams. The Task Force was charged with 
improving Tanzania’s performance in the ten indicators that comprise the Doing Business 
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aggregate indicator. The task teams were supposed to, and in some cases did, include 
private sector representatives. 
Whilst many people, even amongst business associations, appear unaware of the efforts 
being made through the road map, the Government was very clear publicly about its 
commitment to reform. For example, its website at the time stated: 
…the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has redefined the 
role of the state to that of policy maker, maintenance of law and order, 
provider of basic social and economic infrastructure and facilitator of 
economic growth. The government recognises that it has the role to 
facilitate the private sector and other economic agents to actively and 
effectively invest in productive and commercial activities in order to 
accelerate economic growth and development. The Government can do 
this mainly through putting favourable policies in place, provision of a 
conducive environment for local and foreign investment, promotion of 
institutional changes conducive to the development of the private sector, 
stimulating investors’ confidence through transparent, effective and 
efficient administrative processes in government institutions and to put in 
place an appropriate legal and regulatory framework (URT 2011a) 
It went on to stress the importance of working with the private sector: 
…the Government has developed modalities for institutionalising the ad hoc 
consultative process with the private sector in evolving appropriate and 
effective macro and sectoral policies. (e.g. through participation in the 
Government Tax Task Force and the Public Expenditure Review working 
groups). Similarly, the private sector itself has evolved institutional 
mechanisms of interactions and consultations with the Government 
through umbrella organisation such as the Tanzania Chamber of 
Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), Confederation of Tanzania 
Industries (CTI), the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) and the 
National Business Council (TNBC)… (URT 2011a) 
In practice, the implementation of the roadmap action plan was largely driven by Barney 
Laseko in the Prime Minister’s Office. He argued that it was beginning to make a 
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difference. He stressed that the process was more important than the specific early public 
policy changes and suggested that it was crucial to get people talking about improving 
the enabling environment (int. Laseko 2011). 
In 2012, following a visit by the President to Malaysia in 2011, the GoT adopted a new 
approach called “Big Results Now” or BRN (Irwin & White 2014). This was an adaptation 
of an approach used by the Malaysian Government’s Performance Management and 
Delivery Unit known as Big Fast Results. BRN was launched in the first half of 2013 and 
implemented through the Transformation and Delivery Council (TDC), the President’s 
Delivery Bureau (PDB) and Ministerial Delivery Units (MDUs). The PDB had a primary 
objective to facilitate, monitor and evaluate the delivery of BRN initiatives in six national 
key priority areas: agriculture, water, energy, education, transport and resources 
mobilisation. The approach of BRN was to hold a workshop (lasting several weeks) with 
participants from the public and private sectors and jointly develop proposals. The PDB 
would then hold Ministers to account for the implementation of the recommendations. 
Intriguingly, and despite the rhetoric of the private sector being the engine of growth and 
the need to improve the environment for business, the enabling environment was not 
originally included within the BRN framework. However, as the case study on Tanzania 
Private Sector Foundation will show (see Chapter 4), this provides an example of the 
private sector influencing government policy. 
3.3.2 State business relations in Kenya 
State business relations in Kenya have been broadly positive. Initially, the move from 
colonialism to independence brought a change of approach – businesses avoided open 
political action in favour of quiet contact with parliamentary and bureaucrats (Chazan et 
al. 1999: 118) – the insider approach – but much of this occurred through informal 
channels rather than transparently. For example, three Cabinet Ministers, from Kibaki’s 
region of Mt Kenya, were perceived as influential and came to be known as the Mt Kenya 
mafia. A group of business leaders, who played golf with Kibaki at the Muthaiga Golf 
Club and who supported Kibaki with election funds, also sought to influence the political 
process. The two groups had different objectives and aimed to limit the influence of the 
other. However, both groups’ interests quickly came to focus on business – and how 
much money they could make – leading to a number of corruption scandals (Booth et al. 
2014). 
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The relationships became more formalised. In 2003, Kibaki invited the private sector to 
participate in formulating economic policy, based on a recognition that it was the private 
sector that created jobs and established a Presidential Private Sector Working Forum. 
One of its outputs, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth & Employment Creation 
(ERS), was published later in 2003. Economic growth followed. (The World Bank, see 
iga.fyi/kengdp, gives GDP of $7bn in 1980, $9 bn in 1990, $13bn in 2000, $15bn in 
2003 and $40bn in 2010). Vision 2030, Kenya’s development plan for 2008-2030, 
emerged from ERS. The private sector thus claimed to have conceived Vision 2030 and 
Fourie (2014) reports this has been confirmed by public officials. During this period, there 
was de facto encouragement for Ministers and Ministries to consult with the private 
sector. Nevertheless the position was undoubtedly complicated by the relationships 
between politicians and business elites. 
There is a close link between political and economic interests with many politicians, not 
least the President, involved in business. Booth et al. suggest that those with economic 
power seek political cover from those with political influence (2014: 14). The Jubilee 
government, led by Uruhu Kenyatta, attempted to be more open to business than 
previous governments, was keen to do more to improve the investment climate and, in 
particular, promised to consult the private sector on proposals relating to business and 
the economy (ibid: 21). There was talk of pro-market reform, including privatisation, 
better regulation and trade liberalisation, to improve the business environment and to 
boost economic growth and employment. Booth et al. (ibid) suggest that the government 
is relatively independent of business – and the reverse is probably also true. There are, 
however, still a large number of companies in Kenya with a large state shareholding, 
which gives an incentive to improve the investment climate, but also an incentive to 
create competitive advantage for their own businesses. Booth et al. observed that, whilst 
there was a lack of institutionalised political parties, the National Assembly and Senate 
exert pressure on other parts of government (2014: 27) and indeed others have also 
commented how Parliament is seen as just another interest group. There is some 
evidence that business associations were becoming more active and indeed were 
achieving some success in influencing public policy during this period (Irwin & Githinji, 
2015). 
At the time of writing, the country was showing signs of settling down into the new 
arrangements and it was becoming easier for business associations at least to lobby, 
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though not necessarily easier to influence policy. Indeed, Kenya and Tanzania are both in 
the third quartile for the ease of doing business. Their rankings are quite a long way apart 
at 92 and 132 respectively in 2017, but their scores for the ‘distance to the frontier’ are 
very close at 61 and 55 (World Bank 2017). 
3.3.3 The regional context 
Kenya and Tanzania are both members of the East African Community (EAC), a customs 
union and common market for East Africa, which aspires to monetary union and political 
federation. Collectively, they exert pressure on themselves both in relation to improving 
the enabling environment and to consultation. The Treaty establishing the EAC sets out a 
vision for the “creation of an enabling environment for the private sector and the civil 
society” (EAC, 2002: 102) (presumably meaning that they want to improve the 
environment for business) and notes that 
the Partner States undertake […] to: (a) promote a continuous dialogue with 
the private sector and civil society at the national level and at that of the 
Community to help create an improved business environment 
The third EAC development strategy (EAC undated) called for regular dialogue and 
consensus building and the active participation of key stakeholders (including the private 
sector, civil society and women). The fourth EAC development strategy (EAC 2011) is 
peppered with references to the importance of the private sector in building resilient 
economies and specifically calls for the “consolidation of political commitment and 
stability by promoting participation of the citizenry and the private sector in the 
integration process” (2011: 53). 
3.3.4 Corruption 
Whilst the EAC may be regarded as a positive driver of state business collaboration, there 
are negative forces as well. One of these is corruption. Transparency International ranks 
Kenya and Tanzania quite low in its corruption perceptions index (TI 2017). Inevitably, 
there are accusations of corrupt practices in state business relations and there is little 
doubt that, in general, corruption is a major problem, despite it being punishable in most 
of sub-Saharan Africa, with most of it being intended to enrich public officials (Warf 
2017). Warf states that corruption occurs at two levels: petty corruption, undertaken on a 
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small scale by individuals (2017: 20), usually seeking to enhance their take home pay, and 
more institutionalised, grand corruption (2017: 21). Whilst there is a significant literature 
generally on corruption and its impact, there is little about the impact of corruption on 
state-business relations. 
It is certainly the case that the business elites find money to support political campaigns, 
though it is questionable whether this counts as corruption, and perhaps is no different to 
developed countries. Furthermore, fighting elections is expensive so politicians are likely 
to seek rents once elected and, even when they do not, they are usually suspected of 
doing so (Temu 2013). Temu asserts that “political patronage and rent-seeking is also 
suspected to get in the way in economic management reforms, regulation and when 
dispensing public goods and services including judiciary services” (2013: 58). It is 
believed, though not proven, that those who fund the ruling party seek favours in public 
procurement and in influencing policy (Temu 2013: 59).  
There is no pressure to stop or ameliorate political donations, and possible return favours 
because there is no campaign finance law (Temu 2013, Ohman 2016). There is also no 
transparency in the financial support, so observers can never be sure whether there is a 
payback in terms of favourable regulation – or favourable procurement practices. Gray 
also draws attention to the complex links between the ruling party in Tanzania, CCM, and 
the private sector, and argues that there is a “continuous process of struggle across 
groups over resource flows and property rights” (2015: 387). 
Temu – writing about Tanzania but probably also true of Kenya – argues that the practical 
consequence of these political and social forces is that fighting corruption directly will be 
ineffective and that as long as corruption persists, the work of the BMOs will be more 
difficult (2013: 59). There is some evidence that, in Tanzania, on occasions BMOs, or 
more likely individual businesses, have paid for a problem to go away (int. Lyimo 2014, 
int. Sykes 2014). The problem quickly re-emerges, usually with a higher price. 
Gray argues that, whilst there is often a desire at the top to clamp down on corruption, at 
least in Tanzania, the central leadership is unable so to do (2015: 401) because none of 
the centres of power are dominant. There have, however, been some efforts to fight 
corruption. In 2015, for the first time, former cabinet ministers were jailed for corruption, 
though some saw this as selective justice rather than a victory for accountability (Policy 
Forum 2016). Later in 2015, the then President, Kikwete and private sector 
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representatives signed a declaration to combat corruption and promote ethics in the 
public and private sectors as part of a wider effort to improve governance. The current 
President, John Magufuli, is making much more effort to fight corruption, along with 
wasteful public expenditure and patronage (Allison 2015). Sen suggests that competitive 
sectors, without excess profits, are more likely to have “an open and transparent 
relationship with the state” (2015: 17).  
Warf observes that corruption is most severe in countries without an independent and 
effective media (2017: 22). That is a problem in Kenya and Tanzania though in both 
countries, the media has attempted regularly to draw attention to corrupt practices. Gray 
notes that the media in Tanzania is increasingly active in exposing and discussing 
corruption (2015: 388), though it is ranked at 83 (with a score almost equal to that of 
Kenya) on the World Press Freedom Index (Reporters without Borders 2017). The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, however, sees the media in Tanzania as ‘unfree’ scoring it at 
4/10 (EIU 2018). 
As will be noted in the case study chapters, the case study BMOs have all stated their 
desire not to engage in corrupt practices. It seems that most BMOs avoid doing so. 
3.3.5 Institutionalising dialogue 
There are some formal routes to dialogue. In both Kenya and Tanzania, the employers’ 
association has a formal relationship – and nominally a chance to engage in dialogue – as 
a result of ILO mandated social dialogue. In Tanzania, the Tourism Confederation of 
Tanzania has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism committing them both to regular dialogue. Otherwise, all routes 
into government are informal. Nevertheless, a large number of formal and informal routes 
exist and it would be difficult for governments to close them all without causing 
consternation amongst the private sector. 
In Kenya, for example, the Kenya Private Sector Association (KEPSA) has been successful 
in setting up regular Minister’s Round Tables, in which they bring together a Minister and 
relevant sectoral associations, and also a Speaker’s Round Table. Additionally, the 
government regularly asks KEPSA for a view (Booth et al. 2017: 22). The Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers (KAM) has been working with County Governors, many of 
whom have instituted a Governor’s Round Table with local business associations. 
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Parliament exerts its authority through 30 committees in the National Assembly and 11 in 
the Senate, scrutinising government activities, policies and programmes (Booth et al. 
2014). However, these often hold public hearings and they certainly provide more 
opportunities for interest groups to engage with government. 
There are therefore many opportunities for groups to engage in the formal policy process. 
But there are also many opportunities to engage more informally. Many interest groups 
are able to meet with officials in Ministries and other agencies. In some cases, groups can 
meet with the Cabinet Secretary and even with the President. Organisations wishing to 
amend existing policy or existing law can go to the relevant Ministry, or they can 
approach the Kenya Law Reform Commission which may then review existing policy and 
make recommendations for reform. They can also lobby the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution which can also make proposals to review legislation. 
In Tanzania, too, it is relatively easy for groups to meet with officials in their ‘line’ Ministry 
and indeed many of the Ministries and Agencies consult regularly with relevant business 
membership organisations and other interest groups. Tanzania is part of the Open 
Government Partnership, which it joined in 2011 (as did Kenya), and is committed to 
“transparency, accountability and public participation in the governance of Tanzania” 
(URT 2016: 1).2 In some cases, this has become institutionalised as with the Doing 
Business thematic task groups and the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s stakeholder forum. 
There is encouragement from the private sector to appoint private sector representatives 
to the boards of agencies and parastatals, which helps BMOs to network more widely. 
There is a tendency for government departments to consult via the Tanzania Private 
Sector Foundation, which put the onus on them to disseminate requests more widely. If 
BMOs fail to gain traction with a Ministry or Agency, meetings of the Tanzania National 
Business Council provide an opportunity to raise issues, often directly with the President. 
Many BMOs seek to cultivate relationships with junior officials and to maintain those 
relationships as staff are promoted. Parliamentary committees give some opportunity to 
make a case for reform. On the whole, it is relatively easy to secure access, though the 
CEO of one business association, concluding that he was not getting a good enough 
hearing, decided to stand for Parliament and was elected as an opposition MP. 
                                                 
2 Though has since resigned 
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3.4 Conclusion 
Tanzania has a dominant and enduring party organisation at the centre of its politics 
(Booth et al. 2014:10) and a weak indigenous private sector; Kenya has no dominant 
party and a rather stronger black-African private sector (ibid: 11). A summary of the 
comparisons is provided in Table 1 and it will be seen that Kenya and Tanzania are 
actually very similar. 
In Tanzania, the party wields the influence, picks the candidate for President, and 
maintains centres of power behind the scenes; in Kenya, parties exist as mechanisms for 
Presidential candidates to pursue their ambitions and so reform regularly. In Tanzania, the 
CCM has never lost; in Kenya, government has been in the hands of different parties, 
though generally it is the Kikuyu who come out on top. In Tanzania, the political elite 
believes that it needs to secure money from the business elite; in Kenya, there is much 
less need, not least because Uruhu Kenyatta is one of Kenya’s richest men. In both 
countries, there is a wide variety of civil society organisations and faith-based 
organisations and bilateral and multilateral donors are also active and aiming to influence 
public policy, not always in harmony with business interest groups. 
Kenya and Tanzania both give the impression of being relatively open to interest groups. 
Civil servants in particular, but MPs as well, are willing to meet with interest groups and to 
listen to what they have to say. Cabinet Secretaries in Kenya and Ministers in Tanzania, 
whilst less accessible, are not inaccessible. In both countries, there has been a desire to 
engage more effectively with the private sector. Indeed, some associations were brought 
into being with the encouragement of the government so that they had an association of 
businesses with which they could consult. In some cases, relationships have been 
institutionalised at least to the extent that it would be inconceivable for there not to be 
some contact between state and business interest. 
There is, however, a considerable number of differences with more developed 
economies. There is a greater degree of patronage. There is almost certainly a greater 
degree of corruption, though the impact of the corruption on state business relations and 
interest group advocacy is not always clear. There are many fewer BMOs compared to 
developed countries, so it is much easier for any individual BMO to secure access at all 
levels, though access only continues for those BMOs who can provide good research 
evidence and build good relationships. This may be linked to the fact that those people 
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who are educated, and thus more likely to emerge at the top of government or business, 
are not large in number and are well-networked, perhaps through having been at school 
together or attending the same church (though there are similar examples in developed 
countries as well). In Tanzania, many people, across politicians, officials, business and 
military are linked through CCM. There is pressure from international finance institutions 
and bilateral donors to consult with the private sector and to engage in dialogue, leading 
for example to the creation of Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils. There is weaker 
understanding amongst officials of the role and importance of the private sector in 
creating wealth, jobs and tax revenue, though there is a recognition at the top that the 
private sector is indeed the engine of growth, and therefore needs to be nurtured. In 
general, there is less desire for conflict and a rather more consensual style, which fits well 
with the idea of public private dialogue but makes it more challenging for business 
associations to be clear about their objectives. The private sector is perceived to be the 
driver of growth but there is a lack of understanding of how government policy can 
support that objective. The public sector is open to interest group proposals, though they 
need evidence and persuasive argument, and it is clear that it is politicians who ultimately 
decide on policy. 
Table 6: Summary of similarities & differences 
 Kenya Tanzania 
 Bicameral legislature; degree of 
devolution to counties 
Multi-party 
Unicameral legislature; local 
government authorities within system 
of centralised control (though 
devolved power in Zanzibar) 
Multi-party 
Strength & legitimacy   
Ease of doing 
business: Rank (score) 
92 (61.2) 132 (54.5) 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index: 
Rank (score) 
145 (26) 116 (32) 
Freedom Index: Rank 
(score) 
129 (48) 124 (52) 
Press freedom index: 
Rank (score) 
95 (68.8) 83 (69.4) 
Key points of access President’s Office President’s Office 
 Speaker Prime Minister’s Office 
 Parliamentarians & Parliamentary 
Committees 
Parliamentarians & Parliamentary 
Committees 
 Cabinet Secretaries Ministers 
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 Ministry officials Ministry officials 
 Agency officials (Business Regulatory 
Reform Unit, Kenya Law Reform 
Commission & Commission for 
Implementation of the Constitution) 
Agency officials (previously Better 
Regulation Unit and then Big Results 
Now secretariat and now ad hoc 
groups including Doing Business 
roadmap task forces) 
 County Governors Local Government Authorities 
 Ministerial Round Tables (managed by 
Kenya Private Sector Association) 
Tanzania National Business Council 
 Governors Round Tables (managed 
by Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers) 
 
Nature of 
relationships 
Reasonably open Reasonably open 
 Member of Open Government 
Partnership 
Member of Open Government 
Partnership 
 Some formal relationships eg social 
partners 
Some formal relationships eg social 
partners 
 Most informal but regular Most informal but regular 
 Apparent desire to involve private 
sector, at least to some extent, in 
policy formulation 
Apparent desire to involve private 
sector, at least to some extent, in 
policy formulation 
Sources: 
World Bank (2017) Doing Business 2017. Rank out of 189 countries; score is distance to frontier out of 100, higher is 
easier to do business. 
Transparency International (2017) Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Rank out of 176 countries; score out of 100, 
with higher less corrupt. 
Freedom House (2018) Freedom in the World 2018. Rank out of 209 countries; score out of 100, with higher meaning 
freer. 
Reporters without Borders, 2017 World Press Freedom Index. Rank out of 180 countries; score out of 100 and rebased 
from original so that higher is freer. 
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Chapter 4. From Policy Novice to Policy Entrepreneur: Tanzania 
Private Sector Foundation 
4.1 Introduction 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) is an apex association, that is, an interest 
group whose membership is mainly other interest groups) though it additionally has 
corporate members. Rather than being created by businesses, or even by associations of 
business, it was initiated by (international) development partners, specifically to create a 
body that might promote collaboration and enable the private sector to communicate as 
one. TPSF has been chosen as a case study because, as the apex, it should have the trust 
of the private sector (Goldsmith 2002) and be seen by government as a key conduit to 
consult with the private sector – and the chapter will show that this is true, though it was 
not always so. 
This case study traces the development of TPSF from its launch in 1998 to 2015, though 
the focus is on the period of 2011-2015.3 It is interesting because it has made progress 
through several stages (characterised in this chapter as policy novice, policy networker 
and policy entrepreneur) in its approach to advocacy, which broadly mirror changes to its 
organisational structure and leadership. Whilst it has no formal arrangement with 
government, it is now routinely invited to offer views on a range of policy and legislation. 
The case study offers evidence that TPSF has been able to influence policy both of a 
technical nature and of a more political nature. It shows that TPSF exhibits many of the 
characteristics that might be expected of a business association in a developed country, 
such as taking an insider approach, seeking access in multiple venues and providing 
information and opinion to government. It highlights several competences exhibited by 
TPSF. In particular, it shows the importance of leaders having a clear direction and a clear 
understanding of what is necessary to succeed and an advocacy team that is both 
competent and closely engaged with government. 
The chapter provides a brief background, followed by sections that in turn look at each of 
TPSF’s development stages. The conclusion summarises the competences exhibited by 
TPSF and draws out the key determinants of TPSF’s success. 
                                                 
3 The case studies generally take a chronological perspective but occasionally it is easier for the reader to follow the narrative if there is 
a digression from the chronology. 
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4.2 Background 
The origins of TPSF follow a decision by the Government in 1995 to move to multiparty 
elections and efforts of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) to convene a group of public and private stakeholders. A primary goal of the 
three leading business membership organisations (BMO), (the Confederation of 
Tanzanian Industry (CTI), the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture 
(TCCIA) and the Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE)) was, and is, to formalise the 
relationship between the private sector and the government. These associations thought 
“government was moving in this direction” but complained of “government’s attitude 
towards business as trying to create the impression that business is actively involved in 
the policy making process when in fact it is not” (Heilman & Lucas 1997:163). 
Subsequent interviews suggest a lack of clarity and unanimity about what is meant by 
‘formalisation’ and ‘institutionalisation’. 
Despite a long and occasionally difficult process, UNIDO’s committee launched the 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation in 1998 with 33 founding members signing the 
articles with support from the World Bank and other donors. TPSF (2000) argued that it 
marked the beginning of a new era for the private sector in Tanzania. The stakeholders 
also laid the groundwork for the launch in 2001 of the Tanzania National Business 
Council (TNBC) as a public private dialogue mechanism, to which we will return. 
The expectation of the founders, of the facilitators who brought TPSF into being and of 
the government was that TPSF would act as an apex bringing together all the business 
associations to speak with one voice and thus to be more effective in communicating a 
private sector view to government (TPSF 2009). Initially it tended to be reactive. It then 
became obsessed with securing project management contracts to generate income to 
maintain its existence and appeared to forget its raison d’être. Following the loss of those 
contracts and the appointment of a new Chief Executive in 2012, it rediscovered its 
primary objective of advocacy, appointed competent people to its policy and advocacy 
team and became much more of a policy entrepreneur.  
TPSF has a secondary objective to promote competitiveness, but improving 
competitiveness is bound up with streamlining government regulation. Heilman & Lucas 
observe that deterrents to business growth include corruption by public officials, 
intellectual hostility and cumbersome regulation (1997: 146); on the whole, business 
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membership organisations (BMO) only focus on the last of these. However, most of 
Tanzania's civil servants have “no experience of the needs of the private sector, and do 
not identify with the benefits generated by better services to entrepreneurs” (Temu & 
Due 2000: 704). 
4.3 Policy Novice: 1995 to 2008 
Initially TPSF employed five staff, under the leadership of Executive Director, Louis 
Accaro. An early paper (TPSF 2000) set out an expectation that dialogue and consultation 
would be promoted through TPSF and TNBC, but tempered this noting that consultation 
was dependent on securing resources. However, perhaps worried by its lack of 
resources, TPSF also set out roles to “encourage business associations to deliver services 
and infrastructure through expanded private investment in health services, transport and 
telecommunication, housing, water and sanitation, power and electricity” (2000: 3) and 
to provide association members with services such as their own member recruitment and 
retention, human resources development, strategic planning and fund raising. TPSF was 
not well known at this time and struggled to attract sufficient funding. Its main activity was 
the organisation of a quarterly breakfast meeting, with each sponsored on an individual 
basis (int. Simbeye 2015).  
Whilst the focus was more or less entirely advocacy, it was largely reactive: it wanted to 
engage but did not have the resource or competence to identify the critical issues let 
alone undertake good research to prepare persuasive policy positions. Nevertheless, it 
organised the private sector continuing the work started by UNIDO and, with others, 
secured government agreement to launch TNBC. At the launch of TNBC in 2001, Elvis 
Musiba, then TPSF Vice Chair, said that, prior to 1998, “the Government dialogued with 
the private sector on an ad hoc basis”, but that the launch of TNBC “symbolises the 
commitment which you Mr President and your Government has to building a strong 
private sector through dialogue” (speech at launch of TNBC, 2001 quoted in Irwin & 
Jackson 2015). Though TPSF lacked the funds to employ dedicated policy officers, and to 
be proactive in identifying issues, it did recognise the importance of engaging with 
government. TPSF aimed to build relationships with government and participate in 
dialogues, though it was not always prepared. Often it simply reacted to government 
requests rather than seeking to broaden dialogue to include the private sector’s priorities. 
It gave the impression that it knew what it ought to be doing (communicating the views 
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of the private sector to government and gathering intelligence from government and 
sharing it with business associations), but its lack of resources and competent people 
meant that it struggled. It is also not clear whether the government was open to lobbying. 
TPSF was, however, presented with an opportunity in late 2003 when the government 
launched Business Environment Strengthening in Tanzania (BEST) with the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Tanzania, the Tanzania 
Private Sector Foundation and four bilateral donors. This showed that the government 
was becoming serious about listening to private sector concerns, though it had been 
nudged into it by the bilateral donors. Arguably, BEST would not have been needed had 
TPSF been more competent, more persuasive and more effective in its first few years. 
Government did, however, see TPSF as a way of encouraging BMOs to work through a 
single organisation (int. Laseko 2011). 
In 2005, in common with other BMOs in Tanzania, TPSF was still weak institutionally 
(Hansen 2005). It was engaging in dialogue but mostly on an ad hoc basis. The only 
regular dialogue mechanism in which it was engaged appeared to be the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority’s Stakeholder Forum (Hansen 2005, int. Maganga 2011). It had not 
set up processes to support advocacy and was not employing dedicated policy officers 
(Hansen 2005). TPSF did grab the opportunity presented by BEST and attracted 
significant funding from BEST-AC – both to develop institutionally and to engage more 
effectively in dialogue and advocacy. TPSF was able to benefit from BEST-AC training. 
The downside of attracting donor funds is that donors worry about what happens when 
their money is no longer available. Up to this point, TPSF had been an association 
exclusively of other associations. Despite prioritising advocacy and representation, it 
failed to persuade a sufficient number of business associations to pay a sufficiently high 
level of subscription. To address the funding gap, it recruited corporate members, that is 
large companies who became individual members of TPSF rather than through joining 
one of TPSF’s association members. This annoyed the business association members who 
perceived TPSF as competing for members and simultaneously led to accusations that 
TPSF had been captured by a small number of corporates who were able to drive the 
agenda. Aggrey Mlimuka, CEO of the Association of Tanzania Employers (ATE) observed 
that “if the donors stopped [funding] today, it would collapse” but complained “it is 
competing with organisations for members. It should be an umbrella organisation, not 
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competing” (int. 2008). Nevertheless, by the end of 2008, some 70 per cent of 
subscription income came from corporate members (int. Accaro 2008). 
In a further effort to generate income, TPSF sought large contracts from the World Bank 
and in 2007 succeeded in winning contracts for three projects intended to boost business 
competitiveness fulfilling Wilson’s observation that “whatever else organisations seek, 
they seek to survive” ([1974], 1995: 10).  
It seemed that there was insufficient thinking about TPSF’s role and strategy. Esther 
Mwikuza, whose only experience of business was running an NGO which had the 
previous president’s wife as patron, was elected Chair in 2007. Soon after, the board 
decided that staff leadership needed to be strengthened. A CEO, Evans Rewikiza, was 
appointed, overseeing the ED, Louis Accaro; this move had the dual objective of 
implementing the World Bank projects and building TPSF’s advocacy capacity. The staff 
complement grew to more than 30 with the World Bank contract paying for everybody 
including the CEO. Inevitably, this resulted in advocacy taking a back seat. For a time, 
TPSF was not seen by BMOs as the legitimate voice of the private sector. Indeed, for a 
time, it was not even a voice: as Simbeye put it, “TPSF had to sing the World Bank song. 
Everyone was focused on ensuring the project was being delivered, so advocacy was a 
bit derailed.” (int. 2015). 
During this time, TPSF received support from BEST-AC – to support the organisation and 
employ advocacy staff rather than to support specific advocacy projects – and it did 
undertake some policy work. It made efforts to work in alliance with other BMOs, for 
example, working with the Confederation of Tanzanian Industry (CTI) on electricity, with 
the Association of Tanzanian Employers on skills gaps, with CTI and Tanzania National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry on issues related to the Common Market for East & 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and with the Vibindo Society on the Business Activities 
Registration Act. In all these cases, however, it appeared that the impetus came from the 
other BMOs, who felt that having TPSF on side could help their case (Irwin & Jackson 
2008). Whilst TPSF claimed credit for having influenced government, the other BMOs felt 
that any success was primarily down to their own efforts. Mlimuka of the Association of 
Tanzanian Employers commented that “I wish we were able to unite and speak with one 
voice. There is a danger of the government playing one against the other” (int. 2008) and 
indeed working together did deliver a more consistent message to government. 
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TPSF aimed also to work closely with government, especially with Better Regulation Unit 
that had been set up in 2004. Nevertheless, instead of uniting, BMOs complained that 
“TPSF does not consult enough” and that “they are more donor driven than member 
driven” (int. Kamote et al. 2008). Accaro recognised some of these shortcomings, saying 
that the issues that they took up were dependent on whether “the members come and 
shout”. He explained that TPSF had no process by which it consulted formally with 
members. As he put it, TPSF “did not ask them for their issues”. Nevertheless, some 
members raised issues that they wanted TPSF to take up. However, “most issues come 
from corporates, not the associations” (int. Accaro 2008). Accaro blamed this 
shortcoming on competence constraints explaining that this meant TPSF was unable “to 
plan or be strategic” (int. 2008). Consultants commissioned by BEST-AC to support BMOs 
complained that “TPSF tends to focus more on government raised issues” (int. Shimwela 
et al. 2008). Whilst the appointment of Rweziki as CEO might have been expected to 
address these problems, he did not create the mechanisms – such as better intelligence 
sharing with BMOs, gathering feedback from BMOs, creation of policy working groups – 
for TPSF to collaborate effectively with other BMOs (int. Simbeye 2015). 
TPSF finally appointed a policy officer in 2007, entrusted to build TPSF’s advocacy 
capacity and to develop a reform agenda, but the person started employing additional 
staff without authority and the appointment did not work out. In 2009, the board of TPSF, 
feeling that Rweziki was focusing too much on the World Bank contracts, commissioned 
an institutional review (int. Simbeye 2015). 
TPSF continued to give the impression of being reactive rather than proactive. During this 
first period of TPSF’s existence, it seems that there was little recognition of the need to 
engage, especially with government. The effort to build competence, particularly in areas 
like advocacy and argument, was insufficient with too much focus on mobilising 
resources – to keep the organisation in being – but not for advocacy. There was little 
focus on the importance of good evidence, as observed by the Better Regulation Unit, 
who suggested that BMOs do not have the competence “to do even rudimentary 
analysis, so look at the situation in a superficial way” (int. Lyimo 2008). 
During this period, TPSF was institutionally weak. It allowed the need for resources to 
drive its activity rather than being clear about its objectives and then seeking the 
resources. It wanted to influence policy but was unable to pull together the evidence, 
   
P A G E  | 93 
formulate credible proposals or make persuasive arguments. It failed to build relationships 
with government. However, it recognised these shortcomings and started to address 
them. 
4.4 Policy Networker: 2009 to 2012 
Change came in 2009 when TPSF began to make more effort to deliver on its objective of 
representing the private sector, though it also created problems by changing its 
governance arrangements. Prodded by BEST-AC, TPSF tried again to appoint a Director of 
Policy, Advocacy and Lobbying and, in late 2009, appointed Edward Furaha (int. Furaha 
2011). Furaha saw challenges, not least of which was a poorly organised private sector 
(which TPSF was expected to address) but also the lack of a common voice and the lack 
of mechanisms to engage with both the executive and the Parliament (int. 2011). 
Recognising that engagement with government was important but not sufficient, Furaha 
aimed to improve its research capability, to gather evidence, to formulate persuasive 
arguments and to prepare positions to influence policy. I assessed the papers written at 
this time and, on the whole, they were weak, reciting previous activity rather than making 
succinct and compelling policy arguments.  
TPSF did apparently achieve a major success however. TPSF nominated the private sector 
members of TNBC. Working through TNBC, in 2009, TPSF persuaded the Government to 
adopt a new strategy for agricultural development, known as Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture 
First) (Ngaiza 2012). Agriculture is a major employer and this proposal was embraced 
with enthusiasm by the Government. It is not clear, however, how much this success was 
down to TPSF (and the Agricultural Council of Tanzania who also claim credit), and how 
much this reflected what the government wanted to do anyway. However, it was helpful 
for all partners to credit the private sector with this success, thus raising visibility and 
building credibility. 
The institutional review was completed and proposed a strategy defining TPSF’s role as 
‘advocacy and lobbying’ (int. Simbeye 2015). It recommended, inter alia, reducing the 
board from 17 members to 11. This was implemented at the 2010 AGM. However, a 
large proportion of corporates and an arrangement in which every individual branch of 
TCCIA was regarded as a separate member skewed the membership and resulted in CTI, 
the Chamber of Mines and the Tourism Confederation of Tanzania (TCT) losing their 
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seats on the board. The chair, Esther Mwikuza, was re-elected, leading to more 
complaints from BMOs that she was not even a business woman (int. Rugimbana 2012, 
int. Simbeye 2015). Together, these elections brought to a head in-fighting that had been 
underway and CTI, TCT and the Chamber of Mines, together with Tanzania Bankers’ 
Association, withdrew arguing that TPSF was not sufficiently representative (Guardian 
2010), that TCCIA had too many seats on the board, that corporates had too much 
influence and that TPSF was not effective as an advocate on behalf of the private sector. 
A further consequence was that the executive committee of TNBC – which comprised six 
members from government and six from BMOs, including CTI, TCT and the Chamber of 
Mines – stopped meeting (int. Simbeye 2015) as did the TNBC itself. CTI attempted to 
launch an alternative apex body, at which point the government intervened. Specifically, 
Permanent Secretary Lyimo, Chief Secretary of the Government and Chairman of TNBC’s 
executive committee said that TPSF had to sort itself out and the TNBC asked the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO) to reconcile the differences, not least because, as already noted, 
the Government was very keen for there to be ‘one voice’ (int. Laseko 2011, int. Simbeye 
2013). As a result, a second institutional review was started. 
The report from this review was published in 2011 – and promptly opposed by CTI 
because it proposed a Council of 20 and an executive of seven and, presumably, a 
concern that the real decisions would be taken by the executive committee. So TPSF 
formed a third review committee, this time chaired by Salum Shamti, chairman of the 
Agricultural Council of Tanzania, which submitted a revised proposal at the end of 2012. 
This time the recommendations were acceptable and were endorsed by the board – and 
largely resolved TPSF’s governance issues: the key proposal was that TPSF members 
should be formed into 11 clusters with each cluster electing one director, together with 
the previous chairman, to give a board of 12. A new constitution was approved in June 
2013. The Chamber of Mines, Tanzanian Bankers’ Association and CTI all rejoined. 
This constant review and change of its governance arrangements coincided with the 
government taking action to improve Tanzania’s ranking in the Doing Business league 
table. It was important for TPSF to sort its governance arrangements – indeed, that is an 
requirement for an effective BMO – and it appears that it has subsequently made a huge 
difference. Simbeye, when interviewed in 2015, talked about the improvement: “TPSF is 
becoming more influential. Before the new board, we were receiving 4-5 letters a day 
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from the government and universities. Now it is 10-15 a day” (int. Simbeye 2015). 
However, during the period 2009-2010, the discussions on governance resulted in TPSF 
taking its eye off the policy process ball. For example, in 2009 the President decreed that 
the government should make more effort for Tanzania to improve its ranking in the Doing 
Business league table. A committee of Permanent Secretaries prepared a ‘roadmap’ and 
set up eight thematic task teams. The roadmap specified that the private sector should be 
involved in most of the task teams, but only two BMOs were actually named: the 
Association of Tanzanian Employers as a member of the employing workers’ task team 
and the Tanganyika Law Society as a member of the registering property task team (URT 
2011b: 149). However, the road map provided a hook for BMOs and TPSF to argue for 
more extensive engagement. 
In practice, it took Furaha until early 2011 to start creating mechanisms to promote more 
effective engagement and dialogue between the public and private sectors. He became 
much more proactive in relation to TPSF’s dealings with government. Furaha worked to 
improve TPSF representation on government working groups and task forces, especially 
those concerned with the Doing Business road map. He tried to address the perception 
of other BMOs that TPSF was a competitor rather than a collaborator (int. 2011) and 
made a conscious effort to network more effectively with other private sector 
stakeholders and to promote alliances, coalitions and collaboration. He had mixed 
success with this: whilst some BMOs such as TAHA and Vibindo worked with TPSF, 
usually on specific issues (int. Mkindi 2012, int. Kikuwi 2013, int. Bitegeko 2013), others 
were still frustrated. Hossein Kamote complained that CTI was “not close to what is 
happening; it is very confidential” (int. 2012) while Richard Rugimbana of TCT suggested 
that “TPSF has not been effectively initiating dialogue with government – it is filled with 
people who are not business people” (int. 2012). 
One area where BMOs have worked closely together has been on proposals intended to 
influence the budget. Furaha explained that the government each year in advance of the 
budget invited BMOs for their ideas for fiscal reform. Furaha felt that they collaborated 
quite well on this (int. 2011) but that there was much less co-ordination on other private 
sector proposals and, indeed, little consultation by the government (int. 2011). He 
suggested that sector specific associations generally had a good relationship with their 
sector Ministry, but that BMOs with a wider focus found it harder. He observed that they 
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would previously have taken up these issues through the executive committee of the 
TNBC, which as noted earlier had stopped meeting. However, TPSF did succeed in 
establishing a regular dialogue with the Office of the Speaker (int. Furaha 2011). Furaha 
stressed that it was important to address three critical audiences: principal officers in 
MDAs, Ministers and Parliamentarians, thus setting some clear targets. He had been 
doing more with Parliament and the improved liaison opened doors for further 
engagement. One of these was with the Parliamentary Committee on Energy and 
Minerals during the power blackouts crisis in 2011. Another was the creation of a budget 
committee (int. Furaha 2015). 
Furaha’s reasoning for developing better links with Parliament was that Ministries did not 
always take the private sector’s proposals sufficiently seriously and he felt that 
Parliamentary committees could exert more pressure especially in relation to fiscal issues 
(int. 2011, int. 2012). At the same time, Furaha continued to make efforts to involve and 
co-ordinate association members. Furaha perceived he was beginning to succeed when 
Parliament established a working group to review the tax base, invited TPSF to chair the 
group and to provide the secretariat and also invited 9 BMOs to participate (int. 2012). 
One of the successes perceived by TPSF to have come about through lobbying the 
relevant Parliamentary committee was to persuade the Government to reduce the skills 
development levy from 6 per cent of gross wages to 5 per cent (though there is an 
objective to reduce it further). TPSF was not the sole advocate for this and Parliament was 
not the sole target. They worked closely with other BMOs, especially the Association of 
Tanzania Employers. Simbeye was appointed to the government’s Fiscal Reform Task 
Force (int. Simbeye 2013) where he could put the case. TPSF employed a former 
Commissioner General of the Tanzania Revenue Authority who argued that a reduction 
in the levy would lead to less avoidance by the largest employers and better collection 
rates and thus more revenue for government. Indeed, the task force argued for a two per 
cent reduction, but the Minister was not sufficiently convinced and agreed to an initial 
one per cent reduction (int. Simbeye 2013). Following this experience, TPSF has 
continued to seek people with particular competence and links to government to make 
arguments on its behalf. 
Whilst Furaha was making a difference in TPSF’s external engagement, the board was 
worrying about the CEO: Rwezika was perceived by the board to be popular neither with 
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members nor with government. Indeed, a report commissioned by the Government 
implied that TPSF was not popular and that it did not represent the private sector (int. 
Simbeye 2015). As a result, Rwezika’s contract was not renewed. Instead, in March 2012, 
TPSF appointed a new CEO, Godfrey Simbeye. Simbeye had previously been Financial 
Controller so he already had an understanding of TPSF, its objectives and its relationships 
with both public and private sectors. He exhibited some much-needed leadership. On his 
appointment, he was told “to be different” – to rebuild relationships with members and 
government, to strive for the board to become influential and to raise TPSF’s visibility (int. 
Simbeye 2015). Simbeye explains: “I started to create the conditions for TPSF to be 
visible […] I wrote a letter to all government officers. The reaction was marvellous. They 
responded and said that they would work with us. From there we saw changes: TPSF is 
being invited to attend meetings and give comments” (int. 2015). Almost immediately, 
Simbeye was invited to join the Doing Business road map Permanent Secretaries 
committee (int. Simbeye 2013). 
Unlike his predecessor, Simbeye gave Furaha more of the support that he needed. TPSF 
engaged with the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs (int. Furaha 
2012). Simbeye took up TPSF’s earlier proposal to the Speaker that Parliament establish a 
Forum with the Chairmen of all the Parliamentary Standing Committees. This started in 
2012, giving BMOs better access to Parliamentary Committees. TPSF sought to develop a 
more formal relationship with key Ministries and Agencies including the Ministry of 
Industry, Trade & Marketing, the Ministry of Finance, the Tanzania Revenue Authority and 
the Ports Authority. Furaha recognised the importance of influencing policy officers and 
principal officers in Ministries, Departments & Agencies (MDA) – not simply going 
straight to the top every time, which is the typical approach in many sub-Saharan Africa 
countries. These officers are likely to draft the government’s policy positions and who 
later will implement them (int. Furaha 2011). The government preferred this approach as 
well (int. Janabi 2011). Helping the ministry policy officers look good with their managers 
may also help to ease policy proposals through the MDAs. Consequently, TPSF identified 
‘contact’ persons – people who might in due course become their champions – in key 
MDAs. It aimed to facilitate meetings between those key people and relevant BMOs. It 
anticipated that BMOs would have issues that they wished to explore but also hoped that 
this approach might be effective in setting an agenda. It became better at sharing with 
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other BMOs knowledge and intelligence gleaned from government. It anticipated that 
one result would be that they would then gather more intelligence from the other BMOs. 
Furaha appeared to make progress in developing TPSF’s relationship with Parliament and 
with public officials. Nonetheless, one area in which TPSF continued to struggle was the 
Doing Business roadmap thematic task teams. Up to this point, private sector 
participation had been low or non-existent. Furaha believed that the only two task teams 
that had actually involved the private sector were the two where the BMO was specified. 
Not only did this mean that the government was failing to live up to its promise to involve 
the private sector, it was also failing to tell them about the task team deliberations. Teams 
prepared reports at the end of each quarter, but these were not available publicly. 
Furaha concluded that TPSF had to take action to address this problem. He established 
private sector development working groups (PSDWG) comprising the BMOs most 
affected by the issues in each thematic area. The objective was to marshal the collective 
energy and expertise of the private sector in the roadmap process and stimulate 
government to take them seriously (IMED 2012). TPSF started with two pilot working 
groups: Trading Across Borders and Starting and Closing a Business. In March 2012, the 
Trading Across Borders PSDWG convened before the main thematic task team meeting at 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. The result was a strong and effective voice of the private 
sector at the task team meeting. It was anticipated that this approach would lead to more 
results and more action. One result of this new pressure was that the road map task 
teams which had not met started to meet. A further result was that BMOs started to push 
government harder. TPSF worried, however, that setting up nine working groups would 
be a challenge with their limited resources and that BMOs in general lacked resource and 
competence (int. Furaha 2011). Indeed, there was already a feeling that too many private 
sector proposals were not taken seriously by government (int. Furaha 2012). However, it 
made more effort to build and sustain a collaborative approach with other BMOs and to 
seek more institutional support for BMOs (from BEST-AC and elsewhere). This would 
allow BMOs to employ their own researchers, and thus to build the capacity of the BMOs 
rather than building the capacity of independent consultants.  
There was a perception within TPSF that their efforts brought the roadmap back to life at 
least in some areas. However, this reflected the need for private sector groups to be 
proactive in lobbying government since otherwise it was all too easy for government 
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simply to ignore them. The Prime Minister’s Office perceived that BMOs were getting 
better at understanding the issues, an important component of competence. However, 
not only were the BMOs not good at working together, they were too often at odds with 
one another (int. Lyimo 2011). Consequently, Furaha started to make more effort to 
involve the members, especially the association (rather than the corporate) members and 
aimed to coordinate them more effectively (int. Furaha 2012). He met quarterly with the 
CEOs of key BMOs. Papers produced by the working groups were sent to TPSF’s entire 
membership to seek feedback and which, in turn, improved TPSF’s member relationships. 
Furaha perceived that members supported his approach, saw TPSF becoming more 
credible with government and Parliament and so became more supportive generally (int. 
2012). 
However, they have not always been as effective in engaging with MDAs. Bede Lyimo, 
formerly head of the Better Regulation Unit and then an official in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, explained that some MDAs saw private sector advocacy as “helpful and 
informative” but that many “deny problems” and saw advocacy as “bothersome” (int. 
2013). His solution was for BMOs representing specific sectors such as tourism or 
horticulture or manufacturing to become more active, to engage more effectively and to 
build better relationships with their relevant Ministries. He confirmed Furaha’s assessment 
of the importance of influencing Directors and Assistant Directors in Ministries, saying 
that it is too easy for Ministers and Permanent Secretaries to agree to anything. However, 
if BMOs can build positive relationships with Directors and Assistant Directors, they 
probably only need to meet the Permanent Secretaries occasionally (int. 2013). 
During this second period, TPSF focused more on advocacy and representation, largely 
driven by Furaha with financial support from BEST-AC. Whilst it was important to resolve 
the governance issues, that necessitated time and emotion that was then not available to 
engage more extensively in advocacy. However, it made solid progress in engaging more 
effectively with Parliament and with MDAs as well as with other BMOs though it was still 
weak at framing issues, compiling evidence and preparing compelling arguments. 
4.5 Policy Entrepreneur: 2013 to date 
Two significant changes occurred in 2013: a new chair was elected and the World Bank 
contracts ended. The last piece in the governance jigsaw was put into place with the TPSF 
100 | P A G E  
elections held in August 2013: Reginald Mengi, one of Tanzania’s wealthiest 
entrepreneurs, was elected chair and Salum Shamti became vice chair. Unlike his 
predecessor, Mengi was vocal about the pernicious effective of corruption, had the 
confidence of the business sector and was influential in his own right (int. Simbeye 2015). 
This election meant that Simbeye had a chair who shared his vision of TPSF’s role and had 
the ear of government. This changed TPSF’s visibility immediately and arguably conferred 
more legitimacy as the voice of the private sector. With the ending of the World Bank 
contracts, TPSF lost a large part of its income. It reduced the staff to 15 and the remaining 
staff took a pay cut. It rented out surplus office space. Simbeye refocused TPSF to 
prioritise dialogue and advocacy. Whilst he regretted the loss of income, Simbeye 
worried that TPSF had been working for the World Bank, on projects unrelated to reform 
of public policy, instead of working for the BMOs and the refocusing mirrored his 
priorities. TPSF set up several standing committees including a Policy and Advocacy 
Committee. A proposal for mandatory membership of BMOs was floated and abandoned 
(Irwin & Jackson 2015: 26). 
Simbeye (int. 2015) was keen that TPSF should be clear that its objective was to promote 
private sector-led social and economic development by (i) providing members with 
services they value; (ii) understanding and representing their common interest; and (iii) 
engaging in effective advocacy with the Government. 
Providing member services meant that TPSF did not have the sole focus on advocacy that 
Simbeye expounded on taking office – and meant that dialogue secured less of his 
attention. The Prime Minister’s Office, too, lamented the lack of focus, saying that BMOs 
need to develop “concrete arguments, scientific arguments, balanced arguments” and 
that their focus should be on “study and advocacy” and giving more information to 
government rather than getting involved in service delivery (int. Laseko 2014). The 
interest group literature suggests that the ability to provide appropriate data, knowledge, 
expertise and opinions is critical in securing access to policy makers and potentially 
having some influence (Maloney et al. 1994, Bouwen 2002, Dür & Mateo 2012, Beyers & 
Braun 2014). The Presidential Delivery Bureau had a similar view, saying that BMOs 
“have problems providing data” and that “there is too much emotion […] and not enough 
data” (int. Ling 2015). BMOs that represent businesses may have to offer selective 
benefits to their members (Olson 1971, Wilson 1974, Schmitter & Streeck 1999), but an 
apex body, whose objective is to bring together other BMOs, should arguably be focused 
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on representation and advocacy. If they offer business services, they compete with their 
(BMO) members. Recognising this conflict, from his appointment in 2012, Simbeye set 
about refocusing TPSF’s work to concentrate on advocacy and dialogue. 
In its mission statement, TPSF explains that it is “the leading voice for the promotion of 
vibrant, innovative and a competitive private sector in Tanzania” (Irwin & Jackson 2015). 
TPSF aims to deliver its mission through six strategic objectives, though in fact three are 
about improving the way that TPSF works (Irwin & Jackson 2015). The other three are:  
 To facilitate communication, networking and flow of business information among 
members (thus improving relationships, knowledge sharing, alliance building); 
 To maximise the impact and voice of the private sector to lobby and advocate for 
issues pertinent to the sector’s growth (that is, engaging with government); and 
 To facilitate the growth of private sector business through enhancing enterprise 
competitiveness. 
As with Simbeye’s objectives above, the first two are about representation and advocacy. 
The third could be about making recommendations to both government and the private 
sector to improve competitiveness, which would complement the first two, or could be 
an excuse to undertake projects intended to improve competitiveness. In practice, TPSF 
seemed to do nothing in relation to this objective. 
The first objective, facilitating communication, implied that TPSF should have a role 
seeking information from government about proposals for regulatory reform and new 
legislation and sharing it with members, as well as sharing information about members 
with other members. However, TPSF says that, too often, fiscal reforms come as a 
surprise. For example, following a recommendation from the first Big Results Now 
workshops to increase the duty on beer and soft drinks by 45 per cent, the Minister for 
Finance proposed in the budget to increase duty by 40 per cent (int. Simbeye 2013). 
Given that the recommendation emerged from one of the workshops, perhaps it should 
not have been such a surprise. Following the budget statement, TPSF framed its argument 
in terms of potential job losses. It took breweries and soft drink manufacturers to 
Parliament in Dodoma to say that they would be forced to lower production (including 
the closure of at least one brewery and the loss of at least 850 jobs). As a result, the 
budget committee recommended that the increase be limited to 10% – and that was the 
final outcome (int. Simbeye 2013). Framing a problem in a clear and simple way can 
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make a difference to the way in which it is then perceived by government (Mahoney 
2008, Baumgartner & Mahoney 2008, Klüver et al. 2015) and is an important 
competence for a BMO. 
The Parliamentary working group on the tax base became the Parliamentary Committee 
on Fiscal Reform, with TPSF again appointed as the secretariat (int. Furaha & Gahhu 
2013). This goes beyond mere access and suggested that TPSF was becoming a member 
of a policy community, that is, a group within the government designing policy proposals. 
The work was concluded in January 2013: one outcome was the creation of a 
(permanent) Parliamentary Budget Committee. TPSF explained that it was now easier to 
go to this committee to raise issues – and this route was then used by TPSF and a 
consortium of other BMOs to avert the imposition of VAT on tourism services. TPSF does 
not always take the lead – indeed other BMOs would resist such dominance – but they 
do work in parallel, engaging with different audiences but seeking a common objective. 
For example, whilst the Tourism Confederation of Tanzania approached the Ministry for 
Natural Resources and Tourism and secured the support of the Minister for Tourism, TPSF 
engaged the Parliamentary budget committee (int. Furaha & Gahhu 2013). 
At the same time as it was trying to improve its relationship with government, TPSF 
continued to make efforts to improve its relationships with other BMOs. The director of 
policy at the Confederation of Tanzanian Industry, Hossein Kamote, for example, 
expressed the view that “TPSF has improved over the last year; it has become much 
better at representing the private sector […] have good people – especially the policy and 
advocacy team” (int. 2014). But not all the difficulties were addressed. As noted earlier, 
Confederation of Tanzania Industries rejoined TPSF after the adoption of the new 
constitution, but continued to say that they “wanted TPSF to strengthen the private sector 
[but they are competing]” (int. Kamote 2015). In other words, Kamote argued that TPSF’s 
role was to advocate on behalf of the private sector but they did not want them 
competing for members. The Tourism Confederation of Tanzania explained that their 
“relationship [had] improved and TCT was asking TPSF to take up issues on their behalf” 
(int. Rugimbana 2014). The Tanzania Horticultural Association worked with TPSF in an 
effort to get specific policy proposals into the party manifestoes in advance of the 2015 
election (int. Mkindi 2015). 
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It appeared that Simbeye began to think more strategically about how TPSF should 
engage with government. He began to see the importance of building links in a chain, 
that might eventually lead to policy reform, rather than arguing for the ultimate objective 
from the outset. For example, following a couple of opportunistic meetings with the 
President when Simbeye participated in trade missions, a meeting of the Tanzania 
National Business Council, which had not met since 2009, was convened in December 
2013 and chaired by the President (int. Simbeye 2013). At the meeting, Simbeye 
proposed – and it was agreed – that the Presidential Delivery Bureau (PDB) should, in 
addition to its existing mandate, review the constraints and overlapping regulations 
imposed by government on business. They agreed to add the business enabling 
environment to the Big Results Now (BRN) process and to recommend proposals to 
address those constraints. This is a good example of a BMO placing an issue of concern 
to business much higher on the government’s agenda. This was a major breakthrough: 
from 2004 till 2009, the focus on regulatory reform had come BEST; from 2009 till 2014, 
the main focus was the Doing Business roadmap task teams. In both of the these, the lead 
had come from the public sector. BRN gave the private sector the chance to participate 
on equal terms. As a result of Simbeye’s lobbying, a workshop on business environment 
reform was held over a four-week period in Feb-Mar 2014. (At DFID’s request, I 
participated for the first two weeks, nominally as an observer but was frequently asked for 
a view (Irwin & White 2014).) 
The President made a speech to participants during the first week, in which he stressed 
his commitment to the process and said that he was calling on all Ministries to move from 
“self-denial” to recognising that there are business environment problems that need to be 
addressed. He stressed the need for change from a state sector, socialist economy to 
a private sector, market economy, and explained that he recognised that a conducive 
enabling environment was critical to economic success. The President said that the 
government recognised that it had to create the conditions that would allow the private 
sector to thrive. He explained that they had to do it “for the sake of the country”. He 
recognised that there was a need to change the mindset of public officials: that they 
needed to be facilitative instead of obstructive (Irwin & White 2014). This reinvigorated a 
desire to improve the enabling environment: for example, the theme for TNBC’s meeting 
in 2015 was enhancing the business environment for sustainable growth. The President 
stressed the need for there to be a conducive business environment, for there to be 
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“better governance”, for there to be more “structured dialogue” and for improved 
“relations between government and private sector” (Kikwete 2015). Kikwete pleaded that 
“we should continue to work as partners rather than as foes or adversaries” (op. cit: 6). 
It seemed, then, that TPSF could put issues on the agenda and it could engage with 
government. As early as 2013, this was confirmed by Haji Janabi (int. 2013), at the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, saying that “TPSF are good partners”. Not only were they able 
to access policy makers but increasingly government wanted a private sector view on 
policy proposals and other activities. TPSF has built on this to become much more of a 
partner with the government. Table 7 summarises the one-off dialogues and consultations 
in which TPSF was actively engaged in just one quarter in 2015 (TPSF 2015). Whilst the 
list included participation in preparatory meetings for international trade negotiations, 
they also included more substantive policy advice, such as commenting on the oil and 
gas extraction policy proposals, on proposed revisions to the policy on small and medium 
enterprises and on the proposed public private partnership regulations. 
Table 7: Invitations to TPSF to engage in dialogue or consultation (2015 Q2) 
 Dialogue and consultation as part of preparations for the 25th Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) Trade in Services Forum (Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT), June 2015).    
 Consultation and dialogue on ‘Re-aligning Regulations and Institutions’ Work Stream of the BRN 
Business Environment initiative (MIT, May & June 2015). 
 Dialogue for launch of Tanzania Investment Report 2015 (Tanzania Investment Council, June 2015). 
 Consultation for EAC experts meeting on the implementation of the EAC-US Cooperation 
Agreement on Trade Facilitation, SPS, and Technical Barriers to Trade (Ministry East African 
Community (MEAC), June 2015). 
 Consultation on outstanding issues under the ‘Taxation’ Work Stream of the BRN Business 
Environment initiative (PDB, June 2015).  
 Consultation prior to Presidential State Visit to India (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), June 2015). 
 Dialogue on the SADC Investment Framework (Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), June 2015). 
 Dialogue in advance of the EAC-EU meeting to discuss Economic Partnership Agreement text 
(MEAC, June 2015). 
 Consulted on development of EAC Special Economic Zones Regulations (MEAC, May 2015).  
 Consulted on Ease of Doing Business Initiative in Eastern and Southern Africa (PMO, May 2015). 
 Consultation as part of the Steering Committee on ‘Contract Enforcement’ under the BRN Business 
Environment program (Ministry of Justice, May 2015). 
 Dialogue on the EAC Common Market Implementation Protocol (MEAC, May 2015). 
 Consultation on Non-Tariff Barriers for National Monitoring Committee meeting (MIT, May 2015). 
 Consultation on process of generating quarterly employment statistics from the Public and Private 
Sectors (Ministry of Labour, April 2015). 
 Consultation on the Oil and Gas related draft policies (Ministry of Energy & Mining, April 2015). 
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 Dialogue to review and update national SME Policy (MIT, April 2015). 
 Consultation on formation of Regulatory Licensing Reform Committee (MIT, April 2015). 
 Consultation on the process of collecting information for costing of the draft SADC Revised Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (MFA, April 2015). 
 Consultation on the African Growth Opportunity Act (MIT, April 2015). 
 Dialogue and consultation on the Private Sector Development Policy (PMO, April 2015). 
 Dialogue and consultation on the draft Private Public Partnership Regulations (PMO, April 2015).  
Source: TPSF quarterly report to BEST-Dialogue (covering 2015Q2) 
In 2011, the Government created a new Ministry of Private Sector Development & 
Investment. TPSF hoped that this would provide a further avenue to persuade Ministries 
not to behave in ways perceived as detrimental to business (int. Furaha 2011). By 2015, 
they had drafted proposed Private Sector Development legislation and invited TPSF to 
comment (TPSF 2015). TPSF was aiming to have quarterly meetings with the Prime 
Minister specifically to discuss business issues. They were working to create additional 
dialogue structures, for example, with the Ministry for East African Co-operation (MEAC). 
This, and other quarterly reports to BEST-AC, provide evidence that TPSF was regularly 
consulted by the government. Indeed, the government was asking for comments on 
more and more, which was positive, but they often gave just a few days in which to 
respond. The level of government consultation with TPSF indicated that it was seen by the 
public sector as a key voice of the private sector. They were consulted much more now 
than a couple of years ago (int. Simbeye 2015). A cynic might question whether the 
government genuinely wanted a private sector view, or was playing a game of 
consultation overload, asking TPSF for comments on everything on the basis that they 
could not cope. The challenge for TPSF was their lack of resources to respond effectively 
on all the topics on which they were consulted (int. Simbeye 2015). So TPSF set up a task 
team to respond more quickly (int. Simbeye 2015) involving more BMOs and thus 
potentially gaining faster access to more knowledge and expertise. TPSF appeared over-
stretched by the scale of the challenge. It attempted to work closely with other BMOs 
and even have them represent TPSF, to promote collaboration and minimise resource 
requirements, but that was not working as well as it might. Rather than trying to respond 
to every request, it may be that they needed to become better at prioritisation, focusing 
on the issues that they thought would deliver the most progress towards their mission 
statement’s desire to improve competitiveness. 
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In some developing countries access is seen as a problem, with policy processes that are 
remote and inaccessible (Court et al. 2005). In Tanzania, it is relatively easy to meet with 
policy makers. Gaining the trust of policy makers, and the opportunity to offer a view at 
an early stage in policy formulation, are usually more difficult. There has been a tendency 
for government to formulate policy proposals and then consult, not always effectively 
(Heilman & Lucas 1997, Mercer 2003). Elliott-Teague observes that, in Tanzania, the term 
‘policy’ refers to recommendations adopted by the Cabinet to guide policymakers as they 
prepare legislation and is more a statement of intent than a mandate (2008: 105). This 
appears to be changing. The evidence in Table 7 suggests that TPSF is now being asked 
to comment on drafts of proposed legislation before they ever get to Cabinet – and in 
some cases has been offered the opportunity to comment on successive drafts – and is 
thus seen as a policy making partner. This may also reflect Tanzania’s consensual culture 
(Wiredu 2015, Melyoki & Galperin 2017). 
Temu (2013) suggests that pressure for change is largely political, even in a country that 
seems to be overwhelmed by advisors from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies: politics 
trumps technical considerations. The desire to be seen to make ambitious 
announcements often leads politicians to ignore technical advice (Temu 2013: 60). This 
may be true but TPSF has been getting better at making arguments based on evidence. 
Indeed, it seems that civil servants are now more likely to involve them at an early stage, a 
big sign of success. This is confirmed by a number of MDAs. The Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, for example, says that TPSF offers advice and opinion, identifies the “right people” 
to meet and co-ordinates the private sector (int. Mjengo 2015). This is an example of 
member co-ordination but also relies on good networks and good intelligence. 
Whilst there was a growing commitment to consult – Lyimo perceived that the 
government had a partner in TPSF with whom they could work (int. 2014) – it was still not 
apparent whether the government listened to the responses. An approach to policy 
formulation in which the Cabinet can suddenly change the anticipated policy proposals 
has implications for lobbyists: they cannot relax until legislation is passed and there may 
still be opportunities to amend policy even after the Cabinet has agreed. The way in 
which TPSF worked suggested that they were increasingly vigilant, but timescales are 
often too short to respond in as much depth as they would like. This would require better 
intelligence, gathered through closer relationships, and more resources to ensure that 
they have the necessary evidence easily and quickly available. 
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In addition to government inviting TPSF to consult, it also invited TPSF to engage in 
dialogue. This provides better opportunities for each side to understand each other and, 
often, a chance to influence policy before it has been formulated. Table 8 summarises the 
key dialogues in which TPSF was engaged in the second quarter of 2015 (TPSF 2015). In 
one-off consultations, TPSF was generally expected to respond in writing. However, there 
were some topics that were regarded as requiring more discussion or needing 
representation on committees that met on a regular basis, to improve collaboration. 
Some topics, such as private sector development policy and public private partnerships 
offered opportunities for both consultation and dialogue. 
Table 8: TPSF selected dialogues (2015 Q2) 
 Fiscal reform agenda: engaged Parliamentary Committee on Budget; worked with the Presidential 
Delivery Bureau on taxation reform; co-ordinated private sector response to the budget speech. 
 Public private partnership: co-ordinated response to the draft public private partnership regulations 
and submitted to government. 
 Private Sector Development Policy: co-ordinated response to the proposed national Private Sector 
Development Policy. 
 Big Results Now: participated in steering group meetings (for ‘re-aligning regulations and institutions’ 
and ‘contract enforcement’); continued work on Initiative 10 (an initiative to realign regulations in 
which TPSF is seeking to address the problems of dealing with multiple regulatory agencies, a 
multiplicity of levies and fees, overlapping requirements for licences and permits, etc) and an overly 
complex regulatory framework). 
 Regional Integration Agenda: input into the Non-Tariff Barriers agenda and co-ordinates private 
sector involvement in the SADC Trade in Services agenda. 
 Simbeye […] networks with all the Permanent Secretaries and is a member of the National 
Permanent Secretary Roadmap Co-ordinating Committee. 
Source: TPSF quarterly report to BEST-Dialogue (covering 2015Q2) 
As with the one-off consultations, TPSF struggled to keep on top of all these. However, 
they demonstrate that TPSF was active with government. It is easy for MDAs to blame 
others for problems, so TPSF networking with the Permanent Secretaries and sitting on 
the National Permanent Secretary Roadmap Co-ordinating Committee means that MDAs 
cannot blame others for the problems. Rather, they can all agree who should be 
responsible for taking an issue forward. Simbeye also chaired a forum of BMOs which 
should deliver better sharing of intelligence and improved collaboration. 
TPSF’s revised governance structure resulted in more pressure (not least from their 
stakeholder clusters) to get involved in more issues and in more requests from 
government to collaborate. All stakeholders’ expectations have been raised. 
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Table 9: TPSF claims of success (12 months to July 2015) 
 Advocacy on Fiscal Policy Reforms 
 Persuaded Government to extend period from 3 years to 5 after which Alternative Minimum Tax 
is imposed on companies reporting a loss and thus not paying corporation tax.  
 Lobbied for the postponement of enactment of VAT Bill and Tax Administration Bill planned for 
June 2014 to allow for extensive consultations with the private sector. 
 Exemption for the agricultural sector from the Skills Development Levy. 
 Influence on formulation and review of policies, laws and regulations. 
 SME Policy 2003. 
 Draft public private partnership (PPP) Regulations. 
 Draft 3 of the Petroleum Policy. 
 Amended PPP Act 2014. 
 The Oil and Gas Revenue Management Bill 2015. 
 2nd Draft of the Private Sector Development Policy. 
 The Tanzania Extractive Industries, Transparency and Accountability Bill 2015. 
 Petroleum Bill 2015. 
 Local Content Policy 2015. 
 Development of Private Sector Compact. 
 Constituted a technical task force comprising of CEOs and leaders from the business community 
to provide strategic leadership and engagement to develop and roll out the compact. 
 Developed a Private Sector Compact. 
 Disseminated the Compact to the General Public. 
 Engagement in strategic dialogue platforms. 
 Convened meeting between the leaders of the business community (40 CEOs and Chairs of 
BMOs) and the Minister for Finance to discuss how to strengthen dialogue with the Ministry.  
 Mobilised private sector to participate in TNBC Executive Committee Quarterly Meetings on the 
assessment of implementation of reforms agreed in the BRN Business Environment workshop. 
 Engaged with the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Budget, Economy Industry and Trade, 
Energy and Minerals to discuss and present Budget Analysis, Finance Bill Analysis etc. 
 Influence on Regional and Economic Integration Policies and Practices. 
 Input on One Stop Border Post Bill 2015. 
 Organise and coordinate the EAC Secretary General Forum 2015. 
 TPSF Policy Scoping Study to remedy the exportation of Tanzanian rice to the EAC market. 
 Provision of input in the SADC Trade in Service negotiations. 
 Involvement in the monitoring of the implementation of the Common Market Protocol. 
 Involvement in the monitoring of Non-Tariff Barriers. 
 Input for negotiations for the establishment of Tripartite Free Trade Area (Common Market for 
Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA)-EAC- Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). 
 Provided input in the development of harmonised EAC standards i.e. Iron and Steel Standards, 
Food and Beverages as well as Detergents. 
Source: Correspondence from Edward Furaha to BEST-Dialogue 23 Jul 2015 
TPSF is asked by BEST-AC to record its successes, focusing on public policies or 
legislation that has been amended as a result of TPSF’s efforts. Table 9 summarises some 
of TPSF’s claimed successes over a one-year period. To some extent, the list has been 
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expanded to include other ‘successes’ presumably because TPSF wants to look good in 
the eyes of BEST-AC. It is also not always clear what success constitutes. However, there 
do appear to be some successes, such as amending the Alternative Minimum Tax and 
postponing the enactment of the VAT Bill. It does still appear to be the case, however, 
that TPSF is largely reacting to government rather than proactively seeking policy reform. 
A major ‘success’ during 2015 was persuading the government not to eliminate all the 
exemptions from VAT, as proposed in 2014, not least because removing exemptions 
would be a good way of spreading the tax net more widely (World Bank 2015). As noted 
in Table 9 , the Government agreed to a review of the proposal. TPSF marshalled 
effectively several BMOs, again recruited the former Commissioner of the TRA to act on 
their behalf and lobbied the Parliament hard. The consequence was that most of the 
exemptions were retained, irrespective of the economic arguments, when the revised 
VAT bill was finally enacted in July 2015. It was clear however that their approach did not 
win over all the government. The view of TRA was that “TPSF is not our good friend” and 
that “the private sector is more powerful than the government” (int. Maganga 2015). 
Given TRA’s approach to consultation and their perception of a desire amongst policy 
makers, encouraged by the World Bank (World Bank 2015), to widen the tax base, TRA 
was surprised when Parliament expressed the view that there had been insufficient 
consultation and then sided with TPSF (int. Maganga 2015). This left TPSF with at least 
one relationship that needed to be repaired – and suggested that TPSF was not always 
taking a sufficiently balanced view (ibid.) – and was occasionally willing to be antagonistic 
rather than always working on the basis of consensus. This example does, however, 
illustrate TPSF’s growing ability to prepare research evidence, to co-ordinate members 
(many of whom went to the Parliament) and to raise their profile. 
Another success appeared to come in the discussions related to the wording of the new 
constitution in 2014. The Government created a Constitutional Assembly to write a new 
constitution and TPSF’s CEO was appointed to that Assembly to allow private sector 
interests to be represented. This resulted, as reported by TPSF, in the inclusion of a 
provision which appears under Chapter 2 article 13 (2) (e) stating as follows: “To put in 
place conducive business environment and to expand investment opportunities”.4 This 
                                                 
4 In fact, the draft constitution includes in (d) “…creating favourable environment for motivating the private sector in the economy…” 
and in (e) “to provide favourable trading environment and to enhance investment opportunities”. 
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phrase was important as all legislation should then reflect this provision. Moreover, it 
reflected the language of the President at BRN described earlier, so it is likely that the 
impetus for this wording came as much from government as from the private sector. 
However, perceptions are important and this allowed TPSF to claim a “win” (though the 
revised constitution has still not been adopted). 
In the third period, TPSF has focused much more on advocacy and dialogue. It engaged 
with government more widely. It was much more likely to be asked for a view and to be 
asked to participate in dialogue. It sustained its relationships and aimed to broaden them. 
It built a competent advocacy team and was more focused on evidence and argument. 
4.6 Conclusion 
When one compares TPSF in 2016 to 2011 and earlier, it is evident that it has made 
considerable progress, albeit over a long timescale. It came into being as a result of the 
joint effort of public and private sector. It slowly recognised its shortcomings and built its 
competence, both individually and organisationally. It became more strategic. It started 
by building relationships and engaging in dialogue, generally at the invitation of 
government. It resolved its governance issues, so that its board and members now 
support its efforts rather than fighting them. It appointed a CEO focused on making a 
difference in policy reform, who is publicly opposed to corrupt practices and who has the 
confidence of the board. He has been able to be entrepreneurial and opportunistic in his 
approach to influencing government. He recognised the need to employ a professional, 
competent and dedicated policy team, and sought the resources required to do so.  
It is possible in addition to discern a number of competences which were not obvious at 
the outset of the research. These are summarised in Table 10, with a brief resume of the 
evidence. In most cases, the evidence could support more than one competence. There 
are some competences that did not feature in the summary of determinants in chapter 2. 
Specifically, TPSF has become better at taking advocacy one step at a time, through 
striving to seek consensus with other BMOs and with government, and in having the 
confidence to be opportunistic and proactive. Whilst governance, leadership and 
management are included in chapter 2, they are not given any degree of prominence. 
This case study, however, suggests that people, especially leaders, are very important. 
TPSF only began to make a significant difference when it appointed Godfrey Simbeye as 
CEO. He was able to support and encourage Edward Furaha as policy director, who until 
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Simbeye’s appointment had had insufficient support. The election of a chair with 
extensive private sector experience and networks raised TPSF’s credibility still further. Yet 
the importance of leadership largely does not feature in the interest group literature. 
Table 10: Summary of TPSF’s competences 
Competence Evidence 
Agenda setting At outset, struggled to put issues on the agenda. Now much more able to do so. For 
example, persuading President to convene meeting of TNBC and then persuading 
TNBC to add constraints on the enabling environment to the Big Results Now 
programme. 
Champion 
recruitment 
Did not originally have champions. Now, has been cultivating contacts in key MDAs 
with view to them acting as champions for TPSF. 
Collaborative 
(and coalition 
building) 
TPSF is the apex body, so one might expect it to collaborate widely and largely it does 
though that was not originally the case; however, it laments the lack of co-ordination 
on many proposals and limited consultation by government; TPSF claims to consult 
with other associations and to feed  information and intelligence back to them 
(though there is limited evidence of this); there is some evidence of TPSF co-
ordinating views, for example, in relation to the Government’s proposed Private 
Sector Development policy; aims to build coalitions. It was very effective in 
coordinating BMOs to lobby on VAT. It observes that good collaboration within the 
private sector makes it easier to work with government and holds up the tourism 
sector as an example. 
Communication Has become much more effective over the research period in communicating the 
views of the private sector to government. 
Consensus 
seeking 
Though there is the occasional exception, TPSF tends to work on the basis of 
consensus and agreement rather than opposition and confrontation. This is closer to 
the European style of lobbying than the US style. 
Dialogue Initially TPSF struggled to engage in dialogue but now has regular dialogue with 
Ministries and the Office of the Speaker; participates in government task forces 
including Prime Minister’s Office Regulatory Reform Task Force; continually looks for 
new opportunities to engage; engages through informal as well as formal 
mechanisms; utilised revised organisational structure, based on sectors, to create 
‘platforms for dialogue’. Works with other BMOs. 
Framing Becoming better at framing (for example, reframing issue of duty on alcoholic and soft 
drinks as one of job loss rather than reduced profitability). 
Governance Revised governance structure in effort to secure more commitment from members 
and potential members and more collaboration on a day to day basis. 
Intelligence 
gathering 
Worked more closely with other BMOs; talk to MDAs and remain vigilant. 
Leadership Current CEO has clear objectives; thinking strategically; rebuilt relationships that were 
fraying; created conditions for visibility; ended prioritisation of work for World Bank 
and instead prioritised dialogue and advocacy. 
Member 
coordination 
Originally made little effort to coordinate members. Now makes effort to involve and 
coordinate members, who are both associations and individual corporate members. 
Draft policy papers are shared to seek feedback. Members beginning to realise that 
TPSF can add value to efforts to lobby government and so are beginning to raise more 
issues. It has stopped competing with member BMOs to deliver services to business. 
Network 
development 
CEO networks widely, for example, with Permanent Secretaries of all the key 
Ministries, and is a member of the National Permanent Secretary Roadmap Co-
ordinating committee, but also on occasion with the President (vide TNBC 
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revitalisation and Big Results Now lab on the enabling environment); CEO chairs the 
business association forum. 
Proactive CEO insists that TPSF is proactive in developing relationships and engaging in 
dialogue. Furaha worked to improve representation. It persuaded the President to 
reconvene TNBC and to add the business enabling environment to Big Results Now. 
Relationship 
development 
Recognises the importance of relationships and that about more than just dialogue; 
recognises the importance of influencing policy officers and principal officers in MDAs 
and not always going straight ‘to the top’; have a good relationship with the Attorney 
General’s Office and thus get advance warning of bills (though effective dialogue with 
MDAs would tip them off much earlier); TPSF was appointed as secretary to the (ad 
hoc) Parliamentary Committee on Fiscal Reform, looking at tax reform, and this led to 
the creation of a (permanent) Parliamentary Budget Committee. 
Research 
capability 
Originally struggled to undertake research; now has improved capability to undertake 
research and prepare policy positions; utilises people with specific expertise, such as 
former TRA commissioner general. 
Resource 
acquisition 
TPSF is one of the better funded business associations, but that does not stop it 
complaining that it lacks the resources necessary to do everything it would like to do. 
Trust building Sees trust as important and perceives that there is not enough trust amongst BMOs. 
Visibility raising Worked through TNBC to secure government commitment to Kilimo Kwanza; 
appointment of Reginald Mengi as Chair. The CEO was appointed to the 
Constitutional Assembly. 
TPSF has become much better at gathering evidence, at writing research papers, at 
framing issues and at preparing policy positions. As a consequence, TPSF has made 
strides in improving the breadth and depth of TPSF’s engagement with government. TPSF 
and the government have forged a closer relationship.  It is now more effective in placing 
issues on the policy agenda. It speaks for the private sector but has not stopped other 
BMOs from lobbying as and when they see fit. Indeed, TPSF often open doors to help 
them. TPSF comes closest of any BMO in Tanzania to having its relationship with 
government “institutionalised” (the ‘holy grail’ of BMOs to formalise, in some way, their 
relationship with government) as evidenced by the large number of committees on which 
it now sits and the frequency with which it is now consulted by government. This appears 
to have been achieved through the commitment and professionalism of the key staff 
rather than through changes of attitude in government though the President has been 
aiming to change attitudes. It has improved its relationship with other business 
associations and indeed has become more proactive in all its relationships. Its influence, 
however, is still largely through responding to government requests for views and 
opinions rather than being proactive in seeking reform of policy or legislation. 
Being consulted does not mean that the government is interested in their views. Indeed, 
Court et al. (2005: 5) argue that political leaders may perceive proposals from civil society 
as illegitimate, increasing the power of the policy makers and simultaneously isolating 
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them from society with the inherent danger that policy responds to the needs of the elites 
rather than the majority. This implies that BMOs need to become more proactive, 
gathering intelligence and feeding information to policy makers and, perhaps, to 
recognise the iterative nature of policy formulation. TPSF appears to be doing exactly this 
– and the clauses in the new constitution evidence a belief that BMOs have a legitimate 
role to speak on behalf of the private sector, even if it has not yet been adopted. 
Some researchers argue that choice of venue is important (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 
Beyers & Kerremans 2011) often linked to efforts to raise public salience (Baumgartner 
2010). Whilst TPSF has utilised several venues – Ministers, public officials and Parliament 
– this seems mainly to have been a response to where the debate was taking place. They 
have, however, opportunistically lobbied the President and regularly lobbied the Prime 
Minister’s Office in efforts to make progress on issues that were being blocked elsewhere. 
They have also, on occasion, aimed to lobby multiple venues simultaneously, usually 
through co-operating with other BMOs. 
One area that has not yet been solved is that of resources. There is a view that donor 
dependence makes interest groups timid and another that it made it more difficult to 
influence government. Heilman & Lucas (1997) say that associations are dependent on 
donors for their funding and too timid in their relations with the state. It is true that BMOs 
are still overly dependent on donors, and TPSF is no exception, but then so is the 
Government of Tanzania. What has changed is that TPSF is no longer timid – its approach 
to the annual budget in general and to VAT in 2015 is evidence of that – but also that it is 
increasingly able to influence policy. 
Furaha sees challenges, not least because the private sector is not well organised, though 
that of course is part of the reason that TPSF was created. TPSF is good at networking and 
able to build coalitions, as evidenced by their approach to the VAT proposals, though it 
could do this more often. They have limited capacity and need to become better at co-
ordinating the private sector. They have created some 10 working groups but these are a 
challenge because so many BMOs are weak. There is still not enough trust amongst 
BMOs. It is difficult to access information from BMOs. TPSF says that it shares information 
with BMOs, though many BMOs would say that it could do better. TPSF has done well in 
organising the private sector in advance of the budget presented to Parliament each year. 
One role of an apex body, however, should be to secure consensus amongst the 
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community of BMOs when major differences appear and TPSF has generally been unable 
to facilitate compromise. 
TPSF demonstrates that an entrepreneurial CEO, and a competent, committed and 
determined policy team, can make a big difference. TPSF struggled for a long time to be 
clear about its role and to have the confidence to focus on that role. Organisations like 
TPSF do not have the time for the luxury of in-fighting. TPSF now seems to have put all 
that behind it and is focused much more clearly on dialogue. It has developed better 
relationships, has become more proactive and better able to take the initiative. When 
TPSF began to focus more on advocacy, it also began to have more success.  
There is limited evidence that TPSF is, even now, taking a strategic approach – which 
might see it become rather more proactive and more focused on a few specific areas that 
might ultimately have more impact. Rather it seems to be driven by government requests 
for a view and by opportunism. However, TPSF is beginning to think about this. For 
example, it would like to do more research and in particular to demonstrate a link 
between an improved enabling environment (achieved through policy advocacy) and 
economic growth. Importantly, TPSF sees the government improving: “The Government 
has changed for the better. They are more open. They involve the private sector in so 
many issues. They are more receptive. They listen.” (int. Simbeye 2015). TPSF is 
committed to work closely with the government for the good of Tanzania. 
Temu & Due assert that associations have had “little impact in influencing policy 
formulation” (2000: 705). Indeed, Heilman and Lucas (1997) say that it is difficult to find 
clear cases where business associations have been able to influence government. Based 
on the empirical evidence of TPSF and its interaction with government, this is no longer 
the case. TPSF has undoubtedly been able to influence reform of public policy. Moreover, 
it now exhibits many of the competences that appear to be important: compiling research 
evidence (evidence), preparing argumentation (expression), networking widely 
(engagement), communicating its position (expression), engaging in dialogue (expression 
& engagement). It is seen by government as a credible partner and credible 
representative of the private sector. There is still much to do, not least in becoming more 
proactive, but TPSF now has a strong foundation on which to build.  
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Chapter 5. Tourism Confederation of Tanzania: mixed fortunes 
5.1 Introduction 
The Tourism Confederation of Tanzania (TCT) is an apex association, with other business 
membership organisations as the only members. It was established in 2000 with 
encouragement from the Government to allow the government to speak more easily to 
the tourism sector. TCT has been chosen as a case study for three reasons. Firstly, tourism 
is important to the economy as a major contributor to GDP and the greatest earner of 
foreign exchange, so the government may be expected to want to collaborate with the 
sector and, indeed, Sen (2015) sees an open relationship between the tourism sector and 
the state. Secondly, TCT is the only BMO in Tanzania to have signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the government committing both to regular dialogue. TCT has, 
however, gone further and made particular effort to build a de facto alliance with the 
Tanzania Tourist Board (TTB). This is significant because examples of enduring public 
private coalitions are not often mentioned in the literature. Thirdly, whilst TCT has 
advocated on urgent issues as they have arisen, it has generally aimed to take a strategic 
approach – with an eye to the long term – encouraging the government to raise 
Tanzania’s profile as a tourism destination. 
TCT has made progress through a number of stages (it started as something of a novice, 
before this case study begins, and then became a reactor to government proposals, 
before becoming more proactive in its relationship with government). The case study 
offers evidence that TCT improved over time in its ability to influence policy of a technical 
nature, though it has struggled with more contentious issues. 
Like TPSF, the case study shows that TCT exhibits some of the characteristics that might 
be expected of a business association in a developed country, such as taking an insider 
approach. TCT has made efforts to collaborate and to understand the government’s 
position, to help officials do their job by providing information and opinion and to look 
for win-win solutions. It values dialogue. One of its members, the Hotel Association of 
Tanzania, is not shy about taking an outsider approach when necessary. The case study, 
therefore, also reviews the efforts that TCT has made to keep the sector united. More 
obviously than other BMOs, it has conferred legitimacy on government policies, though 
arguably government recognition of TCT also confers legitimacy on TCT. 
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The case study shows that the competence, inter-personal skills and longevity of the 
Executive Director, Ricard Rugimbana, are important. Moreover; lack of resource means 
that the ED manages the dialogue and advocacy – in partnership with members. He has a 
clear direction and a clear understanding of what is necessary to succeed. 
The chapter provides a brief background. It describes TCT’s advocacy activities, divided 
into two sections: issues where TCT has been reacting to government actions; and issues 
which might be regarded as more strategic and where TCT has been proactive. Rather 
than trying to describe everything in a chronological order, each issue has been treated 
separately, though they are introduced in the order of the issue first arising. The 
conclusion summarises the competences exhibited by TCT and draws out the key 
determinants of TCT’s success. 
5.2 Background 
Tourism is important to the economy of Tanzania. In 2015, it contributed about 12 per 
cent of GDP and about 10 per cent of jobs (WTTC 2016). It has overtaken all other 
sectors to become the biggest earner of foreign exchange. 
Originally established with six members, all associations, it had grown to 12 by the end of 
the period covered in the case study. It employs just five staff. TCT describes its objective 
as being to facilitate and assist members in the development of legal and responsible 
tourism (www.tct.co.tz, undated). As an apex body, it has always seen policy advocacy as 
a key role. TCT further explains that it aims to ensure that the voice of the tourism sector 
is heard by the public sector and that it aims to influence public policy that might impact 
on tourism. In addition to representation, it offers services to members including a travel 
guide and tourism directory and participates in travel fairs to promote Tanzania.  
Rugimbana has been at TCT since 2003, having previously worked in the Tanzania 
Tourist Corporation and then as a tourism consultant, so there has been a high degree of 
stability and an effective institutional memory. In the early days, much of the focus was on 
promoting tourism. Rugimbana explained that until the mid-1990s, tourism was 
dominated by the public sector (Tanzania Invest 2006). However, since then, the private 
sector has become increasingly important (ibid.). The government set out an ‘integrated 
tourism master plan’ in 1991 (Beye et al. 2006) updated in 1996 (Chambua 2007). A 
national tourism policy (URT 1999) was adopted in 1999. The master plan was revised 
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again in 2002 (Beye et al. 2006). Despite a formal role to represent the sector, it seems 
that TCT did not engage effectively with government at this time. The turning point came 
with the creation of the donor funded project to support business association advocacy, 
BEST-AC, which provided TCT with training and occasional funding – important because 
TCT felt that business associations were immature yet being expected to participate as 
equals at a high policy level (int. Rugimbana 2006). In other words, TCT recognised a 
need to develop its competences. 
By 2006, TCT was working with the government – to develop a strategy to promote 
tourism in the south of Tanzania – and the government was more regularly consulting 
TCT (int. Rugimbana 2006). Indeed, Rugimbana characterised TCT’s relationship with the 
Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) as good, saying that “they listen and 
there is constant improvement in the various policies, regulations and procedures” 
(Tanzania Invest 2006), though it was not always clear that this was the case. At this time, 
Rugimbana criticised the large number of licences required by tourism businesses and the 
high level of taxation (Tanzania Invest 2006) and it seems that little has changed. 
5.3 Reacting to government  
5.3.1 A row over park fees 
In July 2007, without prior warning, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
announced large and immediate increases in the fees for hunting and photographic 
safaris. Photographic fees would increase from $20-30 to $100 per tourist, and hunting 
fees from $2,000 to $25,000. Then, in August 2007, again without warning, the Tanzania 
National Parks Authority announced an immediate increase in concession fees (a tax 
levied on people staying in lodges or hotel situated within a game park) (Hansen 2008). 
TCT had two concerns. Firstly, tour operators would be unable to pass on the increase in 
fees for bookings already taken, given that bookings are made 6-12 months in advance 
and European Union law prohibits increases of more than two per cent after signing a 
contract (Hansen 2008). Secondly, the suddenness of the change would signal to 
international investors that the investment climate in Tanzania was becoming 
unpredictable. 
TCT members agreed that the issue needed to be contested but had different views on 
tactics. Some wanted to go to court, a strategy often used in developed countries (Berry 
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1997), but Rugimbana advised against this because of the possible damage to their 
relationship with government. “You still have to deal with government and going to court 
would mean […] the relationship would be bruised” (int. Rugimbana 2010). The 
immediate aim was to stop the government introducing fees within the season but TCT 
also had a more strategic aim of promoting tourism as a partner of government. It 
explained to government that the sector appreciated that it needed to pay fees, but that 
sudden increases in the middle of the season damaged competitiveness and made 
Tanzania look untrustworthy and unpredictable. TCT explicitly sought a result that could 
be positioned as a win for government and themselves by solving the immediate problem 
– not to have fees raised without sufficient notice – but also advocated a consultation 
and dialogue mechanism to decide when and how fees would be raised in the future, so 
that the problem would not recur.   
TCT sent letters in early August – to different agencies, to the Permanent Secretary at 
MNRT and to the Minister – and BEST-AC was asked for a small grant (Hansen 2008). 
TCT met with the Permanent Secretary in mid-August; it prepared an interim impact 
assessment by 28 August; and on 30 August it presented its report (covering park fees, 
hunting fees and concession fees) to the Permanent Secretary. The report contained 
emails from travel agents in Europe showing complaints and legal threats from customers, 
demonstrating TCT’s ability both to network widely and to gather compelling evidence. 
Rugimbana prepared a document and requested the Permanent Secretary convene an 
emergency meeting of relevant stakeholders (int. Rugimbana 2010). This the Permanent 
Secretary did, within the week. TCT’s governing council, which had representatives of its 
then nine members, considered tactics and arguments. Good framing can make a 
difference (Baumgartner & Mahoney 2008, Klüver et al. 2015) and TCT framed the issue 
as one of accepting the increase in fees but seeking to delay implementation rather than 
suffer lasting damage from a last-minute approach. Soon after, the Ministry announced a 
delay in implementation until July 2008.  Rugimbana stressed the need for collaboration: 
“As partners, we need to address this issue in the interests of tourism” (int. 2010). 
This shows how TCT aimed both to solve the immediate problem (dealing with 
unannounced park fees) and the longer-term problem (accepting the need for periodic 
rises but with consultation and then longer notice periods). Indeed, the government 
accepted the need to rethink notice periods and agreed that future proposals for 
increases in fees should be negotiated a year in advance, so that the market could 
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prepare. Rugimbana claimed that “the evidence produced by TCT no doubt played a role 
in persuading the government to change its stance” (Hansen 2008: 7) and that the 
statements from the EU-based travel agents provided “one of the arguments that caused 
the Ministry to accommodate TCT” (ibid.). Accepting the political decision, but seeking 
delay fits the theories of Michalowitz (2007) and others that it is easier to exert ‘technical 
influence’ than shift political interests. It is clear however that TCT could not have 
undertaken its advocacy activities without the resource provided by BEST-AC (Hansen 
2008) to some extent confirming the view that advocacy is not possible without at least 
some resource (Mahoney 2008, Braun 2012). 
5.3.2 Formalising dialogue 
It seems that the relationship between TCT and MNRT improved as a result of the park 
fee lobbying. One consequence was that MNRT approached TCT to ask if they would 
work with them to prepare for a joint meeting with the Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(Hansen 2008). Rugimbana later noted that “this is monumental as we are going there 
together” (Hansen 2008: 9). Rugimbana perceived that a further consequence was that 
his members were “taking TCT more and more seriously” (ibid.). Whilst the Government 
consulted TCT regarding the Tourism Act of 2008, it seems that this improved relationship 
did not result in TCT being able to influence the Act, which TCT later described as a long 
list of “do’s and don’ts”. 
Nevertheless, the advocacy on park fees and a degree of proactivity from TCT spurred a 
re-appraisal of the relationship which resulted, in 2010, in TCT and MNRT signing a 
memorandum of understanding, for an initial period of five years, in which they 
undertook to work together on the issues in the industry. TCT would act as the secretariat 
for two years and then the Ministry would take on the task for two years. The group was 
to meet at least six-monthly, with a set agenda that always included tourism development. 
The MoU stated the intention of  
enhancing a collaborative and effective partnership […] that addresses key 
issues in the tourism sector and which ultimately provides cost effective and 
efficient services […]; building a foundation of trust and confidence that builds 
and encourages both parties to explore best practice, emerging trends, new 
ideas and a better understanding of the challenges and issues facing the sector 
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[…], and working together to build and develop a tourism industry that is 
sustainable, culturally and environmentally friendly. And through a 
consultative process solicit views and ideas aimed at developing appropriate 
policies, legislation and strategies that will enable the creation of a conducive 
business environment in which international and domestic tourism will 
prosper (MNRT 2010).  
The memorandum was important because, as Rugimbana explained: “If you don’t have a 
formal forum to dialogue with government formally, when staff change you start up 
afresh” (int. 2010).  
The public sector also recognised the importance of developing and maintaining the 
relationship. Ibrahim Mussa, Director of Tourism at MNRT, emphasised that, in tourism, 
the dialogue between the public and private sector was very strong. The committee gave 
a structure and transparency. He observed that: “We don’t have to agree, but we do have 
to talk.” (int. Mussa 2011). MNRT saw TCT as important, not least in ensuring that the 
sector was heard by government. But there seemed also to be an expectation that TCT 
could ‘sell’ government decisions to the sector, reflecting a view that interest groups can 
confer legitimacy on those decisions (Taylor & Warburton 2003). 
5.3.3 A collaborative approach 
The interest group literature maintains that coalitions, alliances and collaboration lead to 
greater effectiveness (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Indeed, TCT has strived to collaborate 
with others, both through working together and through attempting to improve linkages. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given their mutual interests, TCT and the Tanzania Tourist Board 
(TTB) worked closely together, often meeting in advance of formal dialogues with MNRT, 
for example, to share views. Dr Aloyce Nzuki, Managing Director of TTB, was clearly 
proud that tourism was the only sector with an MoU with the private sector. He 
explained: “We have moved ourselves from competitors to business partners.” (int. Nzuki 
2011). The benefit for TCT was that participation in the committee was at a senior level 
and included decision makers who could address TCT’s issues. The Tourism Board, too, 
benefited from the arrangement. Nzuki observed that “the private sector will say 
something we have been dying to say to our superiors and have a higher chance of being 
taken seriously” (int. 2011). 
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Even with the MoU, there were ups and downs and meetings did not always take place. 
However, Mussa noted the positive relationship. “We recognise TCT. We have a very 
good relationship. We meet them when they need us. That sense of closeness is there. 
They can meet me or the Minister.” (int. 2011). 
Whilst TCT had a good relationship with MNRT and TTB, it was keen to develop better 
relationships with other agencies, such as Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), 
which tended to act without consultation. As a result, TCT lobbied for private sector 
representation on the boards of all the agencies and relevant MNRT committees. They 
thought that they had made considerable progress when a new Minister, in 2013, 
advertised all the board positions in the press. TCT asked MNRT that all private sector 
applications go through them, so that they could ensure that people represented sectoral 
rather than personal interests, and this was accepted. The result was that the Secretary 
General of the Hunting Association was appointed to the committee that allocated 
hunting blocks and three people (from Hotel Association of Tanzania (HAT), Tanzania 
Association of Tour Operators (TATO) and TCT were appointed to the Ministerial 
Tourism Advisory Committee. TCT was clear to its nominees that they would be expected 
to collect views from the private sector prior to meetings and share information 
afterwards – and TCT would aim to co-ordinate this. 
TCT was grateful to join the Advisory Committee but argued that this arrangement was 
still not ideal, as private sector representation was at the behest of the Minister, and they 
would have liked to see the arrangements institutionalised (by which they meant, written 
into law, seemingly without recognising that successive Ministers could change the law). 
TANAPA seemed to present a special case: not everyone was persuaded by the 
arguments in favour of private sector representation. Mussa (int. 2012) argued that the 
private sector was represented on boards for areas directly relevant, such as the National 
Tourism College and the Licensing Authority and that TANAPA was a special case 
because it was politically sensitive and had broader motives than the private sector’s 
interest in profit such as environmental sustainability. Mussa explained that the legislation 
already allowed the Minister to appoint the private sector to TANAPA’s board, although it 
did not require it. 
This all gave the impression that TCT was tolerated rather than welcomed: they had built 
a relationship in which government and private sector talked to each other regularly and 
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which appeared warm. However, it also seemed that they were invited only to participate 
in fora where the government thought that they would be positive and supportive but 
were excluded from fora, such as TANAPA, where they were likely to be difficult. 
5.3.4 Influencing proposals for a tourism levy 
In 2010, the government proposed to introduce a ‘land rent’ on tourism on the basis of a 
fixed fee per business, though a development levy had been proposed in 2008 (int. 
Mussa 2013), on the grounds that other countries did something similar and that it was 
okay because “it is paid by foreign tourists” (op. cit.).  
TCT persuaded MNRT that a tourism development levy was a better option than a land 
rent, again accepting the political imperative but aiming to influence government to 
implement in a different way, that is, focusing on the technical aspects (Michalowitz 
2007). Discussion then dragged on for years until, in 2013, the CEO of the Hotel 
Association of Tanzania (HAT) met with Minister Kagasheki and pointed to the 
experience of South Africa where, she explained, a tourism development levy was self-
assessed and voluntarily paid, the funds were managed by a private sector committee 
and disbursed to the government institution for tourism, after submission of a specific 
proposal. TCT could see the benefit of a scheme such as this, especially as part of a wider 
tourism strategy (q.v.). 
The Government’s initial plan was to impose the levy at two per cent of the bed and 
breakfast rate (calculated in dollars, with a variable exchange rate, and no thought about 
what constituted the bed and breakfast rate). TCT and HAT persuaded the government 
instead to apply a flat rate of $1.50 per bed night (int. Sykes 2014). Collection initially 
applied only to larger hotels and immediately ran into problems. It was collected by TRA, 
who did not have a dollar account. HAT suggested that all agree a fixed conversion rate 
for six-month periods – and this was adopted (int. Sykes 2014). However, the industry 
was upset when they discovered that TRA was taking five per cent of the proceeds to 
cover their own costs and suggested that perhaps HAT could do this instead, which 
would at least have the benefit of contributing funds to HAT. 
The government set up an advisory committee to determine how the money raised 
should be spent and the CEOs of TCT and HAT were both appointed (int. Rugimbana 
2014). HAT understood from discussions with MNRT that approximately 60 per cent of 
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the levy would go to TTB to support implementation of the marketing strategy. It 
anticipated that this would be matched by a gradual tapering of government support for 
the Board. The medium-term plan of the government was to transform TTB into a semi-
autonomous (and presumably fee-earning) agency, which would take on the practical 
functions of the Tourism Ministry, such as quality control and licensing, leaving only the 
policy work in the Ministry. They anticipated that 20 per cent would go to the National 
College of Tourism and the final 20 per cent to Ministry’s general budget. This rather 
negated the need for a committee (int. Sykes 2014). Two years after initial 
implementation, the committee had met only once – for its inaugural meeting – and there 
was growing discomfort in the sector about how the money was being spent (int. 
Rugimbana 2015). The director of tourism at MNRT, by then Zahoa Kimmage, did not 
seem to think that this was a big problem (int. Kimmage 2015) but for TCT it was a “hot 
issue” (int. Rugimbana 2015). 
Collaboration over the tourism development levy was important to TCT. It was more than 
just dialogue: TCT aimed not only to shape the way in which the policy developed but 
also worked hard to sell it to the sector. Their effort shows the difference that TCT could 
make when it provided good evidence and solid argument, reflecting the belief that 
officials welcome good information and opinion (Bernhagen et al.2015). It is clear that 
TCT worked closely with MNRT in the design of the levy. They provided advice whenever 
the process ran into difficulties. They sold the idea to the sector, on the basis that this 
could help everybody, and gave it a legitimacy (Taylor & Warburton 2003). As soon as 
the government secured its position, however, it gave the impression of ignoring TCT. 
5.3.5 Perceptions of success 
Despite some of the apparent challenges, in 2010 Rugimbana perceived that TCT had 
benefited from the support that it received from BEST-AC: “If it wasn’t for BEST-AC we 
wouldn’t have achieved what we achieved. TCT had concentrated on providing services 
but BEST-AC emphasised the importance of advocacy.” (int. Rugimbana 2010). TCT 
aimed to build its competence (participating in training for example and in mobilising 
resources); to ensure that it had reliable and comprehensive evidence with good 
arguments; and to engage government effectively, building alliances, sharing knowledge 
and promoting dialogue. Rugimbana (int. 2010) offered a number of lessons from TCT’s 
advocacy work: Firstly, reflecting the assertion of Hall & Deardoff (2006) that evidence is 
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essential, he emphasised that “to be able to do successful advocacy you need data 
readily. It is no good just turning up with a long shopping list complaining.” Secondly, 
close collaboration with other BMOs makes a difference: “associations need to work 
together as a team and have a single voice […] the sector is united.” Thirdly, you need to 
understand what government wants: “when you approach the government, you have to 
try and arrive at a win-win scenario” so adopting the most appropriate strategy for each 
issue and finding the right arguments is important. Rugimbana recognised that it can take 
time to persuade government: “the challenge is to convince government. Even if the 
government is interested, they are very slow. They are still a big player that doesn’t see 
the role of the private sector and the way various acts impinge on their performance. It is 
a mind-set which takes time to address.” As a result, Rugimbana perceived that “the 
government now sees TCT in a different way, as adding value to government not like a 
labour union shouting. Whenever the Ministry has an issue, they always consult TCT.”  
5.3.6 Concession fees - again 
The real challenge for TCT was that the government did not see many of its decisions, or 
those of it agencies, as issues. As a result, the issue of fees blew up again in 2011. This 
time it was concession fees, that is, fees levied on hotels located within the national parks. 
The argument for concession fees was that they provided additional resource to enhance 
tourism facilities and to enable TANAPA to engage in conservation, which the Minister 
argued was not a competence of the private sector (int. Rugimbana 2012). When 
concession fees were introduced, TCT had argued for a percentage, rather than a fixed 
amount as proposed by the government, on the basis that the government raise more 
income as the lodges attracted more customers; government did not trust the lodges, so 
TCT offered to police the system (int. Rugimbana 2011). In early July 2011, with only four 
weeks’ notice, and in contravention of the agreement concluded in 2007, TANAPA 
announced an increase. TANAPA’s arguments were that they had been ‘forced’ to sign 
the original agreement, that the formula for concession fees was too complex, that their 
overall income had gone down, and that the figures submitted by businesses were not 
accurate. TCT’s countered that the agreement was signed, including by two MPs now in 
the Cabinet; that TCT, perhaps disingenuously, would have been happy to come up with 
a fixed fee instead of a formula if it had been consulted; that hotels paying the concession 
fees reported that the agency had collected more money not less so the gap between the 
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collected and reported fees must be accounted for internally and perhaps individually; 
that TANAPA did not share the declared business figures with TCT as had been agreed so 
that TCT could not check whether they were accurate; and that Tanzania Association of 
Tour Operators (TATO) was committed to helping with enforcement but TANAPA had 
not reported a single case to them. 
In an effort to delay the increase, HAT resorted to the courts with an expectation of a 
hearing in August 2011. Again, favouring dialogue over court and seeking to avert what 
they perceived would be a publicity disaster, TCT asked the Minister to step in “to avoid 
washing our dirty linen in public” (int. Rugimbana 2012). TANAPA and HAT met with the 
Minister for Tourism in June 2012 resulting in the agreement of a draft MoU which 
TANAPA refused to ratify, with TANAPA arguing for a fixed fee per bedroom irrespective 
of whether it was occupied (int. Rugimbana 2012). 
The court case was finally settled in 2014, some three years after the issue arose, allowing 
TANAPA to levy a fixed amount of $30-$100 per person per night. HAT regarded this as a 
win as they had delayed the imposition for long enough to prepare (int. Sykes 2015). 
This issue showed that TCT had a sufficiently good relationship with MNRT that it could 
secure access and discuss issues, reflecting the assertion of Fraussen (2013) that interest 
groups and policy makers need to understand each other. It also suggested, however, 
that at least one agency and one BMO were happy to plough their own furrow and 
simply ignore both Ministry and TCT policy, reflecting the expectation of Poppelaars 
(2009) that interest groups will compete for access and influence. That meant that TCT 
had to be vigilant and ready to go to the Ministry whenever an issue blew up. Going to 
court is often seen as failure or at the very least the last refuge, but HAT has used it 
successfully to delay issues so that the sector has time to prepare and to introduce greater 
transparency into the process. 
5.3.7 Taxation 
Like most BMOs in Tanzania, TCT had a view on taxation though, as with many of its 
other issues, TCT tended to react to proposals, or anticipated proposals, from 
government. It has had mixed success in lobbying on taxation, achieving more success on 
very narrow issues and little success on broader issues. For example, the Government 
proposed in its 2013/4 Finance Bill four changes that TCT perceived would adversely 
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affect the tourism industry, which TCT aimed to avert through lobbying the Parliamentary 
Budget Committee as well as the executive. The proposed changes covered (a) the 
removal of VAT exemptions from a range of tourist services (without notice and without 
consideration for the potential impact on competitiveness); (b) the abolition of 
‘withholding tax exemption’ on payments for aircraft lease rental (which would make 
safari flights more expensive); (c) the imposition of excise duty on smaller aircraft, as 
typically used by safari operators (again affecting competitiveness); and (d) a reduction in 
the import duty exemption on ‘deemed capital goods’ for items relevant to tourism, such 
as cutlery, furniture, fridges and beds.  
TCT claimed that these changes would end a period of growth in tourism and cited 
examples of how changes the other way had previously stimulated growth. It argued that 
safaris would become more expensive in Tanzania than in Kenya, to which it would lose 
trade: “through this budget, the Tanzanian government is proposing to make it almost 
impossible for Tanzanian operators to operate locally let alone survive against regional 
and international competition.” (int. Rugimbana 2013). Rugimbana reminded the 
government of all the other taxes and levies imposed on tourism, including park fees and 
the Tourism Development Levy and that “taxes cannot be collected from closed 
businesses” (int. 2013). They further argued that tourism should be treated as exports (as 
it had been previously, hence the VAT exemptions (int. Akko 2014)) and suggested that 
the reputation of Tanzania as a tourism destination would be tarnished if costs were seen 
to rise unpredictably. Importantly, and once again, TCT rustled up supporting letters from 
European travel agents. Indeed, tour operators had already started cancelling bookings. 
TCT argued that growth in tourism would, in due course, provide the government with 
the extra revenue it was seeking, whereas raising costs too far would almost certainly 
result in a reduction in tourism, and thus a reduction in revenue.  
As a result, the Government agreed to continue to exempt tourism services from 
additional VAT (int. Rugimbana 2013) and not to impose excise duty or withholding tax 
on aircraft (int. Rugimbana 2013). It did not win the argument over deemed capital 
goods. 
In this instance, TCT was successful in averting proposals to change the way in which 
tourism businesses were taxed. But by reacting to proposals, rather than working with 
government on long term solutions, it was likely that proposals such as these would 
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reappear regularly. Indeed, the World Bank (2015), amongst others, had been pressing 
the government to broaden the tax base and saw removing VAT exemptions as one way 
of achieving this aim. The Tanzania Revenue Authority said that it had heard too often the 
argument about economic growth leading to increased tax revenue and that changes 
rarely resulted in the promised growth (int. Maganga 2014) so it was becoming harder for 
associations to use that argument. In a rare admission of corruption, it also transpired that 
a handful of tourism companies may have offered inducements to the Parliamentary 
Committee to avert the proposed VAT changes (int. Akko 2014, int. Sykes 2014). Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the issue returned in 2016, but no-one was ready for it. As the Daily 
Telegraph reported, “Tanzania’s safari industry has been thrown into absolute 
pandemonium in every conceivable way, after the African country’s government 
introduced an 18 per cent VAT tax on tourist services with just a week’s notice” (Morris 
2016). 
TCT’s approach to taxation suggests that its predominant approach was reactive and 
short term. It seems that it was unable to apply the principles that it had adopted in fights 
over park fees and concession fees in which it aimed for a short-term fix and then to 
lobby for a longer-term solution as well. This may simply reflect TCT’s small team and lack 
of resources. 
5.4 Proactive with government 
5.4.1 Tourism marketing strategy 
Until 2009 or so, TCT’s advocacy was based on single issues and, as with the park fees 
and hunting licences, was largely reactive. However, this did not address the fundamental 
problems facing the industry. TCT wanted to take an holistic view of the industry and, 
with financial support from BEST-AC, commissioned a value chain study (looking at all the 
links in the tourism supply chain) aimed at providing a long-term view. Rugimbana 
emphasised that “this approach was only possible through BEST-AC; before that we were 
always reactive, so our successes were inconsistent” (int. 2011). He went on to explain 
that this way of working demonstrated the value to the government of TCT as a source of 
research evidence and opinion: “We can add value to the industry, we are not just 
complaining” (int. Rugimbana 2011). 
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The value chain study (Kashangaki et al. 2009) analysed the total cost of regulation and 
considered the scope for simplification. It identified the main weaknesses of the tourism 
industry. TCT proposed to work with the government to agree target markets for tourism 
“so all efforts of the two are geared towards the same direction” (int. Rugimbana 2011). 
This included the introduction of the tourism development levy described earlier. 
The value chain study was followed in 2010 by a review of the business environment, 
also commissioned by TCT, for the tourism sector (Raheem & Mkindi 2010). This looked 
at the myriad of taxes, licences, levies and regulations imposed on tourism businesses. 
In July 2011, TCT recruited consultants to prepare a marketing strategy. Rugimbana 
expected the strategy to identify specific foreign markets to be targeted in a coordinated 
way and to develop domestic and regional tourism. As he later explained “Now we will 
all agree on which markets to concentrate. We will continually review progress and see 
what needs to change.” (int. 2011). Having a joint marketing strategy, attracting more 
tourists to Tanzania, encouraging the government to put more money into the budget of 
the Tourist Board, and TCT working more closely with MNRT, were all arguments used to 
justify the introduction of the tourism development levy (int. Rugimbana 2011). 
TTB agreed to work with TCT to produce the marketing strategy. Rugimbana explained: 
“A tourism development strategy doesn’t belong to TCT or the Tourism Board, it is a joint 
strategy. Government has a role in promoting tourism, but it is the private sector that 
offers the services and makes business out of the opportunities. We are dependent on 
each other.” (int. 2011). Nzuki added that “the public sector has come from a 
background where they see themselves as regulators, they don’t listen to what the private 
sector is saying, but gradually that is changing” (int. 2011). 
Nzuki was very positive about TCT, observing that “the office bearers are doing a 
commendable job. They represent the interests of the sector fairly. Nobody dominates; 
no-one is an underdog.”  He noted that Rugimbana was well networked: “He is 
everywhere”. He offered the view that in Tanzania “a fight publicly doesn’t work here. 
The culture is that if you insult someone publicly then your plans will end up in deadlock.” 
(int. 2011). The implication was clear: TCT is politically sensitive; it took its arguments – 
and its evidence – to the government. But it kept its head below the parapet. However, 
its members, and the tourism businesses, saw what it was doing and supported it. Nzuki 
perceived that public servants came from a background of regulation but that they were 
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gradually changing. He cited as an example the contribution of TCT and other tourism 
associations to develop the Tourism Act (int. 2011) even though TCT thought that it had 
failed to influence anything in the Act. 
Mussa offered a similar view about the changed relationship: specifically, he suggested 
that the culture in the Ministry was changing and that it had become more likely to 
consult with the private sector (int. 2011). Mussa explained that the priority government 
gave to tourism had increased, partly in an effort to reduce its dependence on donors, 
and partly because tourism was a major earner of foreign exchange. Furthermore, he 
argued that tourism (actually Tourism, Trade and Financial Services) was one of the five 
priorities in the Government’s 2011/2-2015/6 five-year Development Plan. The Plan 
stated that  
further development and diversification of the tourism sector is of course a 
great opportunity for the country, being one of the sectors with the highest 
multiplier effects in the economy, as it draws services and other inputs from 
the transport, agriculture, accommodation, water, electricity, financial services, 
and culture sectors among others. In promoting touristic (sic) services, the 
market dynamism towards further growth will be enhanced, along with 
increased tax revenues to fund the Plan. Hence, the overriding objective will 
be to maximise the economy’s capacity to retain revenues generated in the 
sector, by prioritising and integrating it with the requisite support services. 
(URT 2011c: 44). 
This appeared to accept the arguments made by the tourism BMOs and by TCT in 
particular though it is not in itself evidence of influence. 
Mussa stressed that the government was committed to tourism and was committed to 
supporting the tourism associations – indeed, he explained, it was responsible for the 
formation of TCT (int. 2011). Nzuki, too, perceived that the senior civil servants in the 
MNRT believed in working with the private sector and that this attitude permeated down 
through the Ministry. He cited the fact that the Minister had appointed private sector 
members (mainly nominated by TCT) to the board of TTB (int. Nzuki 2011). 
In October 2011, the consultants appointed by TCT and TTB, LA Group, produced An 
External & Internal Analysis and SWOT Analysis. This was followed by part one of the 
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International Marketing Strategy, with a five-year time horizon, published in March 2012. 
Leopold Kabendera, then vice-chairman of TCT, explained that the marketing strategy 
“brings everything we have been working on for the last few years together. It gave the 
association a position of strength from which to negotiate on advocacy issues.” (reported 
in Irwin & Jackson 2015: 13). Indeed, one of the 15 recommendations was to strengthen 
public private partnership in tourism by including other BMOs.  
Rugimbana emphasised that the process was as important as the plan: “For the first time 
the public sector allowed us to take the initiative, and then we moved through the 
process jointly.” (int. 2012). In July 2012, TCT had a positive meeting with the Minister for 
Tourism to ask him to adopt the strategic plan as a government document. TCT needed 
him to champion the plan at the permanent secretaries’ meetings and through the 
government committees such as those for Environment & Natural Resources and Finance 
& Economy. Funding for implementation was to be secured through the introduction of 
the Tourism Development Levy. 
In December 2012 LA Group produced a Strategy of Influence for TCT, to help TCT plan 
its advocacy and lobbying which included raising awareness amongst stakeholders of the 
marketing strategy and securing commitment from both the public and private sectors. 
TCT was to some extent successful in this: the marketing strategy was launched by the 
Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism and it was mentioned in the budget speech as 
being the new strategy for the government. 
Mussa described the marketing strategy as “a very good document”.  He valued the 
research and the direction it set. He felt that, before the strategy, the government was 
spreading its resources too widely. He explained that the document was useful because 
he could then resist pressure political pressures for individual actions, which he could not 
do before (int. 2012). 
Recognising the importance of follow-up, TCT created a stakeholder influencing schedule 
to disseminate the strategy, with the aim of increasing buy-in but also of raising tourism as 
a priority among government and other stakeholders. TCT also created a structure to 
monitor implementation with an intention to hold a six-monthly Tourism Stakeholders’ 
Workshop and ten annual sub-sectoral meetings. 
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TCT gave the impression that it had been extremely successful in persuading the 
government to adopt its strategy. It seemed likely however that this was an occasion 
where, rather than an interest group genuinely influencing a public policy, the interests of 
the government and the interests of the sector were aligned (Mahoney 2007, Woll 2007). 
TCT was funded to commission consultants to produce a strategy. MNRT was consulted. 
TTB was intimately involved. All parties were happy with the result – though some people 
in government apparently ignored the key proposal of focusing on a few target countries 
and continued to jet off to places that took their fancy (int. Mdachi 2015). It did however 
provide the opportunity for TCT to reinforce its relationship with the government. It 
encouraged more dialogue and allowed TCT to portray that positively to their members. 
It enabled TCT to fill a role of becoming a trusted provider of information and research 
evidence. Unlike many associations in Africa, TCT also recognised the importance of 
follow up and put in place mechanisms to assist it to do so. 
5.4.2 Tourism policy 
The push for a new tourism policy came from TCT. The first tourism policy had been 
adopted in 1991. The policy current at the time, and still current in 2011, was adopted in 
1999 (URT 1999). MNRT seemed themselves to recognise that there was a need to 
revisit the policy (Mussa 2011). Likewise, TCT was keen to reposition tourism in Tanzania 
– there are problems of poaching, encroachment of agriculture on wildlife areas, 
dynamite fishing and river diversion. TCT was worried that Tanzania was at a crossroads 
and losing the battle with other destinations with similar attractions. So they wanted a 
long term vision and a programme to get there. They also perceived that most tourism 
activity was in the north of the country and wanted to spread tourism across the country, 
not least because the country’s largest game reserve is in the south. They saw the way to 
do this was to build more airstrips, a view apparently shared by TTB (int. Mdachi 2015), 
and they believed that tourist development would then follow. 
TCT, of course, was not the only organisation pushing to update the tourism policy. The 
World Bank and others were making similar noises. However, TCT took a proposal to the 
seventh Tanzania National Business Council meeting, held in November 2013. The 
Council agreed that tourism was a major contributor to the economy and indeed that it 
was sufficiently important that it should be a regular agenda item – but then challenged 
132 | P A G E  
TCT and MNRT to see how more could be done to promote conservation and to grow 
the number of tourists, without apparently considering whether those were compatible. 
TNBC set up a task force to consider Tanzania’s tourism strategy, with 11 members from 
the private sector and five from the public sector. TCT was commissioned to prepare a 
draft, on which they consulted widely including with MNRT, the Presidential Delivery 
Bureau and the World Bank so that they could go back to TNBC with a single voice. Their 
draft was completed during 2014, but the Council did not then meet until September 
2015. This was then quickly followed by the 9th Council meeting; here the Chief 
Secretary, Ombeni Sefue, noted that the tourism task force had proposed a new policy 
and institutional framework with a long-term development strategy, that this laid the 
foundation for a transformation of the sector and that recommendations of the task force 
had been unanimously approved. It seemed, however, that this meeting was convened 
primarily to say goodbye to the retiring President. Furthermore, there has been little 
progress with the recommendations. The Citizen newspaper explained that the report 
was subsequently presented to the incoming President, John Magufuli, and to his new 
MNRT Minister, Jumanne Maghembe, who were positive. Since then, however, nothing 
has happened to adopt the recommendations although, as noted earlier, the government 
imposed VAT on all tourism related activities, pushing up prices, so the sector is gloomy 
about its current prospects (Masare 2016, Morris 2016). 
Again, it seemed that TCT had been effective in pulling together stakeholders including 
MNRT to agree, this time on a policy, but subsequently failed to persuade the 
government to adopt the policy. As a follow up, TCT reports that MNRT, with support 
from the World Bank, has now started on the development of a 10-year Tourism 
Development Strategy which follows and will build on the report prepared by TCT with 
MNRT and approved by TNBC. In early 2017, MNRT commissioned the (Tanzanian) 
Economic & Social Research Foundation to seek stakeholder views to feed into that 
strategy. TCT is optimistic that the government will now adopt the tourism policy. This 
example shows the need for patience and persistence. 
5.4.3 Perceptions of critical factors 
Following the more strategic efforts to agree a marketing strategy, Rugimbana was asked 
again about his lessons from interacting with the public sector (int. 2013). He stressed the 
need to seek a solution that would satisfy the government as well as the sector, implying 
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a need for compromise: “Whatever you are advocating, you cannot just state the 
problem. You have to see the government’s side and come up with a win-win solution. At 
the end of the day government has to deliver to the public so we have to help them 
achieve that without undermining.” But that alone is insufficient: “You must know your 
industry well. You are the authority. You must have the data at your finger-tips.” Fraussen 
(2013) argues that BMOs have to keep their members on-side and indeed Rugimbana 
adds: “You must have a good rapport with your members; without them on board, you 
cannot succeed in advocacy.”  
He added to these thoughts the following year when he, perhaps belatedly, recognised 
tax revenue as a key public sector driver:  
The government’s main agenda is tax, just tax. It is also to do development, 
but the main preoccupation is raising revenue. If you do not address that issue 
then you are wasting your time. If you can show them that what you are 
bringing in will increase revenue generation then they will listen. They will look 
at the merits of the argument. (int. Rugimbana 2014). 
That is why TCT was willing to work with the Government in relation to the tourism 
development levy for example, but they also fought off three potentially damaging taxes, 
which has increased its confidence in advocacy and its ability to work with the public 
sector. By 2015, Rugimbana recognised that “the first part of the advocacy programme 
didn’t bring much success. We now have success, but it has taken much longer to see an 
impact. It wasn’t clear if the slow start was because we were lacking in skills, or because 
the dialogue was not real. Things are coming together now. The bits are fitting” (int. 
2015). 
In 2016, the Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment (MITI) announced a regulatory 
licensing reform programme (URT 2017) with the objective of improving the business 
climate, with an initial focus on the tourism sector, so it looked as though TCT was finally 
beginning to influence Ministries other than MNRT. MITI established a team to undertake 
a review and invited TCT to nominate a team member (correspondence, Rugimbana 
2016), which is better than the Ministry simply inviting a person of their own choosing. 
Once again, TCT is part of the dialogue, though it is not clear yet what difference they will 
make. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
TCT’s competences have developed considerably during the period of the research. 
Moreover, we can infer a number of competences from TCT’s activities and approaches 
to issues. These are summarised in Table 11, with supporting evidence. There are some 
competences, such as cultural sensitivity and learning, that did not feature in the summary 
of determinants in chapter 2. Like TPSF, this case study suggests that leaders are 
important. Initially, Rugimbana was not very confident in his ability to engage in dialogue 
with the public sector, but his confidence has grown considerably as he has developed 
TCT into an organisation with which the government at least has to talk. 
Table 11: Summary of TCT’s competences 
Competence Evidence 
Argumentation Originally found it difficult to construct argument. Have now learnt to accept policy 
imperative, and then argue about interpretation or implementation; often focus on technical 
and detailed arguments to show better approach; interviews included  comments such as “it 
is not enough to say that there is a problem: you must say how it can be solved and do so in 
a way that all parties win”; recognised that government’s objective to raise revenue, “so 
need to address in any proposal, otherwise you’re wasting your time”. 
Collaboration Has always collaborated with other tourism BMOs and with TTB. Now collaborates more 
closely with Ministry of Tourism and also other BMOs. Interviews included responses such 
as “we moved through the process jointly”; “the leadership was very open to working with 
the private sector”; “as partners…”. Successfully collaborated with European travel agents. 
Communications At outset, did not really communicate. Now aims for appropriate coverage in the media “to 
get our voice heard, more consistently”; need to communicate with members. 
Cultural sensitivity A typical interview comment was that “If you insult someone publicly then your plans will 
end up in deadlock”. Recognises need to create benefits for all parties. 
Dialogue Originally did not see role to engage in dialogue but now sees it as primary activity on 
behalf of the sector. Persuaded MNRT to sign MoU committing to formal process of 
dialogue; persuaded Minister for Tourism to open up board positions on agencies and 
Ministry committees to include private sector representation. 
Engagement As with dialogue, did not engage beyond narrow target audience but now engages more 
widely. A typical response was “what was important was that we as the private sector 
participated from day one”; aimed to engage Minister of Trade and Minister of Finance as 
well as Minister for Tourism; MNRT sees TCT as engaging effectively; signing MoU with 
MNRT. 
Framing For example, accept policy proposal but seek to delay implementation because otherwise 
will damage Tanzania’s reputation as reliable tourist destination. Aim for win-win positions. 
Research 
capability 
Originally did not gather research. Now recognises need for strong evidence; must have it 
“at your finger-tips”; good evidence allows an opportunity “to argue with government 
based on the merits of the argument”. 
Learning Staff participate in many courses and CEO participated in advanced advocacy course 
gained insights from advocacy projects, for example, the importance of revenue. 
Member co-
ordination 
TCT is unusual because it only has other associations as members and has no individual 
members – nevertheless the CEO stresses the importance of having good rapport and good 
communications with members. It aims to ensure that they work collaboratively (not always 
successfully). It has increased membership to 12. 
Network 
development 
Networks widely, and where necessary aims to work through others, including eg with 
TPSF, TNBC, European travel agents, agencies involved in tourism. 
Persistence Recognises need to be persistent; length of time to progress with revised tourism policy. 
Strategy & tactics Looks long term; tries not to bruise the relationship; utilised a range of tactics, including 
lobbying and written materials, but also for example securing large number of letters from 
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European travel agents; worked through wide range of committees and agencies; kept 
changing tactics until they “find what works”; always looking for win-win solutions. 
Understanding The CEO said in interviews “you must know your field, understand the sector, appear 
authoritative and have all the evidence at your finger tips”; he explained he was looking for 
“win-win” with government – for example, delaying increases in levies rather than opposing 
them completely – “what is good for the sector is good for the government”; and he 
recognised the need to help officials to do their job. 
There appears to be a degree of ambiguity in TCT’s relationship with the public sector: 
sometimes, it seems that the Ministry or the TTB is trying to influence TCT rather than the 
other way around. Tanzania is not entirely comfortable with interest groups or what is 
perceived to be external criticism (Melyoki & Galperin 2017) and the views of BMOs are 
often seen as criticism rather than as a genuine attempt to improve the ability of business 
to do business. This leads to challenges in dealing with officials who do not understand, 
or do not care, about improving the environment for business. This is exacerbated by the 
dominant approach in sub-Saharan Africa being patronage (Heilman & Lucas 1997) so 
there is a tendency to work closely with, support and seek favours from people who you 
know or with whom you have a particular affiliation. Thus, individuals and associations 
seek to develop and maintain relations with the ruling elite with the inherent danger that 
policy responds to the needs of the elites rather than the majority (Court et al. 2005: 5). 
TCT has not taken this approach. Rather, it has developed relationships, at all levels, in 
MNRT and at least some of its agencies. They, in turn, appear to have welcomed the 
information and opinion that TCT provided even if they, as Beyers & Hanegraaff (2016) 
surmise in relation to interest groups generally, they were ultimately unsuccessful in 
reforming public policy. 
Nevertheless, even providing information and engaging in dialogue requires a level of 
competence. In TCT’s case, there seem to be three critical steps: access, framing and 
influence. 
Beyers and Braun (2014) note the challenge for interest groups even to get a foot in the 
door with government. For TCT, access should not have been an issue, not least because 
of the original impetus from government. However, it seemed that TCT’s confidence in its 
evidence, its competence and the strength of its arguments may have been. The 
consequence seems to be that TCT initially struggled with access. BEST-AC provided an 
external stimulus which helped it over the confidence hurdle and, as they continued to 
interact with government, continued to build in confidence. Since about 2007, TCT has 
been effective at building and indeed institutionalising its relationship. Reflecting resource 
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exchange (Jones & Baumgartner 2005) and access goods (Bouwen 2004) theories, 
government values TCT because it is able to bring information about the sector and 
reasoned positions backed up with evidence. Certainly its relationship with, and its access 
to, government has improved. 
TCT has been able to move some government policies in their direction and they have 
conferred legitimacy on government decisions (Taylor & Warburton 2003) as for example 
with the Tourism Development Levy. Its access does not appear to depend on its 
resource availability, as suggested by Beyers and Braun (2014) but its ability to offer 
evidence and persuasive policy positions certainly does. 
As an apex body, crucially TCT is at the centre of a coalition, representing all aspects of 
tourism. This makes it the natural counterparty for MNRT when it wants or needs to seek 
a private sector view, reflecting the idea that coalition representatives secure greater 
access (Beyers & Braun 2014). Sorurbaksh (2016) suggests that coalitions are also more 
influential. Certainly, TCT has continued to build alliances, not only through attracting 
more association members, but also through building relationships with TPSF, TNBC and 
TTB. Of these, TCT works most closely with TTB, for example on the tourism marketing 
strategy. 
TCT has made considerable effort to frame issues carefully. This might be to argue, for 
example, that rises in fees are acceptable but only with enough notice or to claim that a 
tourism strategy would enable everyone to work together to market Tanzania more 
effectively. This fits with the theory that good framing makes a difference (Baumgartner 
2007, Klüver et al. 2015, De Bruycker 2016) but also, to a large extent, demonstrates the 
strategic approach adopted by TCT: look for technical changes which, Michalowitz 
(2007) argues, is more effective than seeking changes in the policy itself. 
Whilst there is much to commend about TCT’s approach and its desire to work with 
government to grow the sector, it does not appear to have been particularly successful in 
its strategic aims. Indeed, it seems to have been much more successful in its one-off, 
reactive, campaigns. TCT thinks that it is becoming more successful, though interestingly 
it only appears to highlight one achievement – the joint marketing strategy – on its 
website (www.tct.co.tz). Whilst the Government did accept and approve the strategy, the 
extent of its implementation is still unclear, though it does appear to be moving forwards 
with nudging from the World Bank. TCT has had minor successes with issues like park 
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fees. It has, however, been very successful in institutionalising dialogue (through its MoU) 
and has extended this to all its members. It appears to have made a breakthrough in 
gaining private sector representation on government committees, which should further 
increase understanding of the sector and will probably lead to greater, though less 
obvious, influence. However, it has still not secured representation of the one board that 
would make a real difference: TANAPA. TCT’s favoured approach is dialogue and it is 
willing to compromise if that will move the sector forwards. 
In common with all business associations in Tanzania, TCT still struggles for resources, 
which it recognises as a weakness. It is currently receiving institutional funding from BEST-
AC in an effort to help it become more sustainable. 
My findings are echoed by Anderson et al. (2017) who confirm that TCT has had some 
success and suggest that the key factors contributing to that success include good 
relationships built on trust, respect and transparency, cooperation with other 
stakeholders, open dialogue and productivity in implementation. 
In summary, TCT has had a reasonably short life, yet has achieved a great deal. It has 
formalised its relationship with government. It now has excellent access, both directly and 
indirectly. It is good at framing issues in a way that makes it easy for the government to 
agree. Finally, it appears to be beginning to have some success in influencing policy as 
well, though on the big issues of policy and strategy there is still some way to go. 
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Chapter 6. Tanzania Horticulture Association: continuous 
improvement 
6.1 Introduction 
Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA) represents horticultural farmers most of whom 
are located in the north of Tanzania. TAHA has been chosen as a case study for five 
reasons. Firstly, horticulture is important to the economy of Tanzania and is a big earner 
of foreign exchange, so the success of the sector is important to the government. 
Secondly, it is held up by donors and BEST-Dialogue as an exemplar of a successful 
business membership organisation (BMO). Thirdly, it is located in Arusha, in northern 
Tanzania, rather than in the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, or the political capital, 
Dodoma, yet still seems able to influence policy. Fourthly, it has taken an approach to 
advocacy that is probably the most strategic of all the BMOs reviewed in that it has 
recruited a team to staff its advocacy activities, has thought carefully about the skills and 
experience required, has thought clearly about how it, and its members, engage with 
policy makers and journalists to educate as well as influence. Fifthly, it has the most 
resources, yet argues that resources are not essential for effective advocacy. 
TAHA is one of several agricultural business associations; others prominent in the sector 
are the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT), which is the apex body, and the 
Agricultural Non-State Actors’ Forum (ANSAF), but there are also many commodity 
associations.  It has no formal relationship with government but has developed a close 
relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture, not least by cultivating junior members of 
staff and working with them as they progress through the hierarchy. 
This case study highlights the work of TAHA during the period 2011 to 2015 as it learned 
how best to influence public policy. It takes an insider approach, though is not afraid to 
seek media coverage. It primarily seeks to refine and reform policy rather than to avert or 
abolish policy, described by Beyers (2008) as a particularistic strategy. Increasingly it does 
this by splitting issues into two – an immediate problem, framed in such a way that it 
makes it difficult for policy makers to object, and a more contentious problem, to be 
solved in the longer term – so that it can secure some short-term relief whilst it makes the 
case for more substantive reform. The case study also shows how TAHA focuses its 
attention on officials rather than politicians and thus gears its evidence and narrative to 
meet their requirements (Knaggård 2015). 
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This chapter provides a brief background, followed by a description of TAHA and its 
activities in the period up to 2012 and then a description of the more strategic approach 
taken from 2012 onwards. It concludes with an assessment of TAHA’s competences. 
6.2 Background  
In Tanzania, agriculture accounts for around 25 per cent of GDP (with main crops 
including coffee, sisal, tea, cotton, pyrethrum, cashew and cloves) and 75 per cent of 
employment (World Bank 2015). Agriculture accounts for 50 per cent of exports, 
including two of Tanzania’s top three exports of gold, coffee and cashew. Kelsall (2013) 
sees the horticulture sub-sector as small but with big potential. In 2004, total horticultural 
exports were just $64m; by 2015 they had risen to $500m (Citizen 2016), contributing 38 
per cent of agricultural exports (Ihucha 2015b), and growing at around 11 per cent per 
year. Tanzania’s main agricultural sectors have, to a large extent, been captured by 
“patronage, cronyism and rent-seeking” (Cooksey 2011a: s59), but horticulture has 
largely escaped state institutions seeking control (correspondence Cooksey 2015). Given 
its contribution to the economy, its ability to earn foreign exchange and its tax 
contribution, one might expect the government to listen to its representatives and, 
indeed, Sen (2015) sees the sector as having an open relationship with the state. 
TAHA was launched in 2004, largely by Dutch expatriate horticulturalists who dominated 
the flower sector and with funding from the Government of the Netherlands (Cooksey 
2011b). Its focus initially was on helping companies locally, with issues like land 
ownership, registration of inputs (such as seed, fertiliser and pesticide) and fiscal regimes 
– it secured representation on the Arumeru District Development Council in 2009 
(Cooksey 2011b) – and providing services to help its members – it created TAHA Fresh 
Handling in 2007 (Cooksey & Kelsall 2011). The sector suffered following the global 
credit crisis in 2008 with many small flower and seed companies becoming bankrupt and 
a 15 per cent decline in flower sales. TAHA responded by trying to help firms overcome 
difficult economic conditions including, for example, persuading the Tanzania Investment 
Board to reschedule loan repayments (Cooksey 2011b). Its advocacy at this time focused 
on activities such as attempting to reduce the costs of freight and eliminating multiple 
testing of chemicals. 
The current CEO, Jacqueline Mkindi, was appointed in 2005 and found an association 
with six staff and just 26 members. Mkindi aimed to expand and diversify the membership 
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and by 2016, it had grown to 727 members (including groups of small-scale farmers), 
representing about 25 per cent of the horticultural sector by value. It has three categories 
of members – commercial large-scale horticulturalists (producers, exporters, processors), 
associates (mainly small farmers and farmer co-operatives) and allied members (service 
providers such as suppliers of fertiliser). Mkindi recognised, however, that having foreign 
investors and expatriate farmers had conferred some advantages, in that they were more 
focused on advocating policy reform and better able to support TAHA to develop 
coherent and persuasive positions. 
TAHA has good relations with the Ministry of Agriculture. It is represented on several 
government committees. It appears also to be successful in its advocacy, though this 
could simply reflect a convergence of interests (Woll 2007). Mkindi (int. 2011b) explains 
that ‘advocacy and lobbying’ is the number one reason for TAHA’s existence. Mkindi 
sees ‘advocacy’ as everything that TAHA does to influence policy and ‘lobbying’ as face 
to face interaction. TAHA advocates both on its own and in partnership with the 
Agricultural Council of Tanzania and others depending on the issue. Most of TAHA’s 
advocacy efforts have focussed on relatively technical issues and it does appear to have 
been successful in securing reforms on those issues. It has not, on the whole, secured 
reform where the issue has been rather more contentious, such as biological control 
agents. On taxation, it has had mixed success. 
TAHA Fresh Handling is a logistics and transport business which now turns over $3m per 
annum and, in 2014, made a profit of $100,000. Many BMOs attempt to offer services as 
a way of supplementing their income and encouraging businesses to become members. 
However, no other BMO in Tanzania has succeeded with a service offer in the way that 
TAHA has. The impression from visiting TAHA, however, is that they still see advocacy as 
a key reason for their existence. 
In 2017, TAHA had 70 directly employed staff – including an advocacy manager 
(originally funded by BEST-AC) and a policy officer and had the funding to recruit a policy 
analyst as well – and utilises a further 90 indirectly employed staff. Either through its 
advocacy or its services, it supported more than 40,000 farmers in the four years to 2016. 
With the encouragement of the Government of Tanzania, through the Small Industries 
Development Organisation, which gives $1m a year, and development partners, 
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especially USAID, currently also giving $1m per annum, it has grown from one office in 
Arusha to having offices also in Dar, Mbeya, Morogoro, Iringa and Zanzibar. 
One consequence of their success is that they have become a ‘donor darling’ (an 
organisation receiving a disproportionate level of interest from donors: see 
http://iga.fyi/ddarling), making it easier to raise more money from donors. However, they 
are held up by other BMOs, by donors and by BEST-AC as an exemplar (Kelsall 2013, 
TPSF 2016). However, it has not always been like this and TAHA had to work hard for its 
success. 
6.3 The foundation: a focus on the detail 2010-2012 
Mkindi claims that when she joined TAHA, the relationship with government was at rock 
bottom, as a consequence of the organisation being weak and lacking credibility, and that 
she had to work hard to build what she described as an excellent relationship with 
government (int. 2011a). It may be that there simply was not a relationship, because 
TAHA’s focus was elsewhere. However, in 2009, the Board clearly decided that TAHA 
needed to do more to lobby government; it successfully argued that there was no need 
for the Tropical Pesticides Research Institute to test chemicals that had already been 
registered for agricultural use by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (Cooksey 
2011). Mkindi recognised that TAHA could do much more to influence the government 
and that this needed to start by engaging more regularly. 
By 2011, Mkindi perceived that TAHA had built a positive relationship with the Ministry 
of Agriculture and had created a feeling of mutual trust (int. 2011b). She explained that 
she developed relationships with people in all the appropriate Ministries, but especially 
focussed on the Ministry of Agriculture from the Minister down to desk officers. This 
reflects the assertion of Baumgartner et al. (2009) that developing a relationship with 
named individuals makes a difference. She knew the Permanent Secretary well enough to 
secure a meeting whenever she needed one – but recognised the importance of working 
with desk officers as well, rather than always going straight to the top. Indeed, Mkindi and 
her team worked to develop and maintain relationships with people whom they could 
regard as champions within the Ministries and in the Prime Minister’s office. TAHA kept 
these champions informed – through sending them monthly newsletters, letting them 
know when they were seeking to achieve particular objectives, through occasional face 
   
P A G E  | 143 
to face meetings and inviting them to events. They also asked for their advice when doing 
research or formulating policy. 
Unlike the Tourism Confederation, TAHA does not have a formal dialogue mechanism 
with the Ministry of Agriculture, though the champions meant that it was largely 
unnecessary. The Ministry of Agriculture did set up the Horticultural Development 
Council of Tanzania (HODECT) in 2008 to provide a forum for a more formal dialogue. 
Mkindi suggested that it had not been effective because it did not receive the revenue 
promised by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry & Trade (int. Mkindi 
2012). It was instrumental in pulling together the sector to agree a horticultural 
development strategy (HODECT 2010) though it no longer exists. 
The Ministry of Agriculture reported that it worked closely with TAHA, especially on tax 
issues (int. Mibavu 2011) and that frequently the Ministry agreed with TAHA’s (and 
ACT’s) positions and then together lobbied other parts of government (int. Mibavu 2011). 
In addition to these direct relationships with key staff in the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Mkindi explained that she had been appointed to several government committees, 
though these appeared to be concerned with mainly technical issues, including dealing 
with the way in which regulation is implemented. However, committee membership gave 
Mkindi an opportunity to expand her networks and to make the case for further reforms. 
The starting point for policy reform is to frame issues simply and in such a way that the 
solution appears obvious. TAHA has been good at framing issues as public problems and 
could be regarded as one of Knaggård’s (2015) problem brokers, in that they have put 
issues on the agenda, despite the perception of Kimball et al. (2012) this can be hard. 
Often, they have been able to influence government to address the issue as well. In 2010, 
for example, the government unexpectedly imposed value added tax (VAT) on air freight, 
making goods sent by air less competitive. Most exporters are supposedly able to recover 
the VAT, but Kelsall (2013) described it as a long and futile task and suggested that 
bureaucracy such as this added 20 per cent to the cost of doing business. The Tanzania 
Revenue Authority confirmed that VAT rebates to most businesses were delayed because 
of their own cash flow problems (int. Maganga 2014). The argument, then, is not really 
about competitiveness, but about bureaucracy and the need to charge VAT and then 
secure a rebate at a later date, meaning that the government actually gains no revenue. 
TAHA, working with ACT, within three months, persuaded the government to waive it 
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again (int. Mkindi 2011a). It was too late however to save the air freight service from 
Kilimanjaro International Airport which had been withdrawn when the farmers switched 
to road transport to Nairobi’s international airport. 
Many BMOs seem to forget that some issues extend across more than one sector and so 
lobby by themselves. TAHA recognises the strength of working with others on those 
broader issues. It continued to work with ACT, therefore, when the government also 
imposed VAT on ‘deemed capital goods’. The government position was that if a capital 
good (such as a greenhouse) or a deemed capital good (such as the plastic sheeting to 
make a greenhouse) was imported there was an exemption from VAT. The government 
changed this arrangement to impose VAT on deemed capital goods. Again, for VAT 
registered businesses, this would not be a problem, except that securing rebates took too 
long. The Government agreed once again to exempt deemed capital goods from VAT as 
a result of the action by TAHA and ACT (int. Mkindi 2011a). A report commissioned by 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, say that TAHA “played a crucial role” in securing this 
reform (Match Maker Associates 2017: 23). 
TAHA recognises that much of the regulation imposed on the sector is intended to 
reassure that the produce is safe to eat. It is as keen, therefore, as the government to 
ensure that the sector is regulated and that agreed standards are upheld, but it is equally 
keen to ensure that the regulation is effective. An issue related to zoosanitary and 
phytosanitary standards arose when members started complaining about the government 
inspectors. Their role was to uphold the standards at the farm level but the farmers 
described the inspectors’ approach as one of looking at fields, giving the impression of 
not knowing what they were doing and wasting the farmers’ time. TAHA discovered that 
the inspectors did not have an operations’ manual, discussed this with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, drafted a manual, then persuaded the Ministry that farm produce should be 
inspected only once, rather than several times, and then persuaded them to endorse and 
implement the manual (int. Mkindi 2011a). This shows how TAHA was able to influence 
the Ministry to ensure that it performed its inspection role professionally but also reduced 
the burden on farmers by reducing the number of inspections. 
Another issue of standards arose in 2011, this time in relation to phytosanitary 
certification. It demonstrates the importance of a business association working to 
understand the issue as well as being another good example of TAHA lobbying 
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successfully on a technical issue. Farmers complained that the UK had suddenly stopped 
the import of flowers but seemingly did not know why. Mkindi eventually telephoned the 
UK Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and discovered that Tanzania’s 
phytosanitary certification did not comply with international requirements. TAHA was 
able to frame the issue as a need for rigour and improvement. TAHA worked with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, reviewed the requirements, identified some areas where the 
certification was inadequate and proposed revised certification in line with international 
standards. This was adopted by the government and exports to the UK resumed (int. 
Mkindi 2011b).  
Both these cases are examples of TAHA influencing on narrow technical issues 
(Michalowitz 2007). The issues are unlikely to be contentious and, as Woll (2007) would 
argue, the government would be as keen as the BMO to resolve it since they would also 
have been losing revenue. Nevertheless, they are examples of TAHA both working 
closely with the Ministry and being able to influence their approach to regulation. 
As TAHA gained confidence, it started to lobby on issues that some may see as more 
contentious. Starting in 2010, TAHA tried to influence government policy in relation to 
the use of biological control agents. Essentially these provide a substitute for pesticides, 
using insects to control insects, resulting in less harmful residues. This could be regarded 
as contentious since there might be objections to the idea of introducing new insects into 
the environment. The government had clearly been working on this having set up the 
National Biological Control Programme (NBCP) in 1990 (NBCP 2016). NBCP (2016) 
explains that the import of biological control agents is guided by the Plant Protection Act 
1997 and Regulations, 1998 and that importers need to present a dossier to the Secretary 
of the Biological Control Agents’ Subcommittee. It is however rather more complicated 
than that, with the need then to go to another committee and then to the Registrar of 
Pesticides and Biological Control Agents. NBCP claims to have approved 20 agents since 
1988, though they only listed eight in their brief, and TAHA claimed that they were not 
approved for commercial distribution (int. Chamanga 2016). Minutes of meetings in 2012 
(MAFC 2012) and 2013 (MAFC 2013) suggested that TAHA was making progress, albeit 
slowly. It is worth noting that the NBCP brief was only published in 2016, possibly in 
response to TAHA’s lobbying. 
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Again, TAHA tried to simplify the issue through careful framing. They suggested that the 
debate was not about accepting the principle of use, which they argued had been settled, 
but as a simple one of putting in place a system to register these agents. Mkindi (int. 
2013) explained, however, it took more than five years of discussions before the 
Government admitted that a registration system was required. TAHA and the Ministry of 
Agriculture then worked together, and involved academic and other experts, to design a 
registration system. The Government then did not convene a meeting of the committee 
until 2016, although has now done so, and it has approved the first three agents for 
commercial use.  
Mkindi (int. 2011a) described the secret of her success at this time as “leadership and 
management and being a go-getter”. She meant that TAHA was proactive. Being 
proactive, and being seen to be proactive, is almost certainly helpful when it comes to 
persuading donors to support TAHA’s activities. However, TAHA also put a lot of effort 
into gathering data and, as Mkindi put it, “doing hard core research”, in line with Berry’s 
dictum that “only the facts count” (1997: 99) and that of Newmark & Nownes (2016) that 
lobbying is about information. She stressed the importance of having a clear 
understanding of the issue and a mastery of the details but also noted the importance of 
seeing the bigger picture (int. Mkindi 2011b). She explained that if she went to 
government without having done her homework, she would not have the facts and 
figures to back up her position, and thus weaker argumentation. Generally, it appears that 
TAHA has been able to do this well as evidenced by reforms in phytosanitary certification 
for example. 
TAHA has learned, however, that it is not enough for staff alone to do the lobbying. Policy 
makers want some reassurance that issues really are issues. In 2011, the Ministry of 
Agriculture said that it would like to see more business people and more farmers involved 
in dialogue (int. Mibavu 2011). The implication seemed to be that associations in general, 
and TAHA in particular, did not consult enough with their own members, so did not know 
what was happening on the ground and sometimes that their members did not even 
understand the issues. As will be seen later, TAHA learned from this feedback. 
Mkindi also explained how TAHA engages with government and others. She networks 
widely, aiming to create strategic alliances and partnerships (int. 2011b). As well as ACT, 
with whom TAHA works closely, they collaborate with the Agricultural Non-State Actors’ 
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Forum, Tanzania Seed Trades’ Association, Tanzania Association of Tour Operators and 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation. Often TAHA will take the lead on lobbying, but 
sometimes they follow others such as ACT or TPSF, particularly where the issue is wider 
than simply horticulture. 
Chamanga (correspondence, 2017) explains that TAHA’s main area of collaboration is in 
relation to taxation issues, which cuts across all sectors. They have worked with ACT, 
TPSF and ANSAF to engage Parliamentary Committees and as well as the President’s and 
Prime Minister’s Offices. They aim to use allies’ networks to reach out to organisations 
with whom they have weaker contacts. 
When it comes to lobbying, Mkindi stressed that it is necessary “to engage with the 
whole system and not just with one or two people; to pressurise the government at all 
levels” (int. 2011b). The point here is that, whilst they may have developed champions 
who can take up their cause, they also recognise that they need themselves to influence 
people across Agencies and Ministries. Mkindi is personable and articulate, so well able 
to do this. 
A good tactic in dialogue and advocacy is to raise awareness and understanding amongst 
stakeholders. Berry (1997) makes the point that interest groups have a role to educate 
and TAHA does this well. For example, each year they do a programme with the 
Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, including taking the MPs on a field trip. TAHA 
works closely with the media and has worked hard to build good relationships with key 
journalists. TAHA organises field visits to farms for journalists and offers them awareness 
raising courses. They never pay ‘facilitation’ fees – but still get good coverage (int. Mkindi 
2011b). 
This combination of providing good research evidence, success in policy reform, even on 
technical issues, being seen to be active not least through the media, and raising 
awareness raised TAHA’s credibility – which Berry (1997) notes as a priority for interest 
groups – and which then makes it easier to continue to secure access (reflecting Braun’s 
(2012) logic of habitual behaviour). 
Until December 2011, Mkindi was responsible for all TAHA’s advocacy. However, with 
financial support from BEST-AC, TAHA was able to appoint Anthony Chamanga as its first 
policy officer. Consequently, TAHA had someone focused full time on policy and 
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advocacy, freeing up Mkindi to manage all TAHA’s other activities and to seek 
sponsorship. Chamanga has a background in agricultural economics and then 
international trade. He worked at the Ministry of Agriculture and is still well networked, to 
the extent that he could request meetings with the Minister. This also ensured that he 
received good intelligence, including draft legislation, often before it went to other 
stakeholders. Mkindi says that recruiting a former official made an enormous difference to 
TAHA’s effectiveness, though she also says that she had to work hard to keep reminding 
Chamanga that he now worked for the private sector. She wonders why other BMOs do 
not also recruit people with inside knowledge (int. Mkindi 2012). 
Early in 2012, Mkindi broke out of being only on committees concerned with technical 
issues when she was invited to join the National Permanent Secretaries Committee 
(driving the so-called Doing Business road map) alongside TPSF and Confederation of 
Tanzania Industries and thus giving a greater chance to influence policy and the 
implementation of policy (int. Mkindi 2012). 
6.4 Thinking & planning more strategically 2013 - 2015 
Several changes occurred around mid-2012. Several mundane but important issues that 
had been pending for a long time were resolved. TAHA sought reform on more 
contentious issues, such as reducing the level of produce cess (local tax on agricultural 
produce) and persuading the government to set up bonded warehouses (int. Mkindi 
2012). This appears to be about the time that TAHA reflected on its approach to 
advocacy, recognising that it was delivering reform on narrow technical issues, but aiming 
to address broader issues as well, often by carefully reframing issues into two stages. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these changes coincided with Chamanga having worked out his 
role and starting to have an impact. When TAHA appointed him, they gave him a ‘to do’ 
list of outstanding issues and anticipated issues (int. Chamanga 2016). Chamanga notes 
that, whilst government was ‘attentive’ at this time, it was often also inactive. Chamanga 
had the luxury of being able to analyse the issues and then to develop ways to resolve 
them. His experience in the Ministry helped him to understand the issues and to identify 
the key people to lobby and often the arguments to be used to secure a change in view. 
Two issues, on cut flowers and on packaging, for example, were each resolved in just one 
meeting. 
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In all its lobbying, TAHA has focused on providing evidence. Mkindi claimed that the 
Ministry staff appreciated the evidence that TAHA provided. She says that, initially, the 
Ministry thought that TAHA was “making a lot of noise for big guys” which, given 
Tanzania’s history, is not always effective. However, they came to realise that TAHA was 
working on behalf of whole sector (int. 2014) – and most of the sector is small indigenous 
farmers. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Agriculture (int. Mibavu 2011, int. 
Msambachi et al. 2013). Mibavu (int. 2011) explained that the Ministry often agreed with 
TAHA and that they then lobbied together. He cited occasions when, for example, they 
had lobbied together on road tax for tractors not used on public roads and on crop cess. 
As TAHA grows, and delivers more services and support to farmers, the government can 
see TAHA bringing in resources from elsewhere that are intended to develop the sector 
in line with government policy. The Ministry of Agriculture had, for example, signed a 
memorandum of understanding with TAHA to work together on post-harvest losses (int. 
Msambachi et al. 2013). Mkindi claimed that the Director of Policy & Planning (appointed 
in mid-2014) was later asking TAHA for more ideas on what could be done (int. 2014). 
TAHA not only works closely with government but also aims to ensure that they are 
recognised for what they do. Kelvin Remen, TAHA’s assistant advocacy officer, notes that 
other BMOs “wonder why we say our first partner is the government” (int. 2015). He 
explained that TAHA has not only established a very close relationship with government 
but also gave them credit. He explained: “the government respects us; we don’t work like 
an activist group, criticising the government; we try to address issues diplomatically and 
credit them for the forums they have given us and the progress.” TAHA claims to be “very 
good at using the network” (int. Mkindi & Chamanga 2013). Chamanga goes on to say 
that often TAHA has government departments “on our side” (ibid.). For example, if TAHA 
is going to lobby the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, it ensures that it has first informed its 
champions at the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Agriculture.  
TAHA also became more proactive in areas where once they might have taken their time, 
such as finding new champions in the Ministry of Agriculture after staff changes. Away 
from advocacy, TAHA also aimed to expand its services to members, with funding from 
USAID, the EU and the Aga Khan Foundation. 
TAHA responded to the question of whether it was involving members effectively by 
being demonstrably more business oriented and by ensuring that all the issues that they 
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took to government reflected the needs of the business community: they improved their 
consultation with members and ensured that they were all briefed on TAHA’s policy 
positions (int. Mkindi 2014). By 2016, TAHA was collecting detail, drafting policy 
positions, and sending them to their members to check that everything was accurate and 
reflected their concerns. They build a good story, seek approval from members and then 
finalise their policy positions before going to government. They send a copy of the final 
position to members for reference, so that, if they are quizzed by the Ministry, they will all 
communicate the same message – and the Ministry does send staff out to talk to farmers. 
In common with other BMOs, TAHA is not very good at spotting the consequences of 
changes or proposed changes to legislation. For example, a requirement of the Fertilisers 
Act, 2009 eventually made it more difficult for farmers to use specialist fertiliser, often 
specified by European buyers, with the threat of the loss of their contract if they did not 
comply. Nothing happened with passing of the Act (int. Chamanga 2016) but the 
Government then approved the Fertiliser Regulations in 2011 (URT 2011d) and created 
the Tanzania Fertiliser Regulatory Authority in 2012. Before the law changed, many of 
these fertilisers were easily available, but the Act required all fertilisers to be registered (or 
re-registered) and the process was slow. Whilst the fee was a modest $50, there was a 
requirement for three seasons of trials at a rough cost of $10,000 per season. It was 
simply not economic for the input suppliers to register many of these fertilisers as the 
demand was low. TAHA tested a two-step approach: to provide relief to the problem in 
the short term and to agree a longer-term solution. It started lobbying the Government 
early in 2013. Mkindi wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture and thought that the best 
outcome might be that the Permanent Secretary would invite them to Dar to discuss the 
issue – but instead the he visited TAHA in Arusha with a team of four officials (int. Mkindi 
2013). In October 2013, the government acceded to TAHA’s first step and agreed a fast 
track registration process whereby some 75 fertilisers that had been tested and proven 
elsewhere could be registered in Tanzania without further trials. This was expected to 
have considerable impact – not just the 75 x $30,000 but the increase in yield or quality 
and thus in incomes from using the different fertiliser. In the second step, the 
Government agreed to review the legislation – and, in 2016, finally agreed to amend the 
Regulations, which reduced although did not eliminate the cost of registration (int. 
Chamanga 2016). The amendments were finally published in 2017 as the Fertiliser 
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(Amendments) Regulations 2017 (URT 2017a). TAHA’s lobbying over six years 
demonstrated both their patience and persistence in seeking policy reform. 
TAHA has now adopted this two-step approach for much of its advocacy. In the first step, 
it looks for an immediate though temporary solution through a waiver or derogation, 
designed to reduce conflict and solve a narrow but immediate problem. This is generally 
a technical solution. Mkindi says that she tries to convey a sense of urgency and the likely 
loss to members (and by implication) to government if it delays, which possibly explains 
why the government is willing, at least on occasion, to agree to the short-term solution. In 
other words, the issue is framed as urgent and one which causes problems for both 
private sector and government alike (int. Mkindi 2014). In the second step, intended to 
provide a longer lasting solution, recognising that the issue might be more contentious, 
they take a more directional approach, including proposing that legislation is reviewed, 
though still do not argue against the fundamental principle of the legislation. The issue is 
framed as a problem for both private sector and government and on which the two need 
to work in partnership to develop a solution. 
In 2013, TAHA determined to use this approach for an issue with pesticides. As with 
fertilisers, many international markets specify the pesticides to be used but pesticides also 
require government approval – and many pesticides in common use elsewhere (with 
approval from their governments and WHO) had not been approved in Tanzania. Testing 
and registration cost up to $10,000, but there was a further issue: the approvals 
committee rarely met because the government had no money to convene meetings. One 
farmer conducted three years of trials and had the necessary data, but the committee 
would not sit, so he could not secure approval. Consequently, TAHA sought a 
streamlining of the pesticide regulation processes and protocol as well. 
Growing success gave TAHA the confidence and willingness to work across borders. For 
example, in 2012, the Government of Kenya introduced a levy of KES4 per kilo on all fruit 
and vegetables imported into Kenya, irrespective of whether Kenya was the final 
destination. An agreement between traders and farmers resulted in this being split equally 
– though in reality the farmers bore the cost because the price goes down. TAHA worked 
with GoT and GoK which resulted in GoK agreeing to abolish this levy in 2013. More 
than 80 per cent of fruit and vegetable exports went via Jomo Kenyatta International 
Airport (in Nairobi) so this was important. TAHA estimated this at about 25 tonnes per 
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day. Assuming a six day week and KES2/kg, this saved about $200,000 which went back 
into farmers’ incomes (int. Mkindi & Chamanga 2013). 
When asked in 2013 to pinpoint reasons for TAHA’s success, Mkindi simply reiterated 
what she had said previously: they “do their homework” and “ensure that we have sound 
evidence” saying that if they “have a weak case or poor evidence, it will backfire” (int. 
2013). They improved their lobbying, however, saying that when they went to 
government, they always took members as well as staff so that the members could 
describe their experiences at first hand.  
Mkindi argued that they had built a good brand as evidenced by the fact that they were 
trusted and consulted by government. The Ministry of Agriculture confirmed this view 
and reported that they perceived TAHA to be a “strong organisation” and that they 
worked together (int. Msambachi et al. 2013). 
TAHA aims to understand the viewpoint of other stakeholders. Chamanga 
(correspondence 2017) says that TAHA has not experienced objections from other 
interest groups but have had cases where a government institution objected to their 
position. He cites the case of fertiliser registration, where the Tanzania Fertiliser 
Regulatory Authority (TFRA) objected to their position, while the Prime Minister’s Office 
supported their position. 
TAHA is well resourced, as a result of raising funds from donors and building its 
commercial activity. There is a mixed view in the literature on the importance of 
resources (Mahoney 2008), though BMOs do need some resource. Mkindi explained 
that, whilst financial resources were not the whole picture, clearly they made a difference, 
for example, to bring together a group of experts to talk about biological control 
mechanisms or a group of MPs.  
Mkindi repeated her point that TAHA does not just engage with one body but “across the 
system”. That is, they aimed to bring on board the civil servants in any Ministry that might 
have a view and the Parliamentary Committees as well as the Ministers (int. 2013). 
Evidence of TAHA’s ability to build relationships, but also of their luck, came in early 
2014. Staff changes at the Ministry of Agriculture including the retirement of Mohamed 
Muya, the Permanent Secretary, and of Geoffrey Kirenga, a director who had been 
helpful to several BMOs, as well as of two other key directors, interrupted the 
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relationship. Chamanga explained that the new people did not understand so well what 
TAHA was trying to do (int. Chamanga 2014). TAHA had to work hard to rebuild the 
relationship and encouraged two new directors to visit. This resulted, in 2014, in the new 
director for Crop Development, Twahir Nzalawahe, and the new director for Policy & 
Planning, Nkurulilwa Simkanga, coming to TAHA. The luck came about in that Simkanga 
had been Chamanga’s first supervisor when he joined the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Chamanga reported that both seemed impressed by TAHA. To some extent, however, 
TAHA creates its own luck. It was not simply coincidence that TAHA appointed as its first 
advocacy manager someone who had worked in the Ministry. TAHA deliberately seeks 
out junior members of staff to become champions so that, as they rise through the ranks, 
they can become more influential on TAHA’s behalf. A consequence of impressing the 
two directors, according to Chamanga, was that the new Permanent Secretary seemed 
also to be increasingly on side. He suggested that “the relationship has resumed” (int 
2014). 
In addition to their success with the Fertiliser Regulations, TAHA secured an amendment 
to the Seeds Regulations 2007, meaning that new vegetable seeds will no longer need to 
undergo trials for two seasons and can instead by authorised on the basis of distinctness, 
uniformity and stability (DUS) testing either by the Tanzania Official Seed Certification 
Institute or a recognised authority outside Tanzania, confirmed in the Seeds 
(Amendments) Regulations 2017 (URT 2017b). TAHA also brought to a successful 
conclusion its efforts to secure a reduction in crop cess. In this case it worked with ACT, 
ANSAF and TPSF and secured an amendment to the Local Government Finance Act 
1982, reducing cess from five per cent to two per cent for food crops and from five per 
cent to three per cent for cash crops (see Finance Act 2017 (URT 2017c)). 
6.5 Conclusion 
The overall impression of TAHA is of an organisation that is highly competent – see Table 
12, though it was not always so. Mkindi had completed an MBA (int. Mkindi 2011) but 
developed her skill set and gained experience in dialogue and advocacy during the 
period of the research. She worked, too, to develop TAHA. It has become much more 
competent. It has learnt the importance of offering selective benefits. Of the four cases, 
TAHA is the one that comes closest to resembling the ideal described by Doner and 
Schneider (2000) with high membership density and effective selective benefits. It has 
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also become effective at advocacy and securing policy reforms. Whilst there may be a 
degree of ‘trumpet blowing’ by the CEO, there is evidence too that Mkindi has been a 
driving force in developing all aspects of TAHA’s work. She has, in particular, developed 
TAHA’s ability as an advocate and has put in place a team to ensure that continues to 
happen. 
Table 12: Summary of TAHA’s competences 
Competence Evidence 
Analysis Good analytical skills (though this is possibly part of understanding). 
Alliances Able to create strategic alliances and partnerships (which is more than simply collaboration). 
Argumentation Has developed its ability to prepare well-argued positions, which are often quite technical (for 
example, relating to VAT on deemed capital goods or on streamlining the protocols for 
regulation of pesticides). 
Business oriented Keeps close to business community; ensure that issues that they take to government reflect 
needs of business community. 
Champions (See relationships). 
Collaboration Initially largely worked on own but recognised need to work closely with other associations, 
including ACT, but also with MDAs; seeks to co-operate in range of ways, including public 
private partnership. 
Communications Originally did not seek media exposure. Now, keeps contacts in government well informed 
with monthly bulletin; runs field trips for journalists; gets to know key journalists; seeks regular 
media coverage to keep in eye of members and policy makers 
Detail Masters the detail, does its homework, gathers the facts and figures to evidence its position; 
prepares policy position; shares drafts with members to ensure that everything is accurate and 
reflects their concerns. 
Dialogue Has increasingly recognised the importance of dialogue and is now involved in many 
committees including several technical committees, such as the National Technical Committee 
of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee. 
Engagement Has learnt the necessity to engage the whole system; pressurises the government at all levels. 
Evidence Puts effort into gathering data and “doing hard core research” and then building a good story 
which is approved by the members. 
Framing Is able to frame issues (and is able to reframe issues to offer two steps) in a way that makes it 
easy for government to respond positively, as with fertiliser and then with pesticide. 
Governance Sees this as making a difference and that strong governance guides the policy direction. 
Leadership Seen by the CEO to be one of the secrets of success; TAHA argues that it is up to private 
sector to “take the lead”. 
Media Work closely with the media; offers field visits for the media. 
Learning & 
development 
Learns from experiments eg field visits for journalists and then Parliamentarians; eg recognising 
need to ensure all members are aware of all policy positions; eg developing its two step 
process for lobbying 
Members Originally did not involve members enough but now involves members in preparation of 
policy positions and in lobbying government. 
Narrative The natural follow on from good evidence is a good story with a compelling argument; ensure 
that members all know the story as well. 
Networking Widely, with other BMOs, with MDAs and others. 
Persistence Keeps pressing, until agreement to change is actually implemented. 
Realism Recognise cannot always overturn policy imperative so aim to minimise burden on business. 
Relationships Has made considerable effort to develop and maintain relationships with both senior civil 
servants and Ministers; have cultivated champions within the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Prime Minister’s Office so that they have people fighting their corner within the Ministries; stay 
close to people in the Ministry and aim to support as much as possible. 
Resources Well-resourced; notes the importance of being able to go to meetings at short notice; aiming 
to set up branch offices in order to cover the country. 
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Tactics Employ a wide range of tactics; in particular, now take two track approach in which aim for 
quick solution to immediate problem and then longer-term policy review. 
Trust Explains that has worked hard to build trust with the government. 
Understanding Says that important to understand the issue (vide their work to understand the problem with 
phytosanitary certification). 
Urgency Aims to “convey a sense of urgency and the likely loss to members and by implication to 
government if government delays”. 
Heilman and Lucas (1997) say that it is difficult to find cases where business associations 
have clearly influenced government. TAHA has clearly put issues on the agenda – often 
through careful framing – reflecting the dictum of turning problems into issues (Berry 
1997). It appears also that TAHA has influenced the way that policy has been 
implemented but has been less successful in changing formal government policies. The 
interest group literature suggests that the ability to provide appropriate and valued data, 
knowledge, expertise and opinions is critical in securing access to policy makers (Walker 
1983, Streeck & Schmitter 1985, Maloney et al. 1994, Bouwen 2004, Dür & Mateo 2012, 
Beyers & Braun 2014). Policy makers need the policy goods; interest groups need the 
access and thus a resource exchange exists. It seems that TAHA has recognised that 
access depends on evidence and sound arguments. 
Neither access (Eising 2007) nor success (Mahoney 2007) provides evidence that a 
business association has influence. A trade association may see a change in public policy 
that accords with their wishes but which they did not bring about. However, the change 
to the phytosanitary certification and the reform of the fertiliser legislation provide 
examples of TAHA putting issues on the agenda which has been followed by a policy 
change. In the case of the phyto-sanitary certification, they worked closely with the 
Ministry of Agriculture to change the requirements; in the case of fertilisers, it seems that 
they contributed significantly even if they were not the only group lobbying for change. 
TAHA tends to focus on quite narrow and often rather technical issues, perhaps unlikely 
to be highly salient to anyone outside the sector, and which do not require a change in 
the fundamental policy. Beyers (2008) distinguishes between ‘particularistic’ issues (that 
are quite technical, usually focused on a narrow sector and which do not conflict with the 
political objective), ‘dividing’ issues (that divide business sectors because of different 
interests) and ‘unifying’ issues (that are perhaps more political in nature and where the 
private sector adopts a more cohesive position). Addressing particularistic issues requires 
what Michalowitz (2007: 136) describes as technical influence; addressing unifying issues 
requires directional influence, that is, influence that changes the direction of the policy 
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(Michalowitz 2007). TAHA has been good at influencing the particularistic issues but less 
good at influencing the unifying issues. Its success on the more contentious issues came 
about after TAHA learned how to reframe issues into two steps.  
Mkindi claims the government is always willing to listen to its ideas in relation to 
horticulture policy (int. Mkindi & Chamanga 2013). However, it is generally unwilling to 
act on issues that might be considered more political such as tax and cess, as Mkindi 
admits (int. Mkindi & Chamanga 2013). This suggests that TAHA is more a problem 
broker than a policy entrepreneur. Knaggård, (2015) explains that problem brokers frame 
issues as public problems, that they are more concerned with bringing parties together 
rather than proposing policy reforms, and thus that they are independent of policy 
entrepreneurs (though there is no reason why that should be) and that they have access, 
persistence and credibility. TAHA does both – doing their homework and gathering the 
evidence, taking members to policy makers to give first hand accounts and taking MPs on 
field trips. 
Knaggård, (2015) further suggests that when interest groups communicate with civil 
servants they need to be ‘knowledge heavy’ but that when they talk to politicians, or the 
public, values and emotions become more important. The implication is that both are 
important. The knowledge provides the evidence that will persuade the civil servants; the 
narrative will provide the argument that convinces the politicians. TAHA seems to have 
recognised this to the extent that they avoid dealing with politicians, “because we know 
that politicians come and go” (int. Remen 2015). TAHA has generally found it more 
effective to work through officers, and leave them to persuade the politicians: “we invest 
a lot in directors in the government and have a list of champions” (int. Remen 2015) 
reflecting the assertion of Herzberg & Wright (2006) that champions are needed to 
sustain PPD and that backing the right champions is important. In Tanzania, this is 
especially important to overcome “hierarchical silos, top-down power houses and lines of 
command along government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) which may 
impair cross-cutting or inter-ministerial work relations” allied with “weak capacity in the 
civil service” (Temu 2013: 63). However, TAHA does occasionally organise field trips for 
MPs to demonstrate the importance of supporting the horticulture sector. 
Mkindi perceived that government was changing, was becoming more responsive and 
was more likely now to listen. However, success, Mkindi explained, requires compelling 
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policy proposal, partnership (especially with government) and ability to mobilise 
resources – and “TAHA is good at this” (int. 2014). Whilst a high level of resource may 
not be necessary, Mkindi explained that it is impossible for BMOs to influence 
government if they do not have enough capacity in terms of people and resources.  
TAHA takes care with building relationships. It is careful about who they engage, how 
they engage and when they engage (int. Mkindi 2014). When the government does agree 
to reform, TAHA keeps pressing, until agreement to change is actually implemented (int. 
2011), unlike some BMOs who fail to follow up (Lutabingwa & Gray 1997) and then 
wonder why nothing has changed. This demonstrates the importance of persistence. 
TAHA makes a point of learning from its activities. It reflects on its approach to lobbying 
and changes what it does, as evidenced, for example, by adopting a two-step approach 
for some issues, by working through champions and alliances and in primarily targeting 
civil servants rather than politicians. The ability to learn and develop would seem to be an 
additional and important competence. 
To summarise, it seems that TAHA is good at putting issues on the agenda, frames issues 
both so that they appear to be technical rather than political and so that solutions present 
themselves, seeks access effectively, raises awareness of issues, builds coalitions for 
reform and is very persuasive. However, it also seems that it is less influential than it 
would like to think it is when it comes to addressing political issues. Nevertheless, I 
concur with Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) that TAHA is one of the most effective BMOs in 
Tanzania, both in terms of sustaining itself and of delivering much of its policy agenda. 
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Chapter 7. Kenya Chamber of Mines: Influencing legislation 
7.1 Introduction 
The Kenya Chamber of Mines (KCM) represents mining companies and companies 
associated with mining with a high proportion being inward investors. Its creation was 
encouraged by the Government of Kenya to make it easier for the government to talk to 
the commercial mining sector. This case study traces their activities as it sought to 
influence the final shape of a new Mining Act, from its publication as a bill in March 2014 
through to Presidential assent and its implementation in May 2016. This is a short period 
compared to the other cases but was nevertheless long enough for the principal advocate 
to learn and develop – and then to modify his behaviour. None of the Tanzanian case 
study BMOs had such an opportunity to influence legislation, which is perhaps the 
hardest of policy reforms to influence. 
The case is interesting for three other reasons. Firstly, it provides an opportunity to 
compare the work of a BMO in Kenya with those in Tanzania, both countries within the 
East African Community, but with Kenya having a stronger economy, stronger political 
processes and a press that seems freer though, according to Freedom House (2017), the 
press in Kenya and Tanzania have almost exactly the same score. Secondly, it covers a 
different sector: mining, which currently makes a small contribution to Kenya’s GDP. 
However, the Government is keen that it should contribute much more, so may be 
expected to collaborate closely with the sector, though Sen (2015) worries about the 
greater likelihood of corrupt practices and collusion in the extractive industries. Thirdly, 
issues usually have several, sometimes competing, actors vying for attention. Eising 
(2016) notes the challenge both of identifying the actors and observing contacts, 
including informal contacts, between interest groups and policy makers. This case 
captures at least some of those contacts. 
This case demonstrates that KCM did influence the final shape of the legislation and thus 
makes a key contribution to the literature. It also shows that KCM exhibited many of the 
characteristics that might be expected of a business association in a developed country, 
such as taking an insider approach, seeking access in multiple venues and providing 
information and opinion to government. It highlights several competences exhibited by 
KCM. 
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The case first describes the sector and KCM’s role in representing it. It then explains the 
stages through which the Bill progressed and what KCM did as it aimed to influence the 
legislation. That is followed by perceptions of key stakeholders and then an analysis of 
KCM’s approach. It concludes that, whilst KCM did not achieve all its objectives, it 
achieved most of the important ones, and argues that this was largely due to one person, 
who was determined and persistent, working collaboratively with board, members, the 
Parliamentary Committee on Environment and Natural Resources and Ministry officials. 
7.2 Background: Mining & Minerals and KCM 
Kenya is not a major mining country though it is believed to have significant and largely 
unexplored potential. It mines a wide range of products including soda ash, fluorspar, 
titanium, rare earth minerals, gemstones, manganese, gypsum, and gold. 
The government’s guiding strategy document, Vision 2030 (GoK 2007), identifies mining 
as a priority sector. The constitution implemented in 2013 created a stand-alone Ministry 
of Mining (MoM) in place of a Department of Mines and Geology in the previous 
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources. In early 2014, there were fewer than 20 
large scale mining ventures. However, given investment, the sector could grow quickly, 
potentially contributing three per cent of GDP within four years and 10 per cent by 2030. 
Until 2000, miners were represented by the Kenya African Mining Association though its 
membership comprised solely small-scale miners. Gichuhi (int. 2014) explains that the 
government was struggling to talk collectively to the mining sector and so encouraged 
them to create the Kenya Chamber of Mines, to represent the interests of miners, 
exploration companies and mineral traders. Initially KCM had an office in the Ministry 
though the organisation quickly moved out (int. Gichuhi 2014). 
Formally, KCM sees its purpose to be to “contribute to the creation, maintenance and 
improvement of a conducive business environment for the successful development and 
benefit of its members’ businesses and of the mineral industry in Kenya as a whole” 
(www.kenyachambermines.com), so its raison d’être is influencing public policy.  
In 2014, KCM had some 213 members including 12 exploration companies (of which the 
best known is probably African Barrick Gold, now known as Acacia) and 31 mining 
companies (including Base Titanium). Its income was about USD 190,000 of which 
subscriptions contributed around 25 per cent, with the balance from member donations 
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and contributions for specific projects, the DANIDA funded Business Advocacy Fund 
(BAF) and the African Development Bank. In addition to its advocacy activities, KCM 
provided some services to members. To some extent, BAF assisted KCM to build its 
sustainability. It funded the post of Policy & Research Manager filled by Stephen Mwakesi 
whilst KCM built subscription income; he joined a CEO and administrator to form a team 
of just three. Mwakesi is a lawyer by profession (int. Mwakesi 2014a) and an excellent 
communicator. He was appointed acting CEO when Gichuhi resigned in November 
2014, but throughout he led KCM’s advocacy on the Mining Bill. 
Whilst not a formal objective, KCM states (www.kenyachambermines.com) that it aims to 
work with others, perhaps recognising that it is too small to do everything itself and to 
ensure that its interests do not harm the environment or communities. Indeed, on the 
Mining Bill, it worked with several BMOs including Kenya Private Sector Association 
(KEPSA), Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Petroleum Institute of East Africa, the 
Geological Society of Kenya and Kenya National Chamber of Commerce & Industry. It 
works with civil society organisations including Kenya National Resources Alliance, CSO 
Platform for Oil & Gas, Institute for Human Rights & Business and East Africa Tax Justice 
Network. KCM has a formal dialogue arrangement with the MoM including a regular 
Ministerial Round Table and, through KEPSA, participates in Ministerial Round Tables with 
other Ministries. It has been cultivating civil servants. It regarded the Principal Secretary 
(known as Permanent Secretary before the new Constitution) as a champion, but he 
moved to the Ministry of Sports, Culture and Arts in August 2014. However, it also had a 
good relationship with the Commissioner for Mines and Mwakesi had a personal 
relationship with the Special Adviser to the Cabinet Secretary (int. 2014a). 
Until the end of 2013, Government policy on mining was largely tacit with a Mining Act 
dating from 1940. In 1992, the government initiated a process of review, with UNDP 
support, and then started again in 2002, with Commonwealth support. In part, issues 
were addressed by passing additional legislation. With support from BAF, KCM was able 
in 2009 to secure amendments to the Mining & Minerals Bill. MoM agreed that the 
existing legislation was too limited, failing to address emerging issues such as 
environmental concerns, the importance of communities and equitable sharing of 
benefits, devolution of decision making in line with the new constitution as well as 
licensing, accountability, efficiency and predictability. All parties recognised that there 
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was a need for a complete overhaul of the legislation. After some discussion and a 
number of internal drafts, the Government of Kenya published a draft Mining Bill in June 
2013. KCM was invited by MoM to make presentations, both in writing and orally, which 
they did. Their view was that the draft did not reflect the needs of the sector and they 
suggested a complete overhaul (int. Mwakesi 2014a). 
KCM felt little progress was being made – no changes were made to the draft and 
nothing was sent to Parliament. KCM met with the Cabinet Secretary in a Ministerial 
Round Table in February 2014 but felt that he was not sufficiently receptive. As a result, it 
made a formal request to meet with the President (int. Gichuhi 2014). Before that 
meeting could take place, the Government published the Mining Bill on 17 March (RoK. 
NA 2014a). Despite a representative of the MoM apparently telling KCM that they “had 
taken care of your interests: you’re going to love the Bill”, KCM had serious reservations 
because little had changed from the previous version (int. Mwakesi 2014a). However, 
reform was considered by both KCM and the government to be important: for the 
government, the legislation would give effect to articles in the Constitution relating to 
minerals, prospecting, mining, processing, refining etc; for KCM, it would revise 
legislation that was no longer fit for purpose. 
With further support from BAF, KCM was already developing policy positions in response 
to the 2013 draft and, by chance, a policy position workshop had been arranged for 24 
March (which I facilitated), so the timing was propitious. Mwakesi spent the weekend 
reading the draft and considering responses. The workshop, in which staff and board 
participated, provided an opportunity to look in detail and debate the potential 
implications of the Bill. The participants decided to draft an overall critique of the Bill – 
including detailed recommendations to amend a substantial number of clauses – and to 
draft four papers each setting out a policy position to address a specific issue in detail. 
Given that the Bill could be submitted to Parliament at any time, KCM initially focused all 
its efforts on the Bill critique – with drafts going backwards and forwards between staff, 
board, ordinary members and a mentor provided by BAF. In addition, BAF supported 
Mwakesi to think through and develop a clear advocacy strategy (KCM 2014p). 
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Figure 3: Timeline 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on interviews and documentation 
Figure 3 summarises the timeline, to show actions on the left-hand side and the 
consequence (which may be a further action) on the right-hand side. The action started in 
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February 2014 and carried on until Presidential assent in May 2016. Most of KCM’s 
lobbying activities took place during 2014, whilst the legislation was being considered by 
the National Assembly, so this provides the focus for the timeline. 
The Bill had its first reading in the National Assembly on 22 April and was immediately 
referred to the Parliamentary Committee on Environment & Natural Resources (ENR) 
(RoK. NA 2014b: 17-18). Then, on 29 April, KCM met with the President. He listened 
carefully to KCM’s concerns and instructed that MoM should work with KCM to 
undertake a joint review and to look for compromises and agreement. Much happened 
quickly thereafter.  
Demonstrating their ability to engage, early in May, KCM organised a three day “retreat” 
with the ENR in Mombasa aimed at setting out and discussing the areas where KCM felt 
the Bill needed to be amended. The retreat attracted 52 participants including 21 
parliamentary members of the Committee. The chairman, Hon. Amina Abdalla, said that 
“she was elated” to be able to participate in the retreat and thanked KCM “for working 
closely with the committee” (Nyando 2014: 7). However, she reminded participants that 
“their principal duty [is] to provide a good law for both Kenya and the investors” (Nyando 
2014: 8). She particularly asked KCM to support the legislators with technical information 
so that they could make informed decisions, in line with the assertion of Bouwen (2004) 
that legislators often ask interest groups to provide evidence. The outcome of the 
meeting was agreement on clauses that needed to be well considered including, inter 
alia, reducing the powers of the Cabinet Secretary, removal of hindrances related to the 
conduct of small scale mining and setting thresholds for mineral agreements. KCM 
followed this up with a formal submission (KCM 2014i, KCM 2014j). 
Then, on 8 May KCM met with the Principal Secretary, the Commissioner for Mines and a 
consultant from Adam Smith International commissioned by the MoM to review the Bill 
and make suggestions for amendment. On 12 May, KCM met with the Cabinet Secretary 
(CS) to review the proposals for amendment and then the ‘technical committee’ of MoM 
and KCM, working collaboratively, prepared a draft of a proposal to go to ENR. On 20 
May, KCM met once again with the Cabinet Secretary to agree their final submission. 
They had agreed that the submission would cover all the areas on which they could agree 
and that each would separately submit additional proposals on the more contentious 
issues. The Bill, as originally drafted, had 198 clauses and three schedules. KCM and 
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MoM agreed and proposed 193 amendments to 95 clauses plus one substantial addition 
(on artisanal mining) and five amendments to all three schedules. There were four 
proposals made by MOM with which KCM did not agree and four proposals made by 
KCM that did not secure MoM agreement – but were included in the joint submission. 
Some proposals were very technical or were about tightening up loose wording (eg, 60 
days instead of two months) but some were very detailed (eg the new section on artisanal 
mining). The KCM/MoM joint submission (KCM 2014k) was sent to ENR on 29 May. 
Mwakesi (int. 2014c) estimated that they secured agreement on perhaps 80 per cent of 
the issues. KCM followed this on 6 June with a submission regarding their other issues 
(KCM 2014m). KCM continued to work on detailed policy positions, which had grown to 
seven, and completed these by 26 June: 
(1) County taxes: there was a concern that counties might seek to impose additional 
taxes on mining; KCM wanted agreement that nationally imposed royalties would be 
shared with the counties instead (KCM 2014b). 
(2) Free carried interest: GoK was seeking a free ‘carried interest’ of 10 per cent of the 
share capital of mining companies (RoK. NA 2014a: 324); effectively they were asking to 
be given, free, 10 per cent of the shares but KCM argued that many prospects never 
deliver and that this would make it harder to raise capital and instead proposed a series of 
amendments which would allow them to share higher dividends in the event that a mine 
starts to produce (KCM 2014c). 
(3) Local equity participation: the draft called for more local participation and that mining 
companies “offload” 20 per cent of their shares through a local stock exchange within 
four years of receiving a licence (without defining offload or local) (RoK. NA 2014a: 324); 
this could make it harder to raise capital and mines often take longer than four years to 
start generating revenue let alone a profit and Kenya’s own listing rules require firms to be 
profitable before they list. KCM argued for a watering down of the requirement and that 
it not be imposed until four years after production starts (KCM 2014d). 
(4) Mineral agreements and stability agreements: the mineral agreement is effectively a 
contract between the mining company and the State; KCM was concerned that the 
provisions seemed one way and gave too much power to the Cabinet Secretary. They 
proposed that mineral agreements should only apply where there is an investment of 
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more than $250m and that this should be balanced by a stability agreement (that is, an 
acceptance that the financial provisions contained in a mineral agreement will not 
subsequently be changed, for example, by changing the law). (KCM 2014e). 
(5) Mineral Rights: the draft legislation gave the CS the power to grant, deny or revoke 
mineral rights: KCM argued that there should a degree of independence and proposed 
the establishment of a Mineral Rights Board instead (KCM 2014f). 
(6) Repeal of previous legislation and the need for transitional provisions: there were 
already a number of agreements with mining companies; KCM was concerned that these 
would all be torn up rather than honoured in the transition to the new legislation. They 
argued that existing arrangements should continue in force until they expired and then be 
replaced with agreements under the new legislation (KCM 2014g). 
(7) Royalties: the draft allowed the CS to set royalties, more or less, at whim; KCM was 
concerned about the lack of predictability that this would introduce and argued that 
maximum rates should be enshrined in the legislation and that actual agreed rates should 
be included in Mineral Agreements and thus given contractual force (KCM 2014h). 
On 18 June, KCM met with a forum of MPs, which helped them to identify people who 
they regarded as critical to influence. In particular, it induced KCM to conclude that the 
really critical partner was the Parliamentary Committee. 
The second reading of the Bill was moved in the National Assembly on 16 July (RoK. NA 
2014c) with the chairman of the ENR already explaining that the committee intended to 
propose setting up a Mineral Rights Board (ibid. 15). It has been suggested that it is hard 
to discern influence (Lowery 2013) so it is interesting to note the chairman’s remarks: “I 
want to acknowledge the contribution made to us […] by the Kenya African Mining 
Association who highlighted the problems facing the indigenous miners” (ibid. 16). As a 
result, ENR proposed to add a new section on artisanal miners (largely drafted by KCM 
and MoM); ENR additionally proposed to add a new section on mineral agreements (ibid. 
16) addressing one of KCM’s concerns. 
On 17 July, ENR published its report on its consideration of the Bill. In it, ENR noted that it 
had met with KCM and recorded that “the Committee listened to the concerns and fears 
of the investors in the sector” (RoK. NA. ENR 2014: 3) and it further explained that it 
“took into consideration these concerns of the investors in a three-day policy retreat” 
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(ibid.). ENR invited public participation to support its consideration of the Bill and 
received written and verbal submission. ENR listed the main stakeholders who submitted 
comments as the Commission on Revenue Allocation, Base Titanium Limited (a KCM 
member), the Kenyan African Mining Association, the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), Kenyan Investment Authority, KCM, African 
Barrick Gold Ltd (a KCM member) and Farasi Strategy Advisors Ltd (not a member). This 
report did not include any proposals for amendment – they came later – but KCM 
perceived that the language captured the spirit of the joint submission and their proposed 
amendments (int. Mwakesi 2014c). Certainly, KCM featured more prominently than any 
other stakeholder: Figure 4 shows the number of times each stakeholder is cited by ENR 
as making a recommendation. It is worth noting KCM’s claim that many of the comments 
from the CIC were based on concerns shared bilaterally by KCM with the CIC (int. 
Mwakesi 2014c). The language of the report does suggest a degree of sympathy for 
KCM’s views. 
Figure 4: Citations in Report of Departmental Committee 
 
Source: Derived from the Report on the consideration of the mining bill, Departmental Committee on Environment & 
Natural Resources, Kenya National Assembly 
MoM explained that it was lobbied by other stakeholders including communities, county 
governments and MPs from mining areas as well as the Treasury and Development 
Partners from countries where some of the mining companies are based though they did 
not feature in the ENR review. 
On 5 August, the second reading debate was concluded with a commitment for 
amendment (RoK. NA 2014d). KCM was of the view that most MPs had not read the 
report and that some had not even read the Bill, so the comments in the debate, other 
than from the ENR, were very general. Some, however, were well briefed and made more 
pointed contributions. Most of the more informed MPs were part of KCM’s target 
audience and had been well briefed by KCM (int. Mwakesi 2014c). The Chair of ENR 
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effectively championed the Bill, balancing both KCM and Government interests, and kept 
it moving through its various Parliamentary stages.  
The next step was the Committee Stage, implemented as a ‘Committee of the Whole 
House’. Any MP can propose amendments at the committee stage, though the usual 
approach is for detailed amendments to be made by the Parliamentary Committee. 
Generally, however, the agreement of the committee is needed for amendments to be 
considered. At this stage, ENR had not concluded its proposals, so KCM continued to 
make proposals for amendments and also sought to lobby individual MPs. During 
Parliament’s summer break, KCM lobbied MPs whom they anticipated would also submit 
amendments. KCM recognised that it needed to make some effort to bring on-side 
associations and MPs who saw themselves as representing small scale miners because 
KCM perceived the small scale miners to think that the Bill would do nothing for them 
and so would oppose making it easier for large scale miners. About this time, KCM saw a 
preliminary draft of ENR’s proposals and concluded that much had been lifted word for 
word from their submission to ENR, which they saw as positive (int. Mwakesi 2014d) – 
and which was helped by the clarity of KCM’s proposals. 
On 21 October, the National Assembly published a list of the amendments to 76 clauses 
and one schedule and 29 additional clauses proposed by ENR (RoK. NA 2014e). An MP, 
not on the committee, proposed amendments to four clauses. This was the first time that 
KCM had seen the amendments that were actually being proposed, as opposed to drafts. 
KCM’s (2014a) analysis of the original Bill, their proposals and ENR’s suggested revisions, 
showed that ENR had adopted many of their proposals, in some cases word for word (see 
Table 13).
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Table 13: Selected clauses before and after 
Clause Draft KCM proposal Revised Comment 
6. Official maps […] at a scale of 1:150,000. To use maps at a scale of 1:50,000. Adopted. Small scale, 
technical change 
8. Pre-emption 
rights 
(1) The State has a right of pre-emption of all 
strategic minerals raised, won or obtained within 
the territory of Kenya before they are sold. 
(2) A mineral right holder shall offer for sale to 
the State any strategic minerals raised, won or 
obtained within the territory of Kenya. 
(3) An offer for sale of any strategic minerals 
under sub-section (2) shall be in writing 
addressed to the Cabinet Secretary. 
(4) An offer made under this section shall be valid 
for sixty days from the date of the offer for sale. 
(5) The Cabinet Secretary shall table any offer 
made under sub-section (3) for consideration by 
Cabinet. 
(6) The Cabinet Secretary shall communicate the 
decision by the Cabinet to accept or reject an 
offer in writing to the mineral right holder. 
This clause should be deleted as it goes 
against the rights bestowed on a holder 
by virtue of grant of a mineral right. This 
creates a conflict with Clause 86(2)(c) 
where the disposal of any mineral 
recovered stands as a right conferred 
on a mineral right holder. 
(1) The State has a right of pre-emption of all 
strategic minerals raised, won or obtained within the 
territory of Kenya before they are sold. 
 
(2) The Cabinet Secretary may make Regulations to 
provide for exploration, mining, processing and 
export of strategic minerals and strategic mineral 
deposits. 
KCM did not get 
exactly what they 
proposed, but the 
key clauses were 
deleted with 
agreement to write 
regulations after 
the legislation was 
enacted. 
9. Discovery of 
minerals 
 
(1) A person who discovers any minerals, for 
which there is no apparent holder of a Mineral 
Right or on any area of land which is not held by 
that person under a Mineral Right that confers 
rights on the holder to conduct prospecting or 
mining operations for minerals, shall report the 
discovery to the Cabinet Secretary. 
It is proposed that upon reporting of the 
discovery, the discoverer is offered the 
first right of refusal to 
stake a claim on the mineral by 
application for a mineral right 
ADD “(2) Upon reporting of the 
discovery, the person making the 
discovery shall be granted the first right 
of refusal to stake a claim through the 
acquisition of a mineral right over the 
area of discovery”. 
(1) A person who discovers any minerals, for which 
there is no apparent holder of a Mineral Right or on 
any area of land which is not held by that person 
under a Mineral Right that confers rights on the 
holder to conduct prospecting or mining operations 
for minerals, shall report the discovery to the Cabinet 
Secretary. 
(2) Subject to sub-section (1), a person who reports 
the discovery of any mineral shall be granted the first 
right of refusal to apply for a mineral right over the 
area of discovery. 
With minor 
changes to 
wording, secured 
their proposed 
amendment. 
31. Mineral 
rights 
(1) The Cabinet Secretary may grant, deny or 
revoke a mineral right. 
The management of the licensing 
regime is a vital component in the 
development of the sector. It is 
Inserted: 
29A. Mineral Rights Board 
(1) There is established a Mineral Rights Board. 
And clause 31 amended: 
KCM did not quite 
move the decision 
making away from 
the Cabinet 
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Clause Draft KCM proposal Revised Comment 
important to ensure that the process is 
free, fair and devoid of undue influence 
which may adversely affect investor 
confidence in the sector. 
Clause 31(1) REPLACE clause with the 
following: 
(1) There is established a Mineral Rights 
Committee, hereinafter referred to as 
The Committee for purposes of 
overseeing all matters relating to the 
granting, denial and revocation of a 
mineral 
right. 
(1) The Cabinet Secretary on the recommendation of 
the Mineral Rights Board 
may grant, deny or revoke a mineral right. 
Secretary but they 
did succeed in the 
creation of a 
Mineral Rights 
Board. 
47. Local 
equity 
participation 
(1) The Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe the 
limits of capital expenditure for the 
purpose of this section. 
(2) A mining company whose planned capital 
expenditure is over the prescribed limit shall, 
within four years after obtaining a mining licence, 
offload at least twenty percent of its equity at a 
local stock exchange. 
(3) The holder of a Mining Licence may apply, in 
writing, to the Cabinet Secretary for an extension 
of the period set out under sub-section (2). 
(4) The Cabinet Secretary may, after consultation 
with the National Treasury, extend the period set 
out in sub-section (2), for reason that the market 
conditions do not allow for a successful 
completion of the offering in the local stock 
exchange. 
The Chamber recognises the purpose of 
the clause as being to encourage local 
participation in mining activities. 
However, it goes against the tenets of 
free enterprise to force a private 
company to list in a stock exchange. 
There are more effective mechanisms 
to encourage companies to list on local 
stock exchanges [etc]. 
Clause 47 REPLACE with 
(1) A mining company shall within four 
years, offer for acquisition at fair market 
value, at least twenty percent of the 
equity in the company to Kenyan 
citizens through any available and 
viable mechanism in accordance with 
the relevant law. 
(2) The holder of a mining licence may 
apply, in writing, to the Cabinet 
Secretary for an extension of the period 
set out under sub-section (1). 
(1) The Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe the limits of 
capital expenditure for the purpose of this section. 
(2) A holder of a mining license whose planned 
capital expenditure exceeds the 
prescribed amount shall list at least twenty percent 
of its equity on a local stock exchange within four 
years after commencement of production. 
(3) The holder of a mining licence may apply in 
writing to the Cabinet Secretary to execute an 
equitable alternative mechanism that will allow the 
company to meet the requirement set in sub-clause 
(1) including an extension of time. 
(4) The Cabinet Secretary, may after consultation 
with the National Treasury extend the period set out 
in sub-clause (2) for reasons that the market 
conditions do not allow for a successful completion 
of the offering in the local stock exchange. 
KCM achieved its 
objective. 
Source: Republic of Kenya. National Assembly (2014a); KCM (2014a); Republic of Kenya (2016) 
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However, KCM also quickly realised that a number of proposed amendments were likely 
to be detrimental to the industry (including for example new permit requirements and 
additional revenue sharing requirements). As a result, KCM spent all weekend lobbying 
key MPs (int. Mwakesi 2014d) demonstrating their influencing skills. On the morning of 
21 October, the chairman of ENR retracted the list of amendments to allow further 
consultation and called a special session of the committee to which they invited KCM. 
Following a detailed discussion, ENR agreed that KCM should sit with their legal drafter to 
redraft some of the amendments.  
Out of nine drafting changes presented to ENR, six were adopted and incorporated into 
the Committee’s revised proposals (see Table 13). Despite many of KCM’s original 
amendments being accepted by the Committee, some critical issues (on prospecting 
rights, mineral agreements, stabilisation and criminal possession) remained. Intensive 
lobbying over the next days resulted in further amendments with the most significant one 
being on Mineral Agreements. 
Whilst KCM was not entirely happy with all the revised amendments, they felt that it was 
much improved. The new order for business for 28 Oct for the committee of the whole 
house was published on 23 Oct (RoK. NA 2014f). Prior to the committee, KCM lobbied 
some MPs and texted more specifically about Mineral Agreements. Joyce Lay, an 
opposition MP from a mining area, had been well briefed by KCM and made a number of 
amendments regarded by KCM as progressive. 
In total, 110 amendments were proposed, 84 of which originated from ENR and thus 
mostly from KCM. Most of the ENR amendments were adopted as proposed while other 
proposals – perceived by KCM as detrimental – were either defeated on the floor of the 
house or withdrawn by their proponents. After more than five hours of deliberations, the 
Mining Bill was agreed by the committee of the whole house and sent to the National 
Assembly where it passed its third reading on 29 Oct (RoK. NA 2014g). There seems to 
be some debate about what happened next. It seems that the NA sent the Bill to the 
President for his assent. Expecting this, KCM (2014h) wrote to the President on 5 
November asking for his intervention to amend clauses relating to consents, mineral 
rights and mineral agreements. 
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However, the Senate intervened, saying that they should have a chance to debate the Bill. 
KCM noted that the Executive and the NA often appeared to ignore the Senate, but that 
this bill was rather emotive and the Senate felt that some elements of this bill were 
important to the counties. Indeed, the Senate threatened to go to court if they did not get 
a chance to debate the bill. They were supported in this by the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution. So, on 19 November, the Speaker of the NA sent the 
bill to the Senate so that they could review the provisions affecting counties, specifically 
clauses on revenue sharing and consent from county government (Kenya. Senate 2014).  
The Senate Standing Committee on Land and Natural Resources (LNR) started its own 
hearing – with public submissions – at the end of February 2015. Whilst the Senate is 
supposed only to look at impacts on the Counties, this provided a further opportunity for 
KCM to lobby for amendment and they proposed nine further amendments, not solely 
focused on counties: they included their proposals for amendment that were not adopted 
by the National Assembly (KCM 2015). The committee received 18 submissions (RoK. 
Senate. LNR 2015) and recommended several changes, including one of KCM’s. 
Whilst the stakeholders were engaging in debating the draft legislation, the MOM had, in 
January 2014, initiated a process to prepare a mining policy, which was expected to 
some extent to guide the regulatory reform required in the sector. The draft policy was 
published on the Ministry’s website on 23 January and KCM was invited by the Ministry 
for a consultative forum with the CS on sector issues with the draft policy being central to 
the discussion. By 30 January, KCM had responded with comments accompanied by a 
formal letter which requested closer collaboration between them and the Ministry to 
develop a comprehensive policy framework. The CS responded on 20 February 
acknowledging KCM’s input and expressing the Ministry’s willingness to partner with 
KCM in developing the framework (RoK. MoM 2014a). 
BAF supported KCM to engage in dialogue on the policy and legal framework. After 
several meetings, however, the Ministry seemed more interested in developing the legal 
framework first and so the policy took a back seat though the draft Bill was largely aligned 
to the spirit of the draft policy.  
The Committee on Land and Natural Resources completed its report by May 2015 (RoK. 
Senate. LNR. 2015), debated in the Senate on 30 July (RoK. Senate. 2015), voted on 16 
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September to approve 29 amendments (RoK. Senate 2015b) and then sent it back to the 
NA on 29 September. 
On 22 October, the NA ENR rejected 11 of the Senate’s amendments (RoK. NA 2015, 
RoK. NA. ENR 2015) and so the Bill was sent to be considered by a mediation committee 
who produced a report (RoK. Parliament 2016), and proposed a final version of the Bill, in 
March 2016. This then had to be sent back to both Houses for approval. 
As the Mining Bill approached finalisation, the Ministry sought to finalise the Mining and 
Minerals Policy (RoK. MoM 2014b), intended to provide a framework with clear 
guidance for sustainable mineral resources development. This was approved by the 
Cabinet on 1 April 2016 (RoK. MoM 2016). 
Following approval by the National Assembly and the Senate, the Mining Bill was sent to 
the President for assent, gazetted on 13 May (RoK 2016) and implemented a few days 
later. This led to a formal presentation by the President to the CS on 13 June (Nation 
2016). 
On 28 July 2016, the Ministry published 11 draft Mining Regulations and Guidelines on 
its official website and on the same day wrote to KCM. The letter invited comments 
before 2 September. KCM saw this as another opportunity for the mineral industry to 
secure a business environment consistent with accepted mining practice elsewhere in the 
world. 
KCM still had some issues with the new Act, though it was much better than it might have 
been if they had not lobbied so hard and so vigilantly. However, the legislation will be 
followed by more detailed regulations and there is a belief within KCM that those 
regulations may alleviate some of their concerns. Once the Act has been operational for 
six months, they will be allowed to start lobbying for amendments should they still 
consider those necessary. 
Positively, however, KCM thinks that they achieved 80 per cent of their proposed 
changes (int. Mwakesi 2014d). They do not regard what they have done as ‘winning’, and 
say that there will be some adverse impact, but they do think that the mining sector can 
live with what is currently proposed and suggest that it will not decimate the industry (as 
the bill as originally drafted would have done). 
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7.3 The Ministry view 
A Ministry view was sought from the Chief Geologist & Acting Commissioner of Mines, 
Shadrack Kimono, and Director of Mines, Raymond Mutiso (int. 2015). MoM explained 
that it was expected to engage in a process of public participation to provide all 
stakeholders a chance to have their say. They organised many workshops. They stated 
that the Mining Bill had more public participation than any other Bill save the Land Bills. 
MoM wanted, through the consultation, to understand all stakeholders’ viewpoints, to 
hear proposals for solutions and to seek convergence. MoM was particularly keen to 
gather evidence to inform the final wording of the legislation and sought to gather it from 
experience in mining areas and from reference to international best practice. They invited 
stakeholders to provide evidence though reported that most simply listed issues without 
offering evidence. MoM observed that mining companies tended to share evidence that 
supported their arguments, for example from Botswana and Tanzania, rather than from 
the US, EU and Australia where mining legislation is stricter. However, MoM also 
commented that KCM members were helpful in sharing evidence on conserving the 
environment based on best practice in other countries where they mine. MoM said that 
the process helped them to realise that mining investors are very sensitive to laws and 
keen to study the legislation closely before they invest. 
MoM recognised that there is no perfect law but that it tried to ensure that the Bill 
responded to the legitimate concerns of key stakeholders: large miners, small scale 
miners and local communities. They perceived that each party felt that they made major 
compromises. MoM believed that the resulting Act would encourage investment, 
because it ensures security of tenure of mineral rights and introduces transparency and 
predictability (ibid.). 
MoM had mixed views on KCM. It described them as “aggressive, confrontational and 
non-compromising”, not always objective and appearing “elitist” and say that the process 
may have been smoother and “less bumpy” without them (ibid.). However, they did 
acknowledge that some changes and areas that KCM highlighted may have been 
overlooked and could not have been changed later. They say that KCM took the lead on 
behalf of the private sector, ensuring that there was a single message. They describe 
KCM’s chairman as “a good mobiliser and organiser” who “was always a step ahead of 
the process”. For example, he would meet with MoM one day and the next be in 
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Parliament talking to MPs before MoM could manage to do so and often this would 
make the difference in what the MPs believed (ibid.). It is noteworthy that MoM 
described MPs as “activists” reflecting the assessment of Booth et al. (2014). They said 
the KCM chairman “was a strategist”. KCM provided intellectual stimulation that forced 
the Government to think further about some of its proposals: “KCM’s involvement 
brought some balance to the process”. MoM perceived that KCM was often suspicious of 
and objected to their contributions. “However, they would come around and agree” 
(ibid.). The way in which the wording was changed, however, suggested that in most 
cases a suitable compromise was agreed. 
7.4 The Parliamentary view 
A view of KCM was also sought from the Chairman of ENR, Hon. Amina Abdalla (int. 
2015). She explained that she avoided interacting with KCM until she had learnt about 
the mining sector but that they were a good partner with whom to work and she enjoyed 
working with them. She was broadly complimentary about KCM and its work, noting that 
the CEO at the start of the lobbying process (Monica Gichuhi) was “broad and fair”, 
though she felt that KCM’s chairman had been prone to “spread misinformation”. 
However, she says that generally “KCM was professional, especially when giving general 
information about the sector; KCM input on the broad issues in the mining sector was 
very helpful”. She notes that working with KCM made “our work easy in terms of public 
participation” and “reduced the number of stakeholders with which we had to engage”. 
Abdalla observed a problem in that KCM did not represent many artisan miners, so the 
committee aimed to engage with them separately. The committee, however, validated 
issues with other stakeholders and through a mission to learn about how the mining 
sector is regulated in Australia. It seemed that whenever the committee felt that KCM was 
basing arguments on ‘misinformation’, or when they lacked evidential rigour, or when 
they appeared only to be self-serving, then the arguments were rejected out of hand; but 
when they had good evidence to support their arguments, they appeared “professional 
and trustworthy” and their proposals were more acceptable. Overall, the chairman says, 
“The Committee incorporated over 95 per cent of KCM’s amendments on the broad 
issues. KCM’s proposals helped a great deal in developing a good Mining Bill.” (ibid.) 
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7.5 KCM’s approach 
Mining was and remains an important and growing sector in Kenya and has the potential 
to contribute considerable tax revenue and to create many jobs. Indeed, ENR makes the 
point that “the review of the Mining Sector Policy and legislative reform is driven by the 
government’s recognition of the importance of the mineral sector in national 
development in line with vision 2030” (RoK. NA. ENR 2014). The challenge, of course, is 
that too many arms of government – Ministries, Agencies and now Counties – all want to 
‘dip their hand’ in the revenue stream. The mining companies recognise that they are 
extracting finite resources, so there needs to be an equitable share with the State. They 
recognise that the local communities also want a stake in the mineral resources. KCM’s 
objective, on behalf of the mining companies, however, was to ensure that they could still 
make a return on the very large investments required. 
Interest groups engaging in public policy advocacy tend to choose between working 
“inside” government – seeking directly to influence officials and politicians – or “outside” 
government – essentially through mobilising public opinion (Walker 1991: 103). Walker 
(1983) suggested that the public sector needs appropriate organisations with which they 
can consult. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, mining is expected to make a 
much bigger contribution to GDP and KCM was established at the behest of Government 
to give it a counterparty with whom to talk, so perhaps it is not surprising that they have 
good access at all levels from the President down – and almost all their activities were 
working inside government. 
Cirone (2011) argues that it is difficult for groups to lobby across multiple venues unless 
they have a high level of resources. KCM, with a very small level of resources, was 
nevertheless able to lobby quite effectively across Parliament and MoM and occasionally 
the President. In addition, KCM talked to other Ministries and Departments, though in a 
minimal manner, including the Office of the President, the Treasury, State Law Office, 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce and Ministry of Industrialisation. However, KCM 
recognised that it should have spent more time lobbying the Ministries of Energy, 
Transport and Labour as well.  
Despite having large mining companies as members, KCM is under-resourced. This did 
not affect their access. Indeed, KCM secured excellent access both to the National 
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Assembly Committee on Environment & Natural Resources and to the Ministry of Mining. 
However, it did affect their other work. KCM was effectively just Stephen Mwakesi and 
his board. At one stage, there were so many meetings in a short period of time, and with 
no additional staff resource, he simply did not have time to complete the policy position 
papers. The position papers were completed eventually, however, and focused closely on 
proposals to amend the legislation, and the arguments that supported those proposals. 
They are commendably short and high on evidence including international comparisons 
to make the case for change – though could arguably have also covered jurisdictions that 
did not have regulatory regimes that supported KCM’s arguments but which would have 
painted a broader picture. KCM would have liked the resources to undertake more 
economic analysis of the key provisions and this would undoubtedly have strengthened 
the arguments further – and may have ensured that all their proposals were rigorously 
evidenced. Despite advice from BAF on having their position papers available when 
speaking to stakeholders, this did not always happen and Mwakesi subsequently stressed 
the need, when you are called to public hearings by a Parliamentary committee, to go 
with a written summary (int. 2015). 
Mwakesi was clear that he needed to keep track of what Parliament and ENR were doing. 
As a result, he spent many hours as an observer in Parliament watching debates, listening 
to arguments and trying to understand how MPs think and how they make proposals. He 
was surprised that more BMOs do not do this in order to gather intelligence (int. 2015). 
Having listened to many of the debates, Mwakesi explained his concern that too many 
Parliamentarians are expected to take decisions on industries about which they know 
little or nothing and this perhaps puts the onus on organisations like KCM to ensure that 
MPs are properly briefed (int. Mwakesi 2015). However, MPs claim to be short of time, 
so KCM found it difficult to gain enough attention to raise awareness and to brief them. 
As a result, they used short policy papers and other means such as text messaging. During 
the lobbying process, KCM members followed the Parliament sessions closely and made 
contributions to the proposed amendments and devising the advocacy strategy. Their 
approach was to ensure they undertook sustained engagement where they aimed to 
educate MPs about the industry and the potential effects of the proposed legislation on 
the sector. 
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At every stage in the process, KCM worked hard to understand what precisely was being 
proposed and aimed to be clear about its objectives. Where it was able to reach 
agreement on specific clauses, it did so, requiring some compromise. But it did not 
compromise on the whole bill; instead it reserved its position on the clauses that it did not 
like and continued to lobby on those separately, recognising that other stakeholders 
would also continue to lobby on those aspects, probably taking a contrary position to 
KCM. Mwakesi suggested that the members, through an active board, were very 
important to their success (int. Mwakesi 2015). He noted that his international members 
have a much greater eye for detail and a consideration of the possible implications. He 
said that this was almost certainly due to a difference in culture but said that local 
members “are beginning to take attention to detail more seriously” though he lamented 
that many local companies did not participate closely enough. He also noted that 
international members are much stricter in relation to being ethical. 
Mwakesi knew the Government’s proposals intimately, as least as well as the 
Government’s own advisers. His view was that associations should not rely on external 
consultants because they did not have enough focus. He also noted that consultants 
sometimes have conflicts of interest. He cited for example the same consultant 
supporting the Ministry, the ENR and the Commission for the Implementation of the 
Constitution, each of which may have had different objectives. Mirroring the observations 
of Datta & Jones (2011) that legislators need ‘accessible’, easy to grasp, evidence that is 
politically acceptable and tells a compelling story, KCM made use of research and 
evidence but much of their argument to Parliamentarians was based on “emotion and 
rationality”: Mwakesi says that you “cannot bury Parliament with information” (int. 
Mwakesi 2015). In keeping with Bouwen’s (2004) definition of access goods, it seems 
that KCM was welcomed by both ENR and MoM because of its expert knowledge and its 
ability to inform government and legislators about the views of the mining companies. 
Empirical evidence suggests that many associations take seriously the building of 
relationships and seek to cultivate and encourage champions, either officials or MPs who 
may act on their behalf. Baumgartner et al. (2009) commonly found government officials 
who, far from being neutral, were acting as advocates, often collaborating with others 
regarded as sharing similar views, and actively lobbying others to adopt a particular 
position. It does seem that champions – from both the public and private sectors, who 
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invest in the process and drive it forward – can make a real difference to BMOs’ ability to 
secure change (Herzberg & Wright 2006). 
KCM has been clear all along that they have lobbied solely on the strength of their 
arguments and have not offered any bribes, though they also noted that some 
organisations are alleged to have offered bribes while trying to influence the government. 
KCM explained that their lobbying would be subject to external scrutiny and the way in 
which they achieved influence will be important. So, on this occasion, at least, KCM did 
not work through champions since they were worried that too much contact with one or 
two individuals might have raised suspicions amongst their colleagues. Nevertheless, 
KCM made an effort, and was able, to engage across government: with the President, 
with the Cabinet Secretary, with the Ministry of Mining, with the Parliamentary 
Committee and with MPs in general. This was helped by building relationships over many 
years.  
After a shaky start, the engagement with MoM was positive and the Cabinet Secretary 
engaged KCM in the review process to allow a collaborative view to be presented to the 
National Assembly. Indeed, it appears that MoM has now also become willing to invite 
KCM to comment at all stages of development of the regulations – and KCM will be 
lobbying hard for representation on the Mineral Rights Board and the National Mining 
Corporation – which will follow the legislation. 
It is particularly interesting however to note the game of musical chairs that has taken 
place since KCM started its lobbying. In Feb 2016, Monica Gichuhi, KCM’s former CEO 
was appointed to be a Policy, Strategy and Institutional Advisor at the MoM. In October 
2015, Mwakesi resigned from KCM, leaving it with a board member to act as part time 
CEO and endangering its relationships. In April 2016, Moses Njiru, a former 
Commissioner of Mines at MoM was appointed as KCM’s new CEO, and he has since 
worked hard to rebuild relationships and reattract lapsed members. And in May 2016, 
Mwakesi was appointed as Private Secretary to the Cabinet Secretary, where he sees his 
role as being to promote a fairness, objectivity and balance in order to achieve a ‘win-win’ 
for both public and private sectors. These appointments should make it much easier for 
KCM to be able to continue influencing MOM and the government in relation of mining 
policy. However, they also have implications for KCM which has effectively lost all its 
institutional memory and, indeed, has also lost the expertise and, importantly, the 
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networks that Mwakesi was able to develop during his tenure at KCM. It is to be hoped 
that Mwakesi, in his new role at the Ministry, can be something of a resource to KCM, 
keeping them abreast of future developments and continuing to press their case, now 
very much from the inside. 
7.6 Conclusion 
From KCM’s work, we can identify a number of competences all of which improved 
considerably during the period of the research. These are summarised in Table 14. There 
are two competences worthy of specific mention. Firstly, KCM demonstrated its ability to 
learn, for example in spotting that observing Parliamentary debates could provide good 
intelligence and in discovering the importance always of having written summaries. 
Secondly, KCM improved its ability to match its objectives for any meeting with the stage 
of the process.  Too often, BMOs focus on the ultimate objective of their advocacy rather 
than on thinking about the specific objectives for a specific meeting. KCM was always 
focused on its ultimate objectives but recognised that there would be many steps 
necessary to get there. 
Table 14: Summary of KCM’s competences 
Competence Evidence 
Argumentation Improved ability to make case, including through preparing detailed critique of Bill but also 
policy papers on specific issues (to keep issues and arguments separate); argued on the 
evidence with officials but additionally used ‘emotion and rationality’ with MPs; ensured 
proposals are clear and precise. 
Champion 
recruitment 
Networks with stakeholders (including a Principal Secretary) though did not use champions in 
this project. 
Collaborative 
(and coalition 
building) 
Aims to work with complementary BMOs and others; drafted, with MoM, amendment to Bill on 
behalf of artisanal miners; collaborated with Commission on the Implementation of the 
Constitution. 
Communication Providing written documents to ENR and others; direct lobbying of MPs; chair was effective 
communicator. 
Engagement & 
dialogue 
Has formal dialogue arrangement with Ministry of Mining; participates in Ministerial Round 
Tables; invited to comment on 2013 draft of Bill; invited to comment on 2014 draft of Bill; 
engaged with policy makers across multiple venues. 
Intelligence 
gathering 
Originally did little to gather intelligence but found that observing Parliamentary debates to 
understand how MPs think and identify the key issues was helpful in preparing arguments. 
Learning & 
reflection 
For example, learning first hand of the importance of taking written summaries even when 
making a proposal in person; learning that observing Parliamentary debates can provide good 
intelligence; learned the importance of keeping short documents for MPs. 
Member co-
ordination 
Several members worked with KCM to provide evidence to ENR; ensured a single message 
coming from the private sector. 
Network 
development 
Reached out to Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution. 
Proactive Was proactive at every stage. Vide lobbying of ENR at every stage 
Relationship 
development 
Developed positive relationship with Commissioner for Mines and Personal Adviser to the 
Cabinet Secretary; three day retreat with ENR 
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Research 
capability 
Prepared good evidence, including international comparisons, and commended by MoM and 
ENR for their evidence. 
Resource 
acquisition 
KCM recognises that it needs more resources and that it is not funded to a sufficient level by its 
members but has so far failed to address this challenge. 
Strategy & tactics Being clear about every stage in the process and being clear about the specific objectives to be 
achieved at that stage; looking several steps ahead. 
KCM is somewhat different to the average BMO in Kenya in that it has a relatively small 
number of members who could afford a higher level of subscription and who understand 
the need to lobby for public policy reform. Nevertheless, as suggested by the literature, to 
be effective, business associations need to be competent in their approach, with 
objective research and evidence that will inform policy makers and with compelling 
policy positions that will persuade politicians and officials. It is also suggested that 
legislators need simpler, more accessible evidence and argument. KCM was able to 
deliver both of these, with arguments for legislators based more on ‘emotion and 
rationality’. Mwakesi grew into the role, recognising what needed to be done in terms of 
lobbying both Parliamentary Committee and Ministry of Mining. He was able to learn 
quickly. He was analytical when it came to reviewing government documents. He was 
very well organised. He kept his members informed and consulted with them regularly.  
Mwakesi worked across multiple venues and often allied with MoM to make proposals to 
ENR (reflecting the belief of Baumgartner et al. (2009) that public officials can also be 
advocates). KCM needed to develop and sustain relationships with ministries, 
departments and agencies, so that they could adopt an insider approach. It is clear that 
KCM was very professional in its approach, gathering intelligence, understanding the 
motives of the MPs, working through MoM and ENR and giving them the ammunition to 
support amendments once agreed. 
Whilst KCM did not achieve all their objectives and compromised in a number of areas, it 
is clear that they had excellent access and the wording of the final legislation suggests that 
they were influential. It is not possible to generalise based on one case study, but it is 
worth noting that whilst KCM recognised the need to compromise on occasion, as 
anticipated by Chapman and Wameyo 2001) and unlike BMOs in Tanzania, it was not 
continually seeking consensus. Whilst the complexity of issues often makes it difficult to 
determine cause and effect (Chapman & Wameyo 2001), there seems little doubt in this 
case that KCM was the driving force behind many of the amendments – persuading 
 182 | P A G E  
MoM or ENR or both of the merits of their case and thus ensuring that ENR adopted their 
proposals so that they then pushed them through the National Assembly. 
Ultimately, much of KCM’s success is due to Stephen Mwakesi who drove the process 
from the beginning to the end. The interest group literature rarely looks at the individuals 
involved but rather focuses on the organisation. He was well supported by his board and 
members but KCM’s success was down to the competence, persistence (a characteristic 
identified as essential by Baumgartner et al. (2009)) and drive of one key individual. His 
legal training helped him to understand the legal language and parliamentary process. His 
ability to communicate and articulate a message in a well-spoken manner has been a 
great plus. The proposals for amendment were very precise, which probably helped. 
Indeed, the way in which BMOs make their policy proposals is another under-researched 
area, yet incredibly important. A key lesson for other BMOs is the importance of updating 
members on progress and regularly seeking their input. Constant updates made KCM 
members feel part of the process and helped them to understand where and when to 
contribute. 
The legislation will be largely enabling, with technical matters covered in subsequent 
regulations to be drafted by the Ministry, though they will eventually also need NA 
approval, so KCM cannot afford to drop its guard. It needs to monitor other 
developments as well. For example, the National Environmental Management Agency 
(NEMA) is currently proposing amendments to the Environmental Management Act 
which might have a detrimental effect on mining. 
The biggest challenge for KCM was struggling with gathering enough research and 
preparing documents. It was somewhat overwhelmed by the process but came through it 
with Stephen Mwakesi still smiling. He developed enormously throughout this process; 
he outgrew his mentor and, probably as a result of his experience, now has a job where 
he can influence public policy even more effectively and where he can now be the 
champion within the government for the mining sector. 
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Chapter 8. The Black Box opened 
8.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis has been to assess the competences that business 
membership organisations require to influence public policy, through asking about their 
own perceptions of what is important and through reviewing how those competences 
improved over time. The working assumption is that BMOs can influence policy 
outcomes. Being seen to be on the ‘winning’ side does not equal influence; rather the 
organisation should have played an instrumental role in bringing about a change in public 
policy. Some scholars argue that interest groups are politically influential to the extent 
that they succeed in obtaining policies that are more closely aligned with their preference 
than would have been the case without their participation (Bernhagen et al. 2014). 
Alternatively, Woll (2007) stresses that apparent policy success could simply be the 
convergence of business and government objectives. However, having similar policy 
goals does not necessarily mean that actors have the same ideas about how to get there, 
so advocacy may still be important. 
In consolidated democracies, where there are many interest groups active in the policy 
process, it is not always easy to identify which organisations are influential. In 
consolidating democracies, with fewer BMOs active, it may be more straightforward to 
attribute influence. Within this thesis the cases provide considerable evidence that BMOs 
have witnessed reforms aligned to their preferences. Kenyan and Tanzanian BMOs can 
put issues on the agenda and influence policy at both the technical and, on occasion, the 
political levels. The work of the Kenya Chamber of Mines provides the clearest example 
of influence, and the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation appears to be involved regularly 
in the policy formulation process and is becoming increasingly proactive. 
This chapter draws together the conclusions from the case studies and links them to the 
core competences (e.g. gathering evidence, preparing positions and arguments, 
developing relationships, etc.). Its key findings are that BMOs exhibit many of the 
competences required to influence outcomes. It discusses the importance of dialogue, 
the key role played by certain individuals, the need to gather intelligence and the need to 
keep a strategic focus. The chapter starts with a recap of the types of BMO in Tanzania 
and Kenya and the nature of their approach to policy issues, it then provides a brief 
 184 | P A G E  
analytical summary of each of the four case studies. The section following discusses Table 
5 from Chapter 2, adding examples and evidence from each of the case studies to 
demonstrate BMO competences. That is followed by a more general discussion which 
highlights the competences that appear to be most important. The conclusion then draws 
out the key learning and makes suggestions for further research. 
8.2 The cases 
The case studies were chosen to provide a cross section of business interest organisations 
– with one apex organisation, one mixed organisation and two business only bodies. 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation 
TPSF is the apex body that brings together all the BMOs in Tanzania, though in fact is 
more of a mixed membership BMO. It generally operates as an insider and ranges across 
many Ministries and Agencies. It is well connected both politically and with officials. It is 
asked frequently to comment on proposals for legislation, often at short notice. It has 
supported other BMOs (e.g. TCT and TAHA) in gaining access to government officials 
and has brought together much of the private sector to influence the government’s 
budget. To some extent, it has institutionalised its relationship with government through 
its participation in the Tanzania National Business Council. It has become a member of 
policy networks and has worked across all stages of the policy process (described in 
Chapter 1) with a wide range of public sector target audiences. There is evidence that it 
has been able to influence public policy, both ‘technically’ and ‘politically’. 
Tourism Confederation of Tanzania 
TCT is an insider group working closely with the Ministry for Natural Resources and 
Tourism (with which it has a Memorandum of Understanding) and the Tanzania Tourist 
Board. It has unified the tourism sector. It claims to take approaches that are sensitive to 
societal culture and in particular the culture of the policy makers, as evidenced by their 
desire not to fight publicly. TCT appears to be sensitive to the way that civil servants and 
politicians come to decisions and aims to work with the grain.  It has worked across all 
stages of the policy process and its target audiences have generally been limited to 
MNRT and their agencies, though it has targeted the Ministry of Finance in relation to tax 
issues. TCT’s Executive Secretary, Richard Rugimbana has worked for the organisation 
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since 2003, and this has led to a high level of institutional memory, which has been 
beneficial. There is some evidence that it has been able to influence public policy.  
Tanzania Horticultural Association 
TAHA is one of several agricultural business associations.  It has built a professional 
advocacy team and worked closely with other agricultural associations and TPSF. It set up 
a subsidiary logistics business and is a ‘donor darling’; accordingly, it is well-resourced. 
TAHA is held up by donors and BEST-Dialogue as an exemplar. It has worked across all 
stages of the policy process. Its key target audience is the Ministry of Agriculture, though 
it has lobbied other Ministries when necessary. There is evidence that it has been able to 
influence technical aspects of policy and, more recently, some contentious policy issues. 
It has been particularly successful in reframing issues, so that an immediate solution to a 
technical problem can be agreed pro tem, and then all parties can take longer to agree a 
more permanent solution to what may be perceived as a more political problem.  
Kenya Chamber of Mines 
KCM takes an insider approach and is well connected to the Ministry of Mining. Unlike 
the other cases, this one focuses on the work of a BMO over a period of two and a half 
years to influence the Mining Bill as it made its way through both Houses of Parliament. 
The case study followed KCM’s efforts to reform proposals for revised legislation. Whilst it 
attempted to influence the bill prior to publication, its real work focused on amending the 
proposed legislation as it made its way through Parliament. KCM targeted a wide range of 
audiences, including the President, the Ministry, and the Parliament, especially the 
Parliamentary Committee on Environment and Natural Resources. Arguably, it was 
successful with several of its proposals included in the final legislation. 
Summary 
The key observations of the nature of BMOs, but not their competences, are summarised 
in Table 15. All operate predominantly as insiders despite being different types of BMOs. 
There are varying degrees of institutional memory and all but one face resource 
challenges. However, all have been asked regularly to comment on proposals for policy 
reform and are involved in dialogue. TPSF, TCT and TAHA might be regarded as regular 
members of policy networks – in the descriptive sense of stakeholders in an issue linking 
formally or informally (Rhodes 2006). KCM was accepted into a policy network at least 
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for the duration of the legislation as it proceeded through parliament. As noted earlier, all 
the case study BMOs appear to have influenced public policy at some point. 
Table 15: Key observations from case study BMOs 
Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation 
Tourism Confederation of 
Tanzania 
Tanzania Horticultural 
Association 
Kenya Chamber of Mines 
Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Committed CEO with 
determination to do good 
for Tanzania 
Experienced and 
committed CEO 
Experienced, committed 
and entrepreneurial CEO 
Capable and fast-learning 
policy director (who 
became Acting CEO) 
Some institutional memory 
through the CEO 
High degree of stability & 
effective institutional 
memory 
High degree of stability & 
effective institutional 
memory 
No institutional memory 
Under-resourced Under-resourced Well-resourced Under-resourced 
Invited frequently to 
consult & to engage in 
dialogue 
Invited to consult and to 
engage in dialogue 
Invited to consult and to 
engage in dialogue 
Invited to consult and to 
engage in dialogue 
‘Institutionalised’ 
relationship, through 
TNBC and bilaterally 
MoU with MNRT No formal arrangement 
but meets regularly with 
Ministry of Agriculture  
No formal arrangement 
with Ministry of Mining 
but meets regularly 
Member of several policy 
networks 
Member of MNRT policy 
network 
Member of Min of Ag 
policy network 
Was member of policy 
network whilst legislation 
progressed 
Has influenced policy 
across technical and 
political issues 
Has influenced policy, 
mainly in relation to 
technical issues 
Has influenced policy, 
mainly in relation to 
technical issues 
Had major influence on 
final shape of mining 
legislation 
There is a wide range of factors that might lead to policy success including experience, 
whether the BMO genuinely represents the sector, venue, objectives of reform and stage 
in the policy process. Beyers and Braun argue that the main factor explaining access is 
capability to produce policy goods (2014: 93) which they conceptualise as a function of 
its resources. In short, they argue that more resources enable the supply of higher quality 
policy goods and this raises the likelihood of securing access. This analysis omits a step 
however. In most cases, the resources are people and this makes the assumption that the 
people have the appropriate competence. Drawing from the management literature, as 
noted in the introduction, Johnson et al. (2014) argue that capability is a combination of 
resources and competences. Beyers and Braun argue that participating in an alliance can 
overcome lack of resource. Bräutigam et al. (2002) have made the same point about the 
need for alliances, specifically in relation to Africa. However, they also stress the need for 
BMOs to be competent enough to engage credibly with the state. In Africa, financial 
resources are required to do research and attend meetings but there is no big 
expenditure on mobilising public opinion or on paying lobbyists or paying campaign 
expenses.  
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Types of interests represented do not seem important either. Most BMOs are not in 
alliances or coalitions, though will often come together on an issue by issue basis. Beyers 
and Hanegraaff (2016) claim that advocacy style makes a difference and differentiate 
between confrontational and co-operative styles. This is reflected in the work of BMOs in 
Africa. In later research, Hanegraaff et al. (2017) conclude that the choice of advocacy 
style has an institutional explanation rather than a cultural one. Whilst this may be true in 
consolidated democracies, it does not appear to hold in Kenya or Tanzania. Rather, as 
noted earlier, BMOs seem to sense that drifting too far from the cultural norm of seeking 
consensus and becoming more adversarial, is likely to lead to a reduced likelihood of 
influencing policy. Choice of style is a competence and we will return to that shortly as 
well as suggesting that this is an area worthy of further research. 
Halpin and Fraussen draw distinctions between involvement, access and prominence, a 
term they use to designate the groups that are “taken for granted” (2016: 4). This implies 
that such groups will be specifically invited to participate in dialogue or to comment on 
proposals. In other words, it is a measure of credibility. Institutionalising the relationship, 
as TCT has managed, is evidence of prominence. TPSF seems to be consulted on all 
relevant issues, so is clearly also prominent. There does not seem to be any evidence, 
however, that they are more successful than TAHA and KCM. Bernhagen et al. (2014) 
note that BMOs will only maintain their credibility with government if they propose 
positions that are feasible. This is exactly the approach adopted by TCT and TAHA which 
both stress the need to argue for the possible and to recognise the need to balance the 
needs of the private sector with other societal needs. From this we might infer the 
requirement for a BMO to have enough competence to make the case for policy reform. 
This is as true in Africa as in consolidated democracies but there is additionally a need to 
be precise about proposals for reform, so again a clear need to be competent. There 
appear, therefore, to be some determinants that make a difference and these seem 
largely to be down to competence. 
8.3 The competences 
Table 16 provides examples and supporting evidence drawn from the case studies. The 
BMOs seem largely to have all the competences, though they did not necessarily exhibit 
these competences at the start of the research, and though they have not all developed 
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to the same extent. In some areas, the BMOs do not appear to have the necessary 
competence levels to have an impact. However, they have all built effective relationships, 
secured access and engaged in dialogue with the government. All the groups gather 
evidence, or commission researchers to gather evidence, to support their policy positions 
and have effective leadership 
All the case study BMOs have a key objective to influence public policy – they would not 
have been selected if they did not – and they are all offering selective benefits to 
members. Importantly, though, they prioritise their advocacy and representation. In the 
early stages of their advocacy, they tended to pick issues that were less likely to be 
controversial, not always out of strategic choice, which resulted in them learning from 
experience and gaining in confidence. Even if the economic or business impact from their 
early successes was not great, it did enable them to promote their successes to their 
members. This implies that an appropriate strategy for a new BMO, or for a BMO with 
limited experience, is to pick an issue that is not too controversial and to learn through 
experience. Examples include TCT on park fees and TAHA on phytosanitary certification. 
For many BMOs, and three of the case studies, the lack of prioritisation initially extended 
to the advocacy strategy. Strategy includes the choice of issues and the objectives for 
which the BMO is striving. There was a tendency for BMOs, as they started to advocate, 
to react to issues either because they were raised by their members or to respond to a 
government action. But as their experience grew, they became more strategic, as 
evidenced by TCT aiming to work with the government to promote its overarching view 
of what a dynamic tourism sector should look like and TAHA choosing issues intended to 
contribute to its aim of growing significantly the level of horticultural exports. 
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Table 16: Summary of possible competences and supporting evidence 
 Area of competence TPSF: evidence & examples TCT: evidence & examples TAHA: evidence & examples KCM: evidence & examples 
Evidence     
 Compile evidence     
  Good at gathering 
'intelligence' 
Talks widely so does gather 
intelligence (but does not 
appear to be systematised). 
Effective at gathering evidence 
even from outside the country. 
In interviews, said that: “You 
must know your industry well. 
You are the authority. You must 
have the data at your fingertips”. 
Puts in a lot of effort to gather 
data; does “hard core research” 
and explains that “only the facts 
count”. 
Important to understand the 
issue. 
Conduit from mining companies 
to Parliamentary Committee; 
Committee seeking information; 
Monitored carefully when key 
stakeholders, e.g., Parliamentary 
Committee, were meeting; 
policy director went to observe 
meetings held in public so could 
listen to discussion; 
Observed Parliamentary 
debates. 
 
  Able to identify, 
commission or 
undertake relevant 
research 
Commissions consultants to 
undertake research. 
In interviews, said “To be able to 
do successful advocacy you 
need data readily” 
Identified key requirement to 
develop international marketing 
strategy and commissioned 
research appropriately 
MNRT saw marketing strategy 
as a “very good document”. 
Undertakes and commissions 
research; they explained that 
they “do their homework”; 
“ensure that we have sound 
evidence”; and “master the 
detail”. 
Very good at analysis, e.g., 
content of bill, and thinking 
through the implications. 
  Analysis Undertakes analysis (though 
could be more detailed in 
drawing out insights and 
conclusions). 
 
 
 
Undertakes analysis (though 
could be more detailed in 
drawing out insights and 
conclusions). 
Undertakes analysis (though 
could be more detailed in 
drawing out insights and 
conclusions). 
Undertakes analysis and 
understands issues in detail. 
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 Area of competence TPSF: evidence & examples TCT: evidence & examples TAHA: evidence & examples KCM: evidence & examples 
 Frame issues     
  Able to frame issue 
appropriately and 
succinctly 
(Links to advocacy & 
argument) 
Frames argument (re duty) as 
loss of jobs rather than reduced 
profitability. 
Frames policies, such as Tourism 
Development Levy, as good for 
sector. 
Good at framing issues to look 
technical e.g. VAT on air freight, 
e.g. helping farm inspectors by 
writing manual. 
Frame issues as two steps: 
technical to achieve now, and 
political to achieve in the future. 
Identified range of problems 
with the draft legislation and 
framed each one separately. 
Engagement     
  Access Invited to sit on committees and 
is regularly consulted. 
Provided secretariat for a 
Parliamentary Committee. 
Ministries are willing to talk to 
TPSF when it asks. 
Addressing audiences of MDAs, 
Ministers and Parliamentarians. 
Has MoU with MNRT. 
Asked by MNRT to work 
together to prepare for meeting 
with TRA. 
Engaged Minister of Trade and 
Minister of Finance. 
Represented on government 
committees. 
Developed strong relationship 
with MALF. 
Represented on government 
committees. 
MALF says that it works closely 
with TAHA. 
Regular access to Parliamentary 
Committee, to MoM, to CS and 
occasional access to the 
President. 
  Coalitions & alliances TPSF is coalition of associations. 
Formed alliances to fight VAT 
expansion and co-ordinate 
budget responses. 
Promoted collaboration in 
relation to DB task forces. 
TCT is coalition of associations. 
In effective alliance with TTB. 
“associations need to work 
together as a team and have a 
single voice”. 
Works e.g. with ACT, ANSAF, 
TASTA, TATO & TPSF. 
Worked with MALF on review 
of taxes. 
MALF & TAHA lobbied 
together. 
Aimed to work with others 
including KAM, KEPSA, KNCCI 
and PIEA. 
  Consensus & 
collaboration 
Works on basis of consensus. Aims for consensus, especially 
amongst members; collaborates 
closely with government. 
Collaborates widely. Worked closely with other 
BMOs and MoM to develop 
mutually acceptable solutions. 
  Champions Addressing critical audiences of 
MDAs, Ministers and 
Parliamentarians. 
Identifying key ‘contact persons’ 
in MDAs. 
Whilst works closely with TTB 
and with previous Director of 
Tourism at MNRT, has not 
proactively sought to cultivate 
champions. 
Identify champions and people 
who might become champions; 
Support staff at all levels in 
MALF. 
Cultivates people who might 
become champions (though 
specifically did not use 
champions in lobbying over the 
Mining Bill). 
   
P
A
G
E
 | 191
 
 Area of competence TPSF: evidence & examples TCT: evidence & examples TAHA: evidence & examples KCM: evidence & examples 
 Develop relationships     
  Members Making more effort to involve 
and co-ordinate members. 
Said that its members were 
taking it more seriously. 
Involved members in 
preparation of policy positions; 
briefed members when adopted 
new policy positions. 
Recruited many new members. 
Worked closely with members – 
in preparation of policy and 
encouraged to lobby alongside 
KCM; an active board is 
important to success. 
  Networker Proactive in its networking 
amongst public & private 
sectors. 
Involved with MNRT, TPSF, TTB, 
PDB, TNBC etc. 
CEO networks widely both in 
northern Tanzania and 
nationally. 
Worked closely with range of 
stakeholders including other 
BMOs, CIC, etc. 
 Share knowledge     
  Pro-active sharer of 
information, 
knowledge & policy 
ideas 
TPSF is starting to share 
knowledge & has plans for 
portal, Responding to Prime 
Minister’s Office desiring BMOs 
to provide information. 
Aiming to be trusted provider of 
information and research 
evidence. 
Regularly shares ideas with 
Ministry of Agriculture, e.g., for 
improved warehousing. 
Shares intelligence with 
Agriculture Council of Tanzania. 
Shared knowledge and 
intelligence with Parliamentary 
Committee and other 
stakeholders, e.g., CIC. 
Expression & communication    
 Advocacy     
  Understand the 
political environment 
& policy process 
Political expertise 
Prime Minister’s Office 
perceived BMOs in Tanzania 
(especially TPSF) getting better 
at understanding the issues. 
Sees advocacy as key role 
Recognised need to understand 
what government wants: have 
to arrive at win-win scenario. 
Interviews generated comments 
such as: “the government has to 
deliver to the public so one has 
to help them achieve that 
without undermining them”. 
Became more involved in 
advocacy as government 
became more open; 
Focus on ‘technical’ issues; 
Received comments such as: 
“Advocacy and lobbying” is 
number one reason for 
existence; and need to “engage 
with the whole system”. 
Raison d’être is influencing 
public policy. 
  Professional staff 
Capable staff with 
specialist functions 
Appointed specialist advocacy 
staff. 
Has entrepreneurial CEO. 
Longevity of CEO. 
Politically and culturally 
sensitive. 
Longevity of CEO (& with MBA). 
Recruited policy director with 
‘inside’ knowledge. 
Policy director had trained as a 
lawyer. 
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 Area of competence TPSF: evidence & examples TCT: evidence & examples TAHA: evidence & examples KCM: evidence & examples 
  Regular user of wide 
range of advocacy 
tools/ tactics/ 
strategies 
Opportunism; dialogue; focus 
on advocacy. 
Does not always use evidence. 
Framing issues to be simple; 
working through dialogue; 
working with others; evidence-
based arguments. 
Framing issues to be simple; 
focus on technical issues; 
involvement of members; 
working through dialogue; 
working with others, evidence-
based argument, use 
champions. 
Evidence-based arguments; 
policy position papers; work 
across multiple venues; form 
alliances; oral & written 
presentation. 
  Effective 
communicator 
Use of multiple venues; good 
use of the media; communicates 
private sector views to 
government. 
Use of multiple venues. Field trips; good use of the 
media; monthly bulletin. 
Policy director very articulate; 
good use of the media; good 
use of written policy briefs. 
  Persistence Lobbying Doing Business 
thematic task forces to keep 
meeting and making decisions 
shows persistence. 
Work on over-regulation of 
tourism sector demonstrates 
persistence. 
Work on biological control 
agents demonstrates patience 
and persistence. 
Persistent all the way until bill 
gazetted, even when thought 
had ‘won’. 
 Argument     
  Able to prepare 
compelling policy 
positions; persuasive 
Recognised need to respond to 
Prime Minister’s Office hope for 
BMOs to make “concrete 
arguments, scientific arguments, 
balanced arguments” 
Improving in its ability to make 
arguments based on evidence. 
“The evidence produced by TCT 
no doubt played a role in 
persuading the government to 
change its stance” and “one of 
the arguments that caused the 
Ministry to accommodate TCT”. 
Worked closely with Ministry of 
Agriculture on phytosanitary 
certification; evidence and 
argumentation persuaded 
Ministry of Agriculture re testing 
of fertiliser. 
Prepared compelling arguments 
to amend proposed legislation; 
kept issues, and thus policy 
proposals, separated; evidence-
based argument was said to be 
“professional and trustworthy” 
(and argument without evidence 
was mostly rejected); argument 
supported by “emotion and 
rationality”. 
 Dialogue     
  Able to set the agenda 
with government 
TPSF and TCT, for example, with 
marketing strategy & revised 
tourism policy. 
TPSF and TCT, for example, with 
marketing strategy & revised 
tourism policy. 
Persuaded government that 
biological control agents and 
new fertiliser should be on 
agenda. 
Originally persuaded 
government of need for new 
legislation. 
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 Area of competence TPSF: evidence & examples TCT: evidence & examples TAHA: evidence & examples KCM: evidence & examples 
  Important to mutual 
understanding 
President of Tanzania calling for 
more ‘structured dialogue’. 
Engaging in more dialogue. 
Member of oversight committee 
for Doing Business roadmap. 
In interviews, said re MNRT: 
“they listen and there is constant 
improvement in the various 
policies, regulations and 
procedures”. And MNRT 
responded: “we don’t have to 
agree, but we have to talk”. 
Organises field trips for MPs and 
media. 
Invited to join oversight 
committee for Doing Business 
roadmap. 
Created to give government a 
counterpart with whom to talk. 
 
  Participation Dialogue with most Ministries. Engaging Minister of Trade and 
Minister of Finance. 
Talks regularly with MALF. Has a regular ‘Ministerial Round 
Table’ meeting with MoM. 
Worked closely with 
Parliamentary Committee. 
Governance & management    
  Think strategically Thinking more clearly about 
how small steps fit together, for 
example in relation to Big 
Results Now. 
Long term objective to persuade 
Ministry to develop and adopt 
tourism strategy. 
For example, identifying 
champions and then informing 
and supporting as they progress 
in Ministry. 
Recognising need to gather 
intelligence, for example, by 
monitoring Parliamentary 
debates. 
  Accountable to 
members 
TPSF & board restructuring. 
Active board. 
Comments in interviews 
included “You must have a good 
rapport with your members, 
without them on board, you 
cannot succeed in advocacy”. 
Active board. 
Involve members in developing 
policy positions. 
Active board. 
Involves members in developing 
policy positions. 
Active and supporting board. 
  Project management 
skills 
Managed projects for World 
Bank. 
Production of member directory 
annually demonstrates project 
management skills. 
Setting up and growing TAHA 
Fresh demonstrates project 
management skills and 
commercial acumen. 
Lobbying on Mining Bill is good 
example of managing on a tight 
budget and with a flexible 
timescale outside one’s control. 
 Resource mobilisation     
  Can secure resources Struggles with lack of resources 
and recognises that more is 
needed to be effective. 
Can secure funding for projects. Has attracted considerable 
support from multiple donors. 
Attracted enough donor 
support. 
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 Area of competence TPSF: evidence & examples TCT: evidence & examples TAHA: evidence & examples KCM: evidence & examples 
  Provide services to 
members 
Primary service to members is 
advocacy. 
Effective services such as 
Tourism directory. 
Effective services such as TAHA 
Fresh and newsletter. 
 
 
 
Mostly inward investors so 
mostly interested in advocacy. 
Credibility     
  Recognised by 
government as 
credible partner 
Invited to sit on large number of 
government committees and is 
frequently consulted. 
Appointed as secretariat to a 
Parliamentary Committee. 
Perceived as voice of the private 
sector and as partner with 
whom government can consult. 
TCT asked by TNBC to take the 
lead of draft tourism plans. 
Perceived to have built feeling 
of mutual trust with MALF; 
In interviews, MALF perceived 
TAHA to be a “strong 
organisation”; 
CEO appointed to Doing 
Business Road Map managing 
committee; 
TAHA explained that their “first 
partner is the government”. 
Parliamentary Committee 
specifically asked KCM for 
information, thought KCM was a 
good partner and stated that 
KCM members were helpful in 
sharing evidence. 
  Good reputation & 
effective influencer 
Large number of examples of 
where has influenced 
government on both technical 
and political issues. 
Recognised (and delivered on) 
Ministry expectation that TCT 
would ‘sell’ government 
decisions to the sector. 
Profiled in the media as an 
effective influencer; 
Large number of examples 
where has influenced 
government, though mainly on 
technical issues. 
MoM reported that KCM took 
the lead and ensured a single 
voice; 
MoM explained that “KCM’s 
proposals helped a great deal in 
developing a good Mining Bill”. 
  Diversified 
membership base, 
representing most of 
sector, with good 
retention 
Apex with majority of BMOs in 
membership. 
Intended to represent the whole 
of the private sector. 
Represents most of the sector. Has broadened membership 
and covers about 85% of 
horticulturists. 
Represents wide cross section of 
the sector. 
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The BMOs have all been able to put issues on the agenda and secure access. Specifically, 
they have been able to frame issues simply and in a way that encourages government to 
act, as for example with TCT’s proposal to delay rises in park fees, framed as an issue that 
would otherwise discourage tourism, and with TAHA’s proposal to amend the fertiliser 
regulations, framed as an issue that would reduce horticultural exports. TAHA, in 
particular, has refined its framing, and its lobbying, where possible to turn an issue into a 
two-stage process and TAHA’s work on fertiliser exemplifies this approach as well. The 
first stage framed the issue as urgent, because exports would fall, but TAHA only asked 
for an interim solution to allow time for a more considered debate. The second stage, 
looking for long term agreement, then took considerably longer. To some extent this 
builds on a policy process characterised by incrementalism, and stopgap measures can 
stay in place for a long time.  
This approach might suggest that advocacy is about bargaining or technical negotiation 
as described by Jordan & Richardson (1982) in which both sides inch towards a 
consensus position. This does not really describe the situation in Tanzania, not least 
because BMOs such as TAHA have limited economic power. Horticulture and tourism 
are both important contributors to GDP but the sectors are comprised mainly of small 
businesses. Those businesses are not suddenly going to stop just because they do not get 
their own way, though in the long term they may well exit the sector (as has happened in 
Kenya, for example, with tea and coffee). So the BMOs have to rely on their ability to 
gather evidence and make persuasive arguments. 
KCM had to work quite hard to frame issues so that it did not simply appear as though it 
was arguing for special consideration for inward investors. They also worked hard to 
identify and separate issues and to discuss them one at a time as well as preparing a 
policy position paper on each rather than putting altogether into a single paper. This had 
the effect of simplifying the debate with policy makers, keeping policy makers focused on 
one issue at a time and thus ensuring that acceptable proposals were not dismissed with 
unacceptable proposals simply because they were all considered together. 
TCT, TAHA and KCM have been good at understanding, and working with, what they 
perceive as government policy imperatives. TPSF have found this more challenging partly 
due to being asked to comment on too many proposals, having too little resource to deal 
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with them, and having insufficient understanding of the potential implications to be able 
to prioritise appropriately. 
All the BMOs have secured the resources (primarily from BEST-AC or BAF) to undertake, 
or more usually to commission, research. Often, though, the research is weak and the 
BMOs are unable properly to assess its quality or whether there are gaps and 
inconsistencies. However, often simply having research evidence is better than having 
nothing because there is a paucity of good data in African countries (Beguy 2016). The 
case study BMOs, along with a handful of other Kenyan and Tanzanian BMOs, have been 
good at preparing policy positions which make a strong argument for change. 
Governance and management is important. TCT argues, for example, that having a 
rapport with its members is essential and that advocacy is less likely to be successful 
without it – and the performance of TPSF prior to its reorganisation appears to support 
that view. Project planning is important both to husband resources and to ensure that 
opportunities are not missed. KCM did this especially well. It is less obvious that the other 
three BMOs have the skills to manage advocacy projects effectively though they do have 
general project planning and management skills. Only KCM exhibited effective planning 
skills in planning an advocacy project. This, however, is not the only important aspect of 
management. Good leadership will ensure that the members pull together, as KCM and 
TAHA demonstrated. Leadership is one of a small number of further competences that 
seem to be missing from the list of identified requirements. Others include balance 
(though this could be linked to understanding the policy imperative), confidence, cultural 
sensitivity, encouraging learning – working one step at a time but with a clear vision of 
where to go – and being proactive (though this could be linked to leadership). Motivation 
may also be important. Rugimbana at TCT and Mwakesi at KCM had a high degree of 
self-motivation but few staff to motivate. Simbeye at TPSF and Mkindi at TAHA are not 
only self-motivated but have been good at motivating their staff and encouraging them to 
take the initiative. These are summarised in Table 17. Again, most of the case study 
BMOs exhibit most of these further competences, though it is TCT that is the most 
sensitive to the collaborative approach expected by policy makers. 
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Table 17: Cross-cutting (and additional) competences 
   Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation 
Tourism Confederation of 
Tanzania 
Tanzania Horticultural 
Association 
Kenya Chamber of Mines 
  Balance Not always balanced, as shown 
in the some of their lobbying in 
relation to VAT 
“They represent the interests of 
the sector fairly” 
Aims to balance needs of 
indigenous farmers and those 
of ex-patriate farmers 
Recognised need to balance 
interests of inward investors, 
artisan miners and communities 
  Confidence Meets President regularly both 
formally and informally and is 
confident in using opportunities 
TCT explain that BESTAC gave 
them the confidence to 
overcome a hurdle 
Always confident in own 
position because always have 
good evidence to hand 
Was confident in own position 
and happy to promote at every 
opportunity. 
  Cultural sensitivity Evidence through desire to 
achieve consensus 
Recognises need to work 
within cultural norms 
Pushy but recognises that not 
always seen as ‘Tanzanian’ 
No evidence 
  Leadership CEO has clear objectives; 
empowers policy team 
CEO leads from the front CEO has clear objectives; 
empowers policy team 
Advocacy Manager led the 
project but also led the sector 
  Learning Staff participate in range of 
courses 
Staff participate in range of 
courses; run own events; learn 
from experience 
Learn from experience; retain 
the activities that work (e.g. 
field visits) 
Recognised importance of 
having written policy briefs; 
learned that Parliamentary 
debates provide intelligence 
  Motivating CEO motivates advocacy team Self-motivated (only small team) CEO motivates advocacy team Self-motivated (and no team) 
  Organisational strategy Does not give the impression of 
being particularly strategic or of 
setting clear priorities, but 
rather responding to the 
priorities of others 
Strategic in the sense that aims 
to influence policy that will in 
turn impact on the level of 
tourism 
Has built TAHA into significant 
and sustainable organisation 
offering a combination of key 
services with considerable 
advocacy 
Had to be well organised in 
relation to timescale for public 
hearings, committee meetings, 
Parliamentary debates etc. 
  One step at a time Sees the need for a step by step 
approach as, for example, 
working to include BEE within 
scope of BRN 
Perceive need, e.g., for tourism 
marketing strategy and then for 
revised tourism policy 
Now have two steps when 
lobbying: address the problem 
with a stopgap measure; then, 
aim for a longer-term solution 
likely to include policy reform 
Monitor stakeholders, 
especially government & 
parliament, at every step of the 
way – and then seek to address 
the step 
  Proactive Takes the initiative on 
relationship development and 
dialogue 
Takes the initiative on tourism 
marketing strategy 
Takes the initiative on issues 
pertinent to the sector but only 
now aiming to be more 
strategic 
Took the initiative on proposals 
for revised legislation 
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The competences that seem to be the most important, based on the number of times 
they were mentioned by case study BMOs, seem to be the need to compile or synthesise 
and analyse research evidence (which in the African context is essentially some kind of 
report); to build effective and collaborative relationships; and to engage in dialogue and 
communicate effectively. Empirical evidence would suggest that BMOs need to be able 
to frame issues clearly and make cogent arguments. Governance and leadership are 
barely mentioned by BMOs yet the evidence from the TPSF case study demonstrates 
what can happen if they are ineffective. These general findings are confirmed by research 
across a broader cross-section of BMOs in both Tanzania and Kenya (Irwin & Githinji 
2016). The next section picks up on these areas and examines them in more detail. In 
Chapter 3, it was surmised that a BMO that empowers its staff is more likely to achieve its 
objectives. The CEOs of both TPSF and TAHA have built policy teams and given them the 
freedom to act on their own initiative. In KCM, the policy officer felt empowered to take 
the initiative and did so. This seems to be an important aspect of success. 
8.4 Competent BMOs influence public policy 
In this section, I look at each of these competences. The table groups the competences in 
the three areas of evidence, engagement and expression used in Table 5. However, as 
noted in Chapter 1, BMOs tend to follow a five-step process in their advocacy which 
encompasses the identification of issues, understanding the issues, preparing a policy 
position, dialogue and advocacy, and follow-up. Some competences will be necessary at 
more than one step. For example, the ability to gather and analyse evidence will help with 
the identification of issues as well as comprehension; the ability to express oneself 
persuasively and succinctly will facilitate the framing and preparation of policy papers as 
well as support the process of dialogue and lobbying. Follow-up will not only require 
some self-reflection (an area where all of the BMOs appear to be weak) but also require 
the gathering of relevant evidence. In this section, rather than follow exactly the order of 
Table 5, I have adopted an order which more logically reflects the five-step approach – 
starting with resource mobilisation because, without at least some resource, nothing will 
happen. 
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8.4.1 Resource mobilisation 
All the BMOs have been able to secure sufficient resource to engage in dialogue and 
advocacy. However, this is a challenge for most BMOs. Maloney (2009: 280) makes the 
point that “many public interest groups are heavily reliant on patronage for their financial 
survival” though it appears, in relation to developed country interest groups, that this 
reference is more to financial resources than to expectations of personal favour, as might 
be expected in developing countries. On that basis, the point is just as true in developing 
countries. 
TAHA explains that, whilst financial resources are not the whole picture, clearly they 
made a difference (for example, to bring together a group of experts to talk about 
biological control mechanisms or a group of MPs). Mkindi (int. 2013) said that it was 
impossible for BMOs to influence if they do not have enough capacity in terms of people 
and resources. TAHA is in the enviable position where its subsidiary, TAHA Fresh, is 
making a significant profit, giving it access to a fair level of resource when necessary. It 
also receives large grants from several donors. 
In common with all other business associations in Tanzania, TPSF and TCT struggle for 
resources, which they recognise as a weakness. They currently receive funding from 
BEST-AC to help build their institutional capacity and become more sustainable. KCM, 
despite its membership base, also struggles with funding and looked to the Business 
Advocacy Fund to support its advocacy.  
Whilst it is clear, at least in the short-term, that BMO members are unlikely to pay enough 
by way of subscription, it is less clear whether, if BEST-AC and BAF did not exist, three of 
the BMOs could find alternative sources of funding. This could have serious implications 
for those BMOs because most of them are highly reliant on donor funding. Even in the 
US, however, many BMOs rely to a large extent on patronage and sponsorship (Walker 
1983, Jordan & Maloney 2007). The only difference in Africa is the source of that 
patronage. Whilst members of BMOs generally see the issues as important, on the whole, 
they are unwilling or unable to pay subscriptions at a level that would continue to fund 
the BMOs’ advocacy work. Indeed, often they do not even see the selective benefits as 
important enough to pay a subscription. Reliance only on subscription-funding would 
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probably result in BMOs losing staff and losing momentum – and probably in less 
balanced proposals for improvements to public policy. 
Unlike in many developed countries, resources beyond the amount required to prepare 
research reports, participate in meetings and perhaps employ a dedicated policy officer, 
does not make any discernible extra difference. Money is not needed to ‘entertain’ 
politicians; there are no expensive lobbyists to pay; BMOs do not maintain additional 
offices solely for the purpose of lobbying; there are no mass communication exercises 
with voters – because voters tend not to be swayed in that way. So the resource 
requirements are relatively modest, but there is nevertheless a need for some resources. 
BMOs, then, have to raise resources by making persuasive arguments to potential 
funders, such as BEST-AC or directly to the development partners, as TAHA has been 
successful in doing. This requires BMOs to have the competence to be able to express 
their needs. 
8.4.2 Identification, understanding and framing of issues 
The public sector is keen for BMOs to support them with evidence. However, BMOs are 
not always very good at providing it and MDAs are not good at explaining that they lack 
data. As a result, the (Tanzania) Prime Minister’s Office lamented the lack of evidence, 
saying that BMOs needed good evidence in order to develop “concrete arguments, 
scientific arguments, balanced arguments” and that their focus should be on “study and 
advocacy” and giving more information to government rather than getting involved in 
service delivery (int. Laseko 2014). The Presidential Delivery Bureau had a similar view, 
saying that BMOs “have problems providing data” and that “there is too much emotion 
[…] and not enough data” (int. Ling 2015). 
Some BMOs, however, recognise the need for more evidence. TAHA stressed the 
importance of “doing hard core research” and of having a clear understanding of the 
issue and a mastery of the details (int. Mkindi 2011): “if we have a weak case or poor 
evidence, it will backfire” (int. 2013). Rugimbana emphasised that “to be able to do 
successful advocacy you need data readily. It is no good just turning up with a long 
shopping list complaining.” (int. 2010). Recognising it, and doing it, are different, 
however. The impression gained from reading and formally assessing BMO research 
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reports over a period of 10 years is that the BMOs are improving in this regard, but that 
there is still some way to go. 
Framing is important because it provides evidence that a BMO has really analysed and 
understood an issue and is able to articulate it in such a way that policy makers will listen 
and then act. This fits with the theory that good framing makes a difference (Baumgartner 
2007, Klüver et al. 2015, De Bruycker 2016). Whilst framing is about more than solely the 
nature of the policy reform being proposed, it nevertheless encompasses the way in 
which a policy is to be reformed. BMO objectives can be classified on a spectrum that 
progresses from making a simple administrative change to a regulation (e.g. speeding up 
the repayment of VAT), through changing the interpretation of existing legislation, 
changing public policy (without the need for legislation) or introducing legislation. The 
framing may, therefore, be closely linked to the venue chosen for the advocacy. An 
administrative change or even a reinterpretation may need never to go beyond the civil 
servants in the relevant Ministry, for example. Whilst TAHA tends to focus on the 
executive and government agencies, TPSF is happy to lobby Ministers, Parliament and 
Parliamentary Committees as well. TCT has tended to lobby civil servants but is not shy 
about asking to meet with the Minister for Tourism. KCM focused its lobbying efforts on a 
Parliamentary Committee but simultaneously lobbied the Ministry of Mining and met the 
President. It does not appear, therefore, that any venue is dominant though it is possible 
that this is issue specific or sector specific. In some cases, it is clearly necessary to lobby in 
more than one venue simultaneously as KCM’s efforts to influence the Mining Bill 
demonstrate. This may be an area that would be worthy of further research. 
The issue for BMOs is not just whether the solution is framed at the appropriate level but 
whether they have given themselves choices so that they have flexibility in how they 
advocate. All the case study BMOs have made effort and had some success with their 
framing. Most of the advocacy projects undertaken by BMOs in Africa appear to seek to 
change existing policy (though that often requires a subsequent reform to legislation to 
secure implementation), rather than seeking to persuade public servants to interpret 
existing policy or existing regulation in a subtly different way. An issue such as reducing 
counterfeits could be tackled at different levels: for example, through changing 
legislation, creating a new structure, or through changing the behaviour of businesses 
without a requirement for government to do anything other than enforce the existing law. 
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In Tanzania, it seems that BMO success in changing or amending legislation is rare, 
though changes to public policy could be a precursor to legislative reform. Too often, 
BMOs assume that reform of legislation is needed when it would be easier to work within 
existing legislation with some re-interpretation or even just an administrative change. A 
good example comes from the work of the Tanzania Association of Tour Operators who 
wanted to persuade the government to create a tourist division within the police force 
and the tourism police. The initial objective – to change legislation foundered – but a 
revised approach, to persuade the Inspector General of Police and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs that existing legislation already allowed for a tourism division with a small amount 
of reinterpretation, quickly met with success. I did not see any examples as obvious as 
this amongst the case study BMOs. 
Another way of framing an issue is to accept the principle but then to ask for there to be a 
delay in implementation so that business can prepare. TCT, for example, argued that rises 
in fees are acceptable but only with enough notice. This also demonstrates the strategic 
approach adopted by TCT: they do not generally argue against the principle but rather 
look for technical reforms which, Michalowitz (2007) asserts, is more effective than 
seeking changes in the policy itself. 
TAHA has been good at framing issues as technical problems. For many of their issues, 
their clear understanding of the issue and careful framing has implied an obvious solution. 
In 2011, for example, the issue of phytosanitary certification (int. Mkindi 2011b) was 
framed by TAHA as a problem simply of certification redesign. TAHA has also become 
good at framing issues in two stages. In the case of fertiliser approval, for example, it 
framed the problem as a need to solve an immediate requirement, perhaps through a 
derogation on an issue they characterised as technical, and a need for a longer-term 
review of the regulations, which they recognised might be more contentious. Neither of 
the problems were characterised as an objection to the policy per se, but rather as a way 
to minimise the burden imposed by the requirement and to reflect the broader policy of 
the Ministry of Agriculture to improve agricultural yields. 
There does not appear to be any discernible difference in the need for good framing or 
good evidence between developed countries and developing countries, though the 
availability of secondary research in the latter is much more limited. After framing the 
problem and doing the research, the next step is to prepare a policy position. 
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BMOs need to be able either to do their own research or assess and synthesise evidence 
from other researchers. They need to be able to analyse and draw conclusions. They 
need to be able then not only to present that evidence but also to frame the issue clearly 
and succinctly, requiring competence in expression and communication. 
8.4.3 Preparing policy positions and argumentation 
This is not an area generally held up by the BMOs as important, either at the start or at 
the conclusion of the research, yet it seems critical to their success (Dür 2018). KCM, 
however, came to recognise the importance of preparing policy positions and thinking 
about the arguments to present to the Parliamentary Committee and others. TCT stressed 
the importance of good argumentation. It may be that the others think that this is so 
obvious that it does not need stating. More likely, they think that good evidence will 
speak for itself without interpretation whereas, as noted earlier, there is a belief amongst 
some of the BMOs – TCT and TAHA in particular – that if they offer a balanced argument, 
it will be more likely to lead to policy reform, as asserted by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 
(1993). 
BMOs need to understand what government wants, so adopting the most appropriate 
strategy for each issue and finding the right arguments is important (int. Rugimbana 
2010). Rugimbana, in 2013, stressed the need to seek a solution that would satisfy the 
government as well as the sector, implying a need for compromise: “Whatever you are 
advocating, you cannot just state the problem. You have to see the government’s side 
and come up with a win-win solution. At the end of the day government has to deliver to 
the public so we have to help them achieve that without undermining.” However, that 
alone is insufficient: “You must know your industry well. You are the authority. You must 
have the data at your finger-tips.” 
All the case study BMOs talk about the need for evidence and for effective argument, not 
only to persuade government but also often as a way of getting through the door. TCT for 
example stressed how its research evidence and opinion was valuable to government: 
“We can add value to the industry, we are not just complaining” (int. Rugimbana 2011). 
KCM argued its case, mostly backed up with evidence, carefully on each and every issue. 
As noted in Chapter 7, when it had good evidence, the Parliamentary Committee tended 
to accept its argument; when it lacked evidence, they tended to ignore its argument. 
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In practice, developing the argument is likely to be an iterative process, utilising the 
evidence and reflecting on and improving their argument, and the way that they express 
it, after every meeting with a policy maker. However, once a BMO has a position, the 
next step is to talk with the policy makers. This entails first access, which is closely linked 
to relationship building, and secondly dialogue. 
8.4.4 Access and relationship building 
Most BMOs pursue an insider strategy and many have good relationships with 
government, supporting Page’s (1999) argument that such a strategy leads to better 
access and more consultation. This holds true in both Kenya and Tanzania. Officials in 
Tanzania and Kenya have confirmed that they want information and evidence. However, 
governments also have an interest in being seen to consult because that confers a 
legitimacy on policy outcomes. The literature, however, has tended to focus on access 
because, it is argued, it is too difficult to measure influence. Bouwen (2004) suggests that 
it is access goods that are important, in which access to the policy makers is traded, or 
exchanged, for information from the interest groups.  
‘Access’ suggests something offered by another party, though of course BMOs can be 
active in seeking access. However, BMOs, at least in Kenya and Tanzania, do not talk 
about access; rather they emphasise the need to build and maintain relationships, which 
is something that they can do actively. In some developing countries access is seen as a 
problem, with policy formulation processes that are remote and inaccessible (Court et al. 
2005). That does not appear to be a problem in Kenya or Tanzania. MDAs are not always 
immediately receptive, but there is usually another route when the direct route fails, 
perhaps through the Prime Minister’s or the President’s Office. BMOs seek to maintain 
these relationships by becoming trusted sources of reliable and authoritative information. 
Interest groups’ advocacy and lobbying is not always successful. Hence it makes sense to 
build long-term relationships and to be proactive and effective horizon scanners: indeed, 
this may be one of the key features that leads to effectiveness and future success. Kohler 
Koch et al. note that effective business associations do not wait until a salient issue 
appears, but instead aim to “establish social recognition and smooth working relations, all 
of which prepares the ground for exerting influence on a more consistent basis” (2017: 
1047). This is confirmed by the empirical evidence in both Kenya and Tanzania. All the 
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case study BMOs worked hard to develop and maintain relationships. If interest groups 
are particularly helpful, it is easy to see that public servants will develop a positive 
relationship with them and then be proactive in consulting them, as suggested by 
Bernhagen et al. (2015), though it is not suggested that BMOs should always be helpful. 
Rather, they may want to emulate the ‘mixed blessing’ stakeholders described by Savage 
et al. (1991) who categorised stakeholders by their potential to co-operate with an 
organisation – calling them supportive, mixed blessing, non-supportive and marginal. 
Associations are unlikely to be uncritically supportive of government. Always being 
perceived as non-supportive or marginal is likely to mean that they are largely ignored by 
government. Associations are, however, likely to veer between being supportive, non-
supportive and neutral, depending on the issue, thus falling into the mixed blessing 
category. Savage et al. (1991) argued that the most effective strategy for an organisation 
is to collaborate with its ‘mixed blessing’ stakeholders on the basis that they can be 
persuaded to become supportive, perhaps in exchange for a degree of compromise. That 
mirrors the outcome wanted by business associations. The conclusion perhaps for 
associations then is to be actively supportive when opportunities allow – on the basis that 
the government will be more likely to listen, and to act, when the association wants 
government to change policy. TAHA and TCT, in particular, have adopted this strategy: 
TCT, for example, supported the introduction of the tourism development levy; TAHA 
worked with government on the provision of warehouses. KCM worked with a range of 
stakeholders including on areas that might not have appeared to be entirely in their own 
interests such as policies for artisanal miners. All the case studies suggest that groups can 
forge positive relationships even when they do not always see eye to eye. 
A key reason for policy makers to grant access is to secure information and opinion not 
least because they have limited time and often limited expertise to gather the information 
that they require. They cannot, however, meet with every group interested in an issue so, 
as Braun (2012) argues, work with selected interest groups based on the quality of their 
policy information. All the case study BMOs have been able to meet regularly with policy 
makers. Living up to the expectation of Therkildsen & Bourgouin (2012) TPSF, TAHA and 
TCT have been able to formalise their relationships and begin to address issues of 
economic and industry policy. TCT has gone further than most with its MoU with the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. 
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TPSF converses with many Ministries and Agencies and it appears that it is consulted 
regularly. TPSF is a member of several policy networks, for example, being appointed as 
the secretariat to a Parliamentary working group on the tax base (int. Furaha & Gahhu 
2013) and a report from TPSF (2015) lists 21 invitations from government to consult or 
participate in one-off discussions in one quarter of 2015. The head of the Better 
Regulation Unit perceived that the government felt that they had a partner in TPSF with 
whom they could work (int. Lyimo 2014) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade said that 
TPSF offered advice and opinion, identified the “right people” to meet and co-ordinated 
the private sector (int. Mjengo 2015). 
TAHA worked to develop and maintain relationships with people whom it regarded as 
champions within the Ministries and in the Prime Minister’s office. TAHA ensured that 
policy-makers were properly informed – sending monthly newsletters, letting them know 
when they were seeking to achieve particular objectives, through occasional face-to-face 
meetings and invitations to events. They also asked for their advice when doing research 
or formulating policy. 
The evidence from Tanzania, however, suggests that Braun’s (2102) assertion of habitual 
behaviour only tells part of the story: those BMOs that are unable to provide good quality 
evidence and are unable to make good arguments certainly find it more difficult to talk to 
government. BMOs other than the case study BMOs provide evidence of this: the 
Tanzanian Exporters’ Association, for example, wasted a lot of time arguing for a credit 
guarantee scheme for exporters, without differentiating between the specific 
requirements of trade credit and the more general need for credit for small businesses. As 
a result, they found it increasingly difficult to secure an audience in government. The 
Tanzanian Association of Milk Processors struggled to convince the government that 
there was over-regulation in the dairy sector, despite having what appeared to be a very 
strong case (Charles et al. 2016). The milk producers failed largely because their evidence 
was vague and too imprecise about the regulations that needed to be amended. 
Although the association met regularly with government it failed to secure the regulatory 
changes it sought. The Tanzanian Association of Micro Finance Institutions persuaded the 
government of the need for a law to govern micro-finance, but then failed to follow up 
with good evidence, leading the government to commission a research institution to do 
the research for them (int. Terry 2015). 
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Even associations that can prepare good evidence find that they need to do more to 
engage in dialogue. The case study BMOs, and indeed many others, have recognised this, 
which is why they undertake other activities including organising social events, field trips, 
newsletters, etc. One of those activities is networking – with Ministries, Agencies and 
other BMOs. Nzuki of the TTB, for example, noted that Rugimbana was well networked: 
“He is everywhere”. (int. 2011). Jacquie Mkindi at TAHA made the same point and 
stressed that it is necessary to “engage with the whole system and not just with one or 
two people” (int. 2011b). Her colleague, Kelvin Remen, noted that other BMOs “wonder 
why we say our first partner is the government” (int. 2015). He explains, referring 
primarily to civil servants in the Ministry of Agriculture: “the government respects us; we 
don’t work like an activist group, criticising the government; we try to address issues 
diplomatically and credit them for the forums they have given us and the progress.” 
The interviews with and observations of BMOs suggest that building a good relationship 
with a Ministry or Agency is more important than the evidence they can offer, provided 
that they are able to offer at least some evidence and some opinion. This emphasis on the 
quality of the relationship over the quality of evidence may be another difference with 
BMOs in developed countries. Holyoke (2014), writing about interest groups in the US, 
describes them as adversarial. The UK, despite an adversarial political system, seems to 
be much more consultative and consensual when it comes to dealing with interest groups 
(Jordan & Greenan 2012, Jordan & Cairney 2013). East Africa has a generally consensual 
and collaborative culture (Melyoki & Galperin 2017), and so perhaps it is not surprising 
that building relationships is important to the advocacy process. Indeed, this more 
collaborative style seems to be important in Africa (Irwin 2015). 
Despite differences in staffing and resources, it did not appear from the case studies that 
some BMOs were more successful in securing access than others. Among the case 
studies, only TPSF gives the impression of being regularly consulted by government as 
observed by Page (1999) though all the BMOs did have frequent contact with at least 
one Ministry. 
Securing access is a sine qua non to start the process of influencing policy makers. 
However, it is only one element. The next is to put the issue on the government’s agenda. 
Again, the desire is to work collaboratively. There is an argument that BMOs might force 
an issue on to the agenda, for example by placing stories in the media, and then be 
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granted access to discuss it. Whilst there are examples of this in both Kenya and 
Tanzania, in general the approach of the BMOs is to secure access and then raise the 
issues. Contact can start simply through dialogue, or because of a story in the media, or 
because of a decision of an individual policy maker. KCM was initially rebuffed by the 
Ministry of Mining when it was attempting to influence the content of the Mining Bill 
prior to its publication and went to the President. In Tanzania, issues are often raised at 
the meetings of the Tanzania National Business Council as a way of getting them on to 
the government’s agenda. 
Developing relationships certainly falls into the engagement group of competence but, to 
some extent, it also falls into expression competences in that, as TAHA has demonstrated, 
maintaining a relationship requires regular communication. It may also benefit from 
cultivating champions. 
8.4.5 Agenda setting 
All the case study BMOs have demonstrated that they can put issues on the agenda. 
KCM put the need to update Kenya’s mining legislation on the agenda, helped by a 
government belief that mining could contribute much more to GDP, which led to the 
Mining Bill of 2014. 
TCT put the need for a comprehensive tourism marketing strategy on the agenda, 
primarily as a way of implementing the ambitions of the Government set out in 
successive tourism policies. They worked closely with the Tanzania Tourist Board, noting 
that “A tourism development strategy doesn’t belong to TCT or the Tourism Board, it is a 
joint strategy. Government has a role in promoting tourism, but it is the private sector that 
offers the services and makes business out of the opportunities. We are dependent on 
each other.” (int. Rugimbana 2011). Indeed, sometimes, the government needs the 
BMOs to assist with implementation, either directly or indirectly. The hotel sector, for 
example, had to be co-opted to collect the Tourism Development Levy, and TCT had a 
role to play in persuading them that this would ultimately support the sector, giving then a 
degree of implementation power. 
TAHA has put a number of issues on the agenda, mainly technical. A key advantage of 
framing issues as technical issues is that they are more likely to be considered and agreed 
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with officials rather than with politicians. This does not often extend to legislation but can 
do. The Kenya Society of Physiotherapists, for example, engaged with an MP and piloted 
legislation through the National Assembly (Irwin & Githinji 2017). 
TPSF has also been successful in putting issues on the table, though it probably spends 
more time reacting to requests from government rather than taking a broad overview on 
behalf of the whole private sector. Effective BMOs grasp opportunities when they arise, 
as TPSF did to add the business enabling environment to the Big Results Now framework. 
There is evidence that the media can influence policy makers (Mwangi 2018). Moreover, 
all BMOs seek, from time to time, to place stories in the media though this tends to be to 
reinforce other activities rather than to put issues on the agenda or to influence policy 
makers. 
Putting issues on the agenda is not itself a competence. Rather, it depends on good 
framing, good argument and good communication. Once it becomes clear that policy 
makers are willing to discuss an issue, the next activity is to engage in dialogue. If policy 
makers do not put an issue on the agenda, then BMOs will look for other ways to 
advance their proposals. 
8.4.6 Advocacy & dialogue 
Whilst the interest group literature looks at access and policy outcomes, it seems largely 
to ignore the process of dialogue and debate that occurs behind closed doors when 
private and public sectors meet to discuss an issue. As noted in Chapter 2, Berry (1977) 
claimed that interest groups might use four approaches: law, confrontation, information 
and constituency influencing. None of the case study BMOs undertook activities that 
might be considered to be some form of popular mobilisation or constituency 
influencing. It was only rarely that BMOs resorted to the courts. Amongst the case 
studies, the only example came from the Hotel Association of Tanzania, a member of 
TCT, and they did it as a delaying tactic rather than as an aversion tactic. The BMOs do 
sometimes engage in what could be considered to be confrontation with policy makers, 
as for example with TPSF and VAT, though that runs counter to policy maker culture. The 
approach of all the BMOs is to provide information and engage in dialogue. This seems, 
at least in Africa, to be an important part of the process, though it is likely to be equally 
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important elsewhere as well. Berry does not appear to include dialogue, though he may 
argue that it is part of the presentation of information and research, and indeed is an 
indication of being an insider. 
The literature suggests BMOs everywhere prefer to take an insider approach – the case 
studies and actions by other BMOs suggest that this is true in Kenya and Tanzania – and 
the primary strategy is to engage in dialogue. Court et al. (2005: 5) claim that political 
leaders may perceive proposals from third parties as illegitimate; indeed, Tanzania, but 
probably Kenya too, appears not to be entirely comfortable with interest groups or what 
is perceived to be external criticism. Moreover, too often the views of BMOs are seen as 
criticism rather than as a genuine attempt to improve the business environment. This 
presents challenges in dealing with officials who do not always understand the 
importance of improving the environment for business. This is exacerbated by the 
dominant approach in sub-Saharan Africa being patronage (Heilman & Lucas 1997). The 
obvious conclusion to draw, then, would be that there is little dialogue. In fact, the 
opposite now appears to be the case – and there is much external encouragement to 
engage in public-private dialogue. 
The case study BMOs have all been able to engage in dialogue and the extent of that 
dialogue has increased over the period. In 2011, for example, TPSF barely engaged in 
dialogue at all; by 2016, it was frequently invited by government for its views and to 
participate in discussion. Dialogue is important for a number of reasons, including culture, 
a general reticence to criticise or assign blame and a desire to maintain a positive 
relationship. In my experience, however, BMOs are not always good at articulating the 
issue clearly and succinctly so there is often a degree of back and forth in an attempt to 
explain – and understand – the issue.  Donors promote the concept of public private 
dialogue, both in multi-party formats, such as the Tanzania National Business Council, and 
bilateral formats. Dialogue complements the societal culture because it is seen to be 
collaborative whereas lobbying is seen to be adversarial. A further advantage, however, 
of the dialogue approach is that if you are not seen to be lobbying for a specific outcome, 
then you cannot be seen to ‘lose’ if you are unsuccessful.  Competent BMOs will present 
evidence, share opinions and offer persuasive arguments. 
Some do this well as described by Nzuki in relation to TCT (int. 2011). In fact, the four 
case study BMOs have all demonstrated a degree of political and cultural sensitivity, 
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focusing on actions that they believe will succeed and actions that they genuinely think 
will make a difference to the enabling environment. They seek discussion rather than 
confrontation. This reinforces the thought that cultural sensitivity may be an additional 
and important competence (Table 17). TPSF is the only organisation that appears 
occasionally to lack the necessary sensitivity in its approach or to think through the 
implications of its arguments. This was apparent, for example, in its efforts to retain a 
range of VAT exemptions. Whilst they were successful once, the advocacy was 
uncharacteristically adversarial and could possibly undermine its efforts to build a positive 
relationship with government. 
In the past, there has been a tendency for government to formulate a policy proposal and 
then to consult, not always effectively (Heilman & Lucas 1997, Mercer 2003). Often 
government says that the private sector has been consulted, but then closer examination 
suggests that the process does not function well (correspondence to author, Determeyer 
(CEO of BEST-AC) 2016). The policy process nominally includes a consultation process as 
legislation proceeds through Parliament, but this assumes that all policy is decided in 
Parliament and it is not. Furthermore, once draft legislation makes it to Parliament, there is 
enormous pressure to get it passed. As KCM demonstrated, BMOs need to be alert and 
to lobby early. 
Given the view that, whilst government wants to reform, it does not really want to be told 
by outsiders what to do (Court et al. 2005), so gaining the trust of policy makers and the 
opportunity to offer a view at an early stage of policy formulation can be quite difficult 
but is essential. There could be a role here for Parliament to promote the interests of non-
state actors and, indeed, part of TPSF’s reasoning for developing better links with 
Parliament was that Ministries did not always take the private sector’s proposals 
sufficiently seriously and it felt that Parliamentary committees could exert more pressure 
especially in relation to fiscal issues (int. Furaha 2011, int. Furaha 2012). TPSF made a 
particular effort to engage with the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and Economic 
Affairs (int. Furaha 2012). TPSF perceived that it was beginning to succeed when 
Parliament established a working group to review the tax base and invited TPSF to chair 
the group and provide the secretariat (int. 2012). Much of KCM’s lobbying was with the 
Parliamentary Committee rather than with the Ministry, though this was to a large extent 
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because the Committee was reviewing the proposed legislation, and KCM did 
collaborate with the Ministry when for example there was a chance to offer revised texts. 
Beyers & Hanegraaff (2016) quote Bernhagen et al.  (2015) to argue that supplying 
relevant information is ineffective if a group mostly faces policy makers with adverse 
views. They argue that the provision of information only makes a difference for influence 
when groups interact with like-minded policy makers. This assertion, however, reduces 
every proposal for reform into a contested issue, with different ‘sides’ taking pro or anti 
positions. However, it is not necessarily the case in Kenya and Tanzania that every issue is 
contested: it may simply be that there are unforeseen consequences arising from the 
original legislation or regulation. Furthermore, at least in Africa, there is a genuine desire 
for more and better information in line with Sen’s assertion that “accurate, reliable 
information is a crucial element of successful collaboration between the state and 
business” (2015: 11). 
The case studies show that BMOs that share good information are generally welcomed, 
even if, as Beyers & Hanegraaff (2016) surmise, the BMO is ultimately unsuccessful in 
reforming the policy. The real point is the spirit in which the BMOs and government 
engage. This reflects the observation of Woll (2012) that a constructive approach is more 
important than arguments based upon threats and pressure. Indeed, Beyers & Hanegraaff 
(2016) also recognise that co-operation rather than confrontation is more likely to be 
effective. They go further, however, in arguing that much advocacy is simply about 
recruiting like-minded policy makers. Issues such as TCT writing the tourism marketing 
strategy may seem on the face of it to fit this categorisation, though there is an argument 
that it is simply that the over-arching interests of the government and the interests of the 
sector were aligned (Mahoney 2007, Woll 2007). It also enabled TCT to fill a role of 
becoming a trusted provider of information and research evidence. Whilst of course 
BMOs look for allies, in Africa as in developed countries, they also reach out to a range of 
civil servants and policy makers in an effort to get them all on side. This may take time. It 
should be noted that the reverse also happens – with public officials granting access to a 
like-minded BMO to lobby for a particular reform. 
As TAHA and TCT have demonstrated, public-private dialogue and regulatory reform are 
closely linked, since effective dialogue can discourage Governments from regulating in 
the first place or, if they must, encourage them to do so in a way that minimises costs or, 
   P A G E  | 213 
if the regulation already exists, reform it to improve the business environment. Effective 
dialogue builds mutual understanding between private and public sectors to address 
issues of concern. 
Some interest groups, especially cause groups, aim to mobilise public opinion and to seek 
media coverage for their activities in their efforts to sway policy makers. Walker observed 
that groups that experience little conflict and enjoy close collaboration with government 
are unlikely to spend time influencing public opinion (1991: 192). Whilst there is some 
reinforcement of positions in the media, especially by TAHA, this is true of all the case 
study BMOs. In other words, they stick to working inside government. This low visibility 
approach is noted by Baumgartner et al. (2009) who reflect the earlier view of Walker 
(1991) and suggest that advocates benefit from operating out of the public eye. 
It is not just BMOs that are proactive in promoting dialogue. Some Ministries and 
Agencies have set up consultative arrangements. This is sometimes within the context of 
a particular initiative, such as the Doing Business task forces, or Big Results Now, which 
have a particular agenda (though this does not stop BMOs from raising other issues). 
Some have gone further. For example, the Tanzania Revenue Authority is committed to 
“trying to make a difference for business” and has therefore set up a stakeholders’ forum. 
TRA says for example that “in the past, we thought [the Confederation of Tanzania 
Industries] were just tax evaders” but “we now appreciate what they are doing”. This 
provides evidence that dialogue improves the perceptions of the public sector as well. 
In Chapter 2, Christiansen et al.  (2018) were quoted as describing a process between 
policy makers and selected groups of “deliberate, negotiate and bargain”. Deliberate 
suggests that there is agreement over the question and negotiate and bargain sounds like 
the parties are agreed and just haggling over the price. From this research, we can 
conclude that the process is much more one of “discuss, explore and persuade”. BMOs 
and policy makers first discuss the issue; the BMO articulates the problem and explains 
why they want the policy makers to take a different approach; then they explore options; 
and then the BMO aims to persuade the policy makers – perhaps to do something 
different, but often just to do what they want to later or in a slightly different way. 
Dialogue, then, requires BMOs to be able to engage with policy makers and also to 
express their evidence and argument clearly and succinctly. 
 214 | P A G E  
8.5 Conclusion 
All the case study BMOs are credible in the eyes of the government. The government is 
happy to accept them as the legitimate voice of their sector and then to enter into 
dialogue with them. As a result, all have been able to develop positive relationships even 
when arguing tooth and nail with government. This may be easier when they are lobbying 
on technical issues, such as the level of park fees, rather than political issues, such as 
whether there should be park fees at all. It may also be easier when they sometime also 
support the government. Looking back at the approach of the case study BMOs, they all 
perceive that they have been successful in influencing public policy. Collectively, they 
perceive five reasons essential for their success and I agree that these are important.  
These are (i) ensuring that they have well-researched evidence and persuasive arguments 
(evidence); (ii) building long term relationships (engagement); (iii) engaging in dialogue 
across a range of venues which generally includes civil servants in a relevant Ministry or 
agency, the Minister and sometimes Parliament as well (engagement and expression); (iv) 
being sensitive to a culture which tends to be collaborative and to avoid confrontation 
(expression); and (v) recognising the need for patience and persistence. All but the last of 
these points to the need for competence and professionalism and all fit within the three 
key areas of evidence, engagement and expression. These determinants, and important 
subsidiary competences, are summarised in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Summary of determinants 
 
 
The first requirement is that the BMO has appropriate evidence. The BMO needs 
objective and comprehensive facts and figures at their fingertips and needs to have 
thought through the implications of any policy proposals. There is a spectrum that ranges 
from hard evidence to total self-interest. The more that a BMO can ensure that it has hard 
evidence to support its case, the easier it will find putting together the case. 
The second requirement is engagement. The BMO needs to be able to access, engage 
and develop relationships with the people who matter including Ministers, senior civil 
servants, junior civil servants, Parliamentarians and staff of government agencies. Good 
relationships will ensure that the BMO is an insider rather than an outsider and so have 
much better access to be able to converse with the people who may be able to make a 
difference, which will help with access. Securing access in the first place is not hard, at 
least in many African countries, but maintaining access requires that the BMO is credible 
and that there is a mutually beneficial relationship. 
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The third, and possibly most important, requirement is expression. The BMO needs to be 
able to prepare and communicate its evidence and arguments to policy makers, both 
elected and appointed, across a variety of platforms. This requires clarity of thought when 
it comes to framing the issue, since framing it well will often suggest an answer. Framing is 
simply communicating an understanding of the problem and of the solution. The BMO 
needs to construct an argument that makes a logical and persuasive case, ideally 
illustrated with good stories about the situation now and what the situation could look 
like if reform occurred. 
BMOs need to be seen by government and others as credible (Berry 1997, Bernhagen 
2007, Baumgartner et al. 2009, Fraussen 2013). Gathering evidence that may not 
otherwise exist, preparing persuasive arguments and engaging effectively with policy 
makers will all help BMOs to be perceived as credible organisations to be given a role by 
government in the policy process (Lucas 1997). 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I sum up the key competences to describe what it means for the staff 
of a BMO to be competent and for a BMO to be professional and then explore whether 
BMOs in fact develop through a series of discernible stages. I then summarise my 
contribution to the literature and conclude with suggestions for further research. 
9.1 Success in influencing public policy 
The evidence from the four case studies suggests that all four BMOs have been 
influential, though to a varying extent. Certainly, all four of the BMOs perceive that they 
have been able to secure policy reform, at least occasionally, and importantly for them, 
they are able to say this to their members. Furthermore, their members and public 
officials perceive them to have been successful. TCT and TAHA have generally only 
succeeded on technical issues, though TCT has made some effort on strategic issues and 
TPSF succeeded on contentious issues as well. KCM delivered on both levels but in the 
narrow context of influencing a proposal for legislation. Importantly, they all perceive that 
they have been successful. Much of their approach is similar to that taken by BMOs in 
developed countries: the insider approach, the reliance on evidence, the use of argument 
and policy papers, the use of the media when necessary. I share the view proffered by 
Mkindi who asserts that it is up to the private sector to take the lead and stresses that 
“success requires compelling policy proposals, partnership and ability to mobilise 
resources” (int. Mkindi 2014). However, the BMOs all stressed their desire to build and 
maintain a positive relationship. After doing this, they were then able to collaborate and 
persuade government to take a different approach based on the merits of the case rather 
than on the weight of public opinion or the number of votes at stake.  
This emphasis on building relationships suggests that BMOs in Africa adopt a style 
somewhat different to many BMOs in consolidated democracies, though it is possible 
that it is at least in part due to the much smaller number of BMOs vying for attention. 
Evidence and persuasion are still necessary, and still need to be of a sufficient quality, but 
they are not enough by themselves. The four case study BMOs have all developed a 
positive relationship with government across a variety of venues and are able to talk to 
government when they feel it is necessary. 
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9.2 Competence 
In Chapter 1, I noted that there seemed to be four factors, three of which are in the 
control of the BMO, that are likely to affect their ability to succeed: advocacy 
competence, project management competence and resources and that BMOs in 
Tanzania and Kenya follow the logic of the five-step approach. The steps describe broad 
activities rather than competences, though the activities point to the need for specific 
competences. Based on the empirical evidence presented, these steps require some 
modification.  
The first step, identifying an issue, is closely linked to framing, using framing in the political 
science sense of articulation of a problem. Indeed, without careful articulation, it can be 
difficult to understand the problem to be addressed. BMOs need to be able to describe 
an issue very simply and in such a way that it leads to a solution, as argued by 
Baumgartner & Mahoney (2008). It is better still if the issue can be framed in a way that 
de-politicises the problem. This ability is clearly an important element of competence. 
TCT, as evidenced both by technical issues such as park fees and more political issues 
such as an international marketing strategy, is extremely good at framing issues in a way 
that makes it easy for the government to agree. The TAHA case study explains that it 
always tries to convey a sense of urgency in its dealings with government and the likely 
loss to members (and by implication) to government if it delays. Now, when they go to 
government, they always have two proposals, a first one to ameliorate a problem, and a 
second longer-term one to review some policy or legislation. 
The second step, understanding the issue, is closely linked to research evidence. Without 
good research, it will be impossible to understand the impact of the issue and the 
potential impact of alternatives. BMOs thus need to gather, or commission the gathering 
of, evidence. Over the years of the research, the BMOs’ ability to gather and report 
evidence improved. 
The third step is preparing a policy position and the arguments to support the preferred 
proposals. The four BMOs all improved in this regard as well. KCM is the best example – 
being able to dissect clauses within a draft Bill, consider the implications, then make 
suggestions for alternative wording, and justify that alternative approach. 
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The fourth step is to engage in dialogue or advocacy. This requires access to key people 
in Ministries and Agencies which hinges on the ability of the BMO to build and maintain 
relationships. Reading much of the literature, one might believe that that interest groups 
are independent of the people who work for them but, in reality, they all depend on their 
people. The more competent, and the better networked they are, the more successful 
they seem to be. Building relationships extends to identifying and cultivating champions 
in the public sector and forging alliances in the private sector. TPSF has demonstrated that 
it is good at this. It engages in dialogue, generally at the invitation of government. It is 
good at networking and is able to build coalitions, as evidenced by their approach to the 
VAT proposals. TPSF says that it shares information with BMOs and it has done well in 
organising the private sector in advance of the budget being presented to Parliament 
each year. 
In the case of TCT, Rugimbana perceives that “the government now sees TCT in a 
different way, as adding value to government, not like a labour union shouting. Whenever 
the Ministry has an issue they always consult TCT.” (int. 2010). TAHA thinks carefully 
about where and with whom it engages (int. Mkindi 2014). To some extent, TAHA avoids 
dealing with politicians, “because we know that politicians come and go” (int. Remen 
2015). TAHA explains that they have generally found it more effective to work through 
officers, and leave them to persuade the politicians if necessary: “we invest a lot in 
directors in the government and have a list of champions” (int. Remen 2015). Most of 
their advocacy, however, has revolved around amendments to administration or 
interpretation of policy. Even in relation to fertiliser, TAHA did not argue against the 
principle of testing and registration; rather it focused on persuading the government to 
recognise the results of testing in other countries. In some cases, BMOs are able to 
institutionalise their relationship with government, as TPSF and TCT have been able to do. 
Undertaking these tasks effectively requires that the people in the BMO have several 
competences, originally and simplistically characterised as advocacy competence and 
project management competence. Broadly speaking, that is still accurate. However, the 
skills required are mostly about communication (defining key messages, identifying 
stakeholders, selecting target audiences, and then expressing a proposal and an argument 
to them). An advocacy project is thus quite different to a project for example to launch a 
new service or to build a new office. 
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The specific advocacy competences that seem to be important are those associated with 
ensuring that the relevant evidence is available and that the policy proposal is succinct 
but well argued. Closely related is the ability to forge and maintain relationships and to 
engage in dialogue. 
Whilst these competences are essential, they may not be enough. TPSF and TAHA for 
example have both recognised the need to employ a professional, highly competent and 
dedicated policy team, and sought the resources required to do so. In the case of TPSF, it 
sorted out its governance, so that its board and members now support its efforts rather 
than fight them. It has appointed a CEO who is focused on making a difference in policy 
reform, who is publicly opposed to corrupt practices and who has the confidence of the 
board. He has been able to be more entrepreneurial and more opportunistic in his 
approach to influencing government. He has also made strides in improving the breadth 
and depth of TPSF’s engagement with government, networking widely with politicians 
and civil servants. Indeed, TPSF has demonstrated that an entrepreneurial CEO, and a 
committed and determined policy team, can make a big difference, though the extent to 
which they are putting issues on the agenda, as opposed simply to reacting to 
government proposals, is not clear. 
In addition to leadership, the opportunity to learn and to access resources is important. 
There is little doubt that TCT benefited from the support that it received from BEST-AC, as 
they confirm: “If it wasn’t for BEST-AC we wouldn’t have achieved what we achieved. 
TCT had concentrated on providing services but BEST-AC emphasised the importance of 
advocacy.” (int. Rugimbana 2010). 
9.3 The nature of dialogue 
As described in Chapter 2, scholars seem to have focused on access as a proxy for 
influence because, it is argued, it is too difficult to measure influence. Some researchers 
argue that there is a resource exchange mechanism at work: public agencies need ‘policy 
goods’ – information, expertise, opinion, political support, maybe implementation 
support – which they trade for access to policy makers. Others argue that a degree of 
policy influence is traded (i.e., the policy makers move at least a little way in the direction 
of interest group or allow the group to help formulate the policy) in exchange for 
information and/or legitimacy. BMOs working with government confer legitimacy on 
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government decisions (Taylor & Warburton 2003) and TCT’s discussions over proposals 
to introduce a Tourism Development Levy provide evidence for this in Tanzania. 
In fact, both of these exchange mechanisms are at work. Interest groups who may be 
expected to have authoritative evidence and information, or who have a history or 
producing high-quality evidence, are given access. The BMO provides information but 
also provide compelling arguments to reform the policy. Government agrees to make at 
least some change in the direction favoured by the BMO. This leads to improved 
legitimacy of the government’s policy in the view of the sector. It may, of course, also be 
‘better’ legislation, more cognisant of the needs of the private sector (balanced with 
broader societal needs) and with fewer unforeseen consequences. These two exchange 
mechanisms can be characterised as information in exchange for access and policy 
reform, often described as influence, in exchange for legitimacy. It is apparent also that 
some BMOs are better than others at moving policy makers to action. It is likely that this 
comes down to how well the BMO makes the case and is an area that would be worthy 
of further research. 
This analysis still feels too simplistic. There is often a step between access and policy 
reform which seems to be overlooked, perhaps because access is a mechanism and 
policy reform is an outcome. There are, in fact, three mechanisms at play. In the first, 
BMOs secure access either through providing information and opinion or in the 
expectation that they will. In the second, they engage in dialogue, in which they explore 
the reasons for changing policy, explore the implications of changing policy and aim to 
move the policy makers in the direction of their own policy preference. Exploration gives 
a chance to share information and opinion and understand each other and understand 
the issue, which may be enough to change a policy, once the public sector has all the 
necessary facts. Policy makers may have overlooked crucial evidence or there may be a 
consequence they had not foreseen and the BMO may not have understood the policy 
imperative. If policy makers do not act on the evidence, then the BMO needs to move to 
persuasion. It offers arguments, based on the evidence, in an attempt to convince the 
public sector to do something differently. In the third, the policy makers finalise their 
policies and seek the support of the BMO to endorse and support what they have 
agreed. 
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Scholars generally do not look at the process of dialogue and at the personal interactions 
between policy makers and those arguing on behalf of the interest groups. This is as true 
in consolidated democracies as it is in consolidating democracies and would make for an 
interesting topic for future research. 
9.4 Being professional 
Preparing compelling arguments, securing access and engaging in dialogue are all aspects 
of being professional; however, the literature is relatively sparse in explaining what being 
professional actually means. Klüver (2012) suggests that interest groups are black boxes. 
Klüver & Saurugger (2013), Maloney et al. (1994), Lutabingwa & Gray (1997) amongst 
others touch on aspects of competence and professionalism. With the exception of the 
World Bank (2005a), there are few attempts to set out the competences that might make 
a difference to the effectiveness and impact of business associations. I have already 
identified a number of competences that seem to be essential: framing, research, 
argumentation, relationship building, communication, all of which are necessary for 
dialogue and advocacy. However, being professional is about more than that. In 
particular, there is need for effective leadership and good governance. 
TCT and TAHA have always had a supportive board and have always been at pains to 
involve their members in their policy making. TPSF was slower to understand the 
importance of its members. 
In Tanzania, the Prime Minister’s Office perceived that not only were BMOs not good at 
working together, they were too often at odds with one another (int. Lyimo 2011). TPSF 
has had its share of governance troubles exacerbated by poor member relationships but 
started to address this in 2012, focusing on and co-ordinating their BMO members (int. 
Furaha 2012). In 2013, it agreed a new structure that ensured a better and fairer 
representation of all sectors and elected a new chairman, Reginald Mengi, one of 
Tanzania’s wealthiest entrepreneurs. Mengi is vocal about the pernicious effective of 
corruption, has the confidence of the business sector and is influential in his own right 
(int. Simbeye 2015). 
Indeed, all the case studies demonstrate the importance of staff who are effective. TPSF 
only began to make a significant difference when they appointed an entrepreneurial 
   P A G E  | 223 
CEO. The other three cases also demonstrate that an effective and knowledgeable 
member of staff, often the CEO, can make the BMO effective. In general, BMOs in sub-
Saharan Africa have a very small number of staff. The Confederation of British Industry, 
for example, has 215, spread around offices throughout the UK and overseas. The US 
Chamber of Commerce has 24 staff on its leadership team.  The median number of staff 
for a BMO in Tanzania is four; even TPSF, the apex BMO, only has 19. The CEO needs 
support to deliver on dialogue and advocacy but few BMOs can afford to appoint one 
person let alone more than one person. If they can afford a bigger policy team, as TAHA 
has done for example, then it benefits significantly. TAHA is the only BMO that appears 
to be aiming to develop its staff (recruiting a policy director and deputy policy director, 
promoting the policy director to director of development, promoting the deputy to policy 
director, recruiting a new deputy) and also the only one to have enough staff in place to 
be able to plan succession in this way. After gathering the data for this thesis, TPSF had its 
policy director and his deputy resign almost at the same time, followed by a delay in 
appointing a new policy director, and a further delay whilst he gets to know the key 
people in government. This episode suggests that, whilst BMOs may becoming better at 
employing good people and giving the appropriate support, there is still a need for good 
succession strategies. This is largely confirmed by the other case study BMOs. TCT is 
largely driven by the CEO. There is no obvious successor being groomed. KCM saw the 
resignation of its CEO during the period of the case study. Stephen Mwakesi was 
appointed as acting CEO. But then he resigned before any additional staff had been 
appointed. 
There is little discussion in the literature on the importance of leadership in interest 
groups – though researchers do pick up on the idea of policy entrepreneurs. Walker 
argued that policy entrepreneurs – whether inside or outside the government – are 
needed to initiate a policy process, but suggested that little will happen unless there are 
institutions (which could be business associations) that will serve as sponsors or patrons 
(1991: 196) or, in the language of BMOs, champions. 
One important aspect of being professional is ensuring adherence to cultural norms 
particularly in the choice of advocacy strategy. Woll (2012) compares lobbying styles in 
the US and the EU and characterises lobbying in the US as aggressive and threatening 
compared to a more softly spoken, constructive and consensus-seeking style focused on 
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the exchange of information in the EU. She goes on to argue that “EU lobbying is more 
rooted in long-term relationships and trust” (2012: 202) but then concludes that this is 
due to “the institutional arrangement in the EU”. Hanegraaff et al. (2017) have tried to 
explain differences in style, exploring whether they are due to culture or to institutional 
context. They note that separating the two is problematic (2017: 481) but, like Woll, 
eventually conclude that “an institutional explanation [is] more powerful and plausible 
than a cultural one” (2017: 482). This may be a reasonable conclusion in the EU, but in 
sub-Saharan Africa, with its societal desire for consensus and collaboration, a cultural 
explanation is more plausible. Ultimately, decisions have to be taken and it would be all 
but impossible for all parties’ preferences to be reflected in final policy positions. 
However, there is a desire for preferences to be seriously considered (Kalumba 2015: 
107) and thus a need to ensure that all are aired in dialogue. There is no doubt that 
BMOs in Kenya and Tanzania work more like BMOs in the EU. I argue that this fits the 
culture prevalent in Kenya and Tanzania much more closely than US style aggression. 
Furthermore, institutions are not wholly independent of the cultures in which they are 
located, yet Hanegraaff et al. appear not to have considered the possibility that the 
institutional arrangements are also dependent on cultural norms. 
There seems little doubt that a competent CEO makes a huge difference and is clearly the 
most important champion. In the case of TAHA, Jacquie Mkindi has been there since 
2005, and so has a good institutional memory. She has undertaken much of the advocacy 
herself, and continues to do so, for example lobbying the Vice President in relation to the 
skills development levy (int. Chamanga 2016). Mkindi is personable, knowledgeable, 
committed and very persistent. TCT also has a committed, knowledgeable and persistent 
CEO in Richard Rugimbana, but TCT has never had the luxury of sufficient resource, even 
to appoint a policy director, let alone a policy team. 
Though the number is growing, only a small handful of people move from public sector to 
private sector and back again, so there is a particular challenge for business that civil 
servants have little experience of the private sector and little recognition of the benefits 
from providing better services (Temu 2013). The President may call for it, as he did at the 
Big Results Now workshop in early 2014, but without some understanding it is difficult for 
civil servants to deliver. Perhaps this could be addressed by setting up a programme of 
mutual secondments – from BMO into the Ministry and from the Ministry into the BMO. 
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9.5 Stages in BMO development 
The World Bank is the only organisation to have attempted to set out stages of 
development for BMOs. However, as noted in Chapter 2, the analysis was rather 
simplistic. On the basis of this research (and wider work with BMOs in Kenya and 
Tanzania), it is clear that BMOs do progress through a series of stages, though there are 
no clear boundaries. I disagree, however, with the stages described by the World Bank 
and the way in which they characterise those stages. Furthermore, BMOs do not 
necessarily need to progress through the stages but rather may exhibit characteristics 
from across the spectrum. The important point, having considered BMOs employing 
between three and 70 staff, is that the stage is a reflection of the BMO’s behaviour and 
competence rather than its size. 
As was most clearly seen with TPSF, a BMO may start as a policy novice, with no or a 
small number of staff, and managed by volunteer board members. It would provide 
networking opportunities for members. At most it would react to government proposals 
and, in all likelihood, would not be seen by government as credible. 
It might then develop into more of a policy reactor, being able to react and respond to 
government proposals, but probably not invited by government to offer its views. It will 
be employing some staff, though may still need input from board members. It will be 
actively recruiting members but involving them may prove difficult. It will lack the 
resource or experience to engage with government on anything other than a limited 
basis. 
The next stage is policy networker (in the sense of actively networking rather than 
necessarily being a member of a policy network or community). In this stage the BMO is 
actively gathering intelligence on government proposals for policy change and is making 
its own proposals. In many cases, it is still reacting rather than being proactive in its 
proposals for policy and legislation but is increasingly proactive in everything else. In 
particular, it is looking to build networks and alliances and to leverage its efforts through 
working with others. It has a growing and capable secretariat, possibly some internally 
generated revenue and is better at communicating with its members. It is likely to be seen 
by government as a credible organisation with whom to consult and talk. It is likely to 
have some influence. 
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The final stage is the policy entrepreneur, who aims to set the policy agenda and to be 
proactive in its relationship with government. It is likely to have a greater level of 
internally generated revenue and to be good at gathering intelligence and at sharing with 
others. It will be a regular user of the media, be seen by government as credible and will 
be consulted regularly and invited to participate in a range of dialogues. It will be an 
effective influencer. 
Despite still being very small, TCT is predominantly a policy networker, with some 
elements of policy entrepreneurship, especially around its efforts to promote a tourism 
marketing strategy and revised tourism policy. TAHA, despite being very large in 
Tanzanian terms, with a high level of resource and a dedicated policy team, is also a 
policy networker with some elements of policy entrepreneurship. It is held back by its 
apparent reticence to tackle contentious issues. TPSF is primarily a policy entrepreneur, 
though it is the BMO that has gone through the most change during the period of this 
research. KCM is possibly the hardest to locate on this spectrum in that it is very small 
but, at least during the work on the Mining Bill, was incredibly professional. It was 
entrepreneurial in its approach to that work. It was networking prodigiously and was 
gathering and sharing intelligence, but in a narrow field and with a small group of target 
audiences. I would therefore assess it as a policy entrepreneur. 
9.6 Contribution 
In summary, this research has made both empirical and theoretical contributions as 
follows: 
Firstly, in a conceptual contribution, the research has identified that there is something 
more at work than a simple resource exchange mechanism. A resource exchange 
mechanism suggests a transactional relationship – as long as the BMO keeps providing 
policy goods, then they will continue to secure access. BMOs do need access and 
arguably they do initially earn it on the basis of their research and argumentation. 
However, they maintain their access, and their credibility, on the basis of the relationship 
that they are able to build. An important block in the foundation of that relationship is 
indeed being regarded as a trustworthy provider of information, expertise and opinion. 
An effective and lasting relationship also reflects the need for collaboration and 
consensus building skills (which links to dialogue below) and on the BMO’s ability to sell 
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its final positions back to the members. In other words, the ability to engage with policy 
makers and to build effective relationships is key to being able to influence public policy 
at least in Kenya and Tanzania. 
It is not clear whether this conclusion extends to developed countries though it seems 
less likely that this is as crucial as it is in sub-Saharan Africa where it neatly fits with the 
prevailing culture. This leads to my second contribution which is that the interest group 
conceptual framework needs to be modified to recognise that the building of 
relationships and the choice of advocacy strategies will be influenced by cultural 
norms. The willingness of the public sector to engage may well depend as much on the 
attitude and approach of the BMO as it does on the expectation of securing access 
goods. 
I have confirmed that, other than developing and maintaining relationships, BMOs in sub-
Saharan Africa work in a very similar way to BMOs in developed countries – except that 
generally their competences are less developed. They gather evidence; prepare policy 
proposals; form coalitions and alliances; take insider approaches; may, on occasion, use 
the media to bolster their position; engage in dialogue; and, pursue administrative reform 
or reinterpretation in preference to legislative change as it is easier and faster. My third 
contribution is that I have confirmed that dialogue is an important component of effective 
advocacy and argue that policy dialogue has three clear stages: discussion, exploration 
and persuasion. 
Fourthly, I have opened the black box and described what it means for a BMO to be 
professional. In my original thinking, there were four rather broad factors necessary for a 
BMO to be successful of which one was advocacy competence. Whilst there is no 
comprehensive discussion in the literature about necessary competences, I identified a 
large number of potential competences and grouped these together in three areas of 
evidence, expression and engagement. BMOs need organisational management skills as 
well. There is evidence that these are all exhibited by the case study BMOs. Additionally, 
and not identified from the literature, the case study BMOs exhibit the ability to strike a 
balance in the dialogue with government, cultural sensitivity, the ability to learn and to 
reflect their lessons in their following actions, the ability to think and act strategically, a 
recognition that reform is best achieved through taking one step at a time and being 
proactive. All this is helped if there is effective leadership supporting, not only guiding the 
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BMO’s advocacy staff but also encouraging them to use their initiative as well. Whilst 
confidence is not a competence per se, being competent and professional leads, as TCT 
explained, to BMOs becoming more confident in their dealings with government and this 
in turn seems to increase the chance of success. BMOs need to be able to do all these, 
and do them well, if they are to stand a chance of being successful.  
Fifthly, I have set out ideas for how BMOs develop through a series of stages and 
described those stages in terms of competence, such as ability to frame and ability to 
argue, rather than other characteristics, such as size. This could be used by BMOs to 
consider what they need to do to develop further. 
Lastly, I have reported on a large number of issues where BMOs have been able to 
influence policy outcomes. They are consulted, they are given the opportunity to 
comment on policy and they are able to engage in dialogue and advocacy. Moreover, 
there are clear examples of BMOs persuading the public sector to reform policy. 
9.7 Further research 
This research has revealed several areas where more research is now required. These 
areas have, in general, been identified through the research and appear to be gaps in the 
literature. These have been noted in the text, but in summary: 
Understanding the process of dialogue and argumentation. The process of dialogue is 
not widely covered in the academic literature though it is described in the practitioner 
literature. However, the practitioner literature tends to focus more on the benefits from 
dialogue than on the process. Practitioners argue that succinct and compelling arguments 
make a difference to the way that an issue is seen by policy makers. Is that really true? Is 
it, as Baumgartner et al. (2009) contend, that interest groups simply seek like-minded 
officials and they then work together to influence others? What actually happens during 
discussions between public and private sectors? Much of the literature argues the need 
for evidence. How much of the dialogue is based on evidence, how much on concepts 
like fairness and how much on threat? Is the conclusion that there are separate, though 
interlinked, stages of exploration and persuasion correct? There would be a challenge in 
attempting to undertake research like this in that having a third party participate in the 
discussion is likely to affect the nature of the discussion but there may be ways to 
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overcome that challenge, based on briefing some participants and key person interviews. 
This is a question that would be of as much interest in the context of developed countries 
as developing countries, but may be easier to spot cause and effect in developing 
countries because of the wide variation in the quality of argument and the fewer cases 
with opposing sides. 
How much difference is made by personal relationships? The case study BMOs all 
talked about the need to build relationships, including but not limited to recruiting public 
sector champions. The impact of personal relationship is under-discussed in the literature. 
Yet it may be that it is those personal relationships that lead to access rather than the 
quality of the evidence of a particular issue. Teasing out the difference that is made by 
developing good personal relationships would potentially balance the claim that 
likelihood of success is all down to the quality of the evidence and the argumentation. 
Do BMOs really succeed in putting issues on the agenda? BMOs contend that they 
have been able to place issues on to the government agenda, as TPSF’s claim in relation 
to including the business enabling environment within the Big Results Now framework. 
However, the government was already concerned with its position in the Doing Business 
league table and had set up a reform plan and task forces.  There have been some good 
examples, as with the Kenya Society of Physiotherapists not only placing the issue of 
regulation on the agenda but also pushing it all the way to legislation (Irwin & Githinji 
2017). But in many cases, BMOs are simply reacting to an agenda set by others. 
How much difference does it make to separate issues into components? This is a further 
question that is likely to apply as much in developed countries as in developing countries. 
Practitioners encourage BMOs to separate issues, even when on a common topic, on the 
basis that a policy maker who does not like one proposal out of several will then dismiss 
the entire submission. That is why for example KCM developed seven policy position 
papers as part of their efforts to amend the Mining Bill. This research would need to 
examine the extent to which BMOs sought to split complicated issues and whether doing 
so leads to greater success. 
How much difference is made by being sensitive to culture? Or is this just about 
understanding and being strategically smart? Does cultural sensitivity mean that BMOs 
pull their punches in their proposals? Does it mean that they are more willing to 
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compromise in the eventual outcome of a particular advocacy project? Does it mean that 
they are more likely to see at least some success but perhaps not success with everything 
that they wanted? 
How much difference is made by effective BMO leadership, especially in Africa? Does 
a good leader set the tone for an organisation? In Africa, there is a tendency to secure the 
permission of the ‘boss’ for almost every decision. Do good leaders allow their staff the 
freedom to use their initiative? Indeed, do they encourage them to do so? In what way do 
they provide support. TPSF for example gave the impression that the CEO allowed the 
team to operate as they saw fit, within agreed parameters. TAHA gave the impression that 
the policy team could get on with whatever they thought needed to be done. Assuming 
that leadership does make a difference, this may then lead on to a further question about 
the nature of leadership in Africa. 
To what extent do BMOs who receive funding from donors pursue their own issues or 
those of the donor? Given the reliance of BMOs in developing countries on donor 
support and given that some donors, such as the International Labour Organisation, are 
themselves driven by a strong desire to promote reform, there may be an element of 
taking the money, irrespective of the conditions that come with it. TPSF showed some of 
the difficulties when they worked on their World Bank contracts. BMOs may feel that 
their objectives are aligned, in which case this may not matter, or they may feel that they 
are compromising their principles simply to find the resources to keep going. 
BMOs in Tanzania and Kenya tend to adopt an insider approach, occasionally supported 
by media activity. There are however some interest groups, especially non-governmental 
organisations and civil society organisations, that adopt an outsider approach. Examining 
the differences in competence – and in success rates – between organisations that are 
predominantly insider and predominantly outsider could lead to further insights about the 
competences that are most important. 
9.8 Conclusion 
The study highlights several issues where associations have been successful in their efforts 
to reform public policy. This study has confirmed that much of the approach adopted by 
business associations in consolidating democracies mirrors the approach taken by their 
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counterparts in consolidated democracies. However, it has also identified that there is a 
greater emphasis in building and maintaining relationships. Associations, once they have 
been able to demonstrate credibility with government, have generally found it easier to 
secure access and can then raise issues of concern. There is more emphasis on public 
private dialogue which allows both parties to understand each other and the issues more 
clearly. There is, in East Africa, a desire to work collaboratively and to seek consensus. 
However, to be effective, associations need to be able to draw on good evidence and 
prepare compelling arguments to support their position. The study has confirmed that 
people are important. They need to be competent. They need to work together. They 
need to be stimulated and encouraged to take the initiative. Importantly, the study shows 
that people can develop their skills and competences and become better at dialogue and 
advocacy and thus more influential. 
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Interviews 
I have been working, and meeting, with BMOs and other stakeholders in Tanzania since 
2006. In many cases, the interviews were undertaken as part of an evaluation of the work 
of BEST-Advocacy Component. In most cases, answers to questions intended to assess 
whether BMOs have been successful and under what circumstances have also provided 
good material for my PhD research. However, from late 2011 onwards, having 
commenced my PhD, I added questions as appropriate to learn more about BMO 
perceptions of what led to their success. The evaluations included mid-term reviews (an 
evaluation commissioned roughly half way through the life of a programme, with the 
intention of giving the managers the opportunity to change direction if appropriate), 
implementation reviews (effectively an end of programme evaluation), annual reviews 
and a five-year longitudinal impact assessment (LIA) commissioned by the UK’s 
Department for International Development. 
Table 18 lists by organisation (and interviewee) people who were interviewed in the 
following missions: BEST-AC mid term review, 2006; BEST-AC implementation review, 
2008; BEST-AC LIA baseline assessment, 2010 July and October; BEST-AC LIA, 2011; 
BEST-AC annual review, 2012; BEST-AC LIA, 2012; BEST-AC LIA 2013; BEST-AC annual 
review, 2013; BEST-AC LIA, 2014; BEST-AC LIA, 2015; interviews to follow up on earlier 
interviews and clarify for purposes of writing case studies, 2016. In addition, in early 
2014, I was asked by DFID to participate in the Business Enabling Environment ‘lab’ 
convened as part of the Big Results Now process held near Dar es Salaam. I was thus able 
to meet and talk to many participants from BMOs and MDAs though they are not listed 
in the table. In the table, two ticks in a period means there was more than one meeting; 
the totals only count from 2011, and count meetings rather than people interviewed, as 
some meetings had multiple interviewees. 
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Table 18: Summary of meetings in Tanzania 
 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
BMOs             
Agricultural Council of Tanzania (Bitegeko, Janet, 
CEO) 
           5 
Agricultural Council of Tanzania (Mwanitu, M, Policy 
officer) 
            
Agricultural Council of Tanzania (Rwechungura, C, 
Communications Officer) 
           2 
Agricultural Council of Tanzania (Sanga, M, 
Communications Officer) 
            
Agricultural Non-State Actors’ Forum (Rukonge, 
Audax, CEO) 
           5 
Association of Tanzanian Employers (Mlimuka, 
Aggrey, CEO) 
           2 
Confederation of Tanzania Industries (Kamote, 
Hossein, Policy Manager) 
           5 
Confederation of Tanzania Industries (Kilindu, 
Christine, CEO) 
           1 
Confederation of Tanzania Industries (Tenga, Leodgar, 
CEO) 
           1 
Hotel Association of Tanzania (Kirov, M)             
Hotels Association of Tanzania (Sykes, Lathifa, CEO)            2 
Organic Farming Association            1 
RULU Arts Promoters (Mulimba, Ruyembe)             
Tanzania Air Operators’ Association (Mpill, Jaffari)             
Tanzania Association of Consultants (Mushi, A, ED)            1 
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 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
Tanzania Association of Cultural Tour Operators 
(Kahambe, J) 
            
Tanzania Association of Cultural Tour Operators 
(Massawe, Alfred, CEO) 
           3 
Tanzania Association of Cultural Tour Operators 
(Mwako, A) 
            
Tanzania Association of Cultural Tour Operators 
(Kilewo, Wesley) 
           1 
Tanzania Association of Micro-Finance Institutions 
(Terry, Winnie, ED) 
           4 
Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (Akko, Sirili, 
Acting ED) 
           1 
Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (Mustapha 
Akunaay, CEO) 
           3 
Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (Remen, 
Kelven, Policy Officer, then Acting ED) 
           2 
Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (Vesna 
Glamocanin, Treasurer) 
            
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & 
Agriculture (Mashauri, S) 
            
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & 
Agriculture (Nnko, E) 
            
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture (Machemba D.C.) 
            
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture Arusha (Kahabi, ED) 
            
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture Arusha (Marunda, S.C, ED) 
           1 
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 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture Arusha (Olomi, Adolf, Chairman) 
           3 
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture Morogoro 
            
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture Mufindi 
            
Tanzania Civil Engineering Contractors’ Association 
(Mworia, C, ED) 
           1 
Tanzania Edible Oil Seeds Association            1 
Tanzania Exporters’ Association (Lanya, P, Board 
member) 
            
Tanzania Exporters’ Association (Naluyaga, L, ED)            3 
Tanzania Graduate Farmers’ Association            1 
Tanzania Horticultural Association (Chamanga, 
Anthony, Policy Director) 
           2 
Tanzania Horticultural Association (Mkindi, Jacquie, 
CEO) 
           5 
Tanzania Horticultural Association (Remen, Kelven, 
Policy Officer) 
           1 
Tanzania Milk Processors’ Association (Mariki, 
Edmund, ED) 
           6 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (Accaro, Louis, 
ED) 
            
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (Furaha, Edward, 
Policy Director) 
           6 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (Gahha, Adam, 
Policy Manager) 
            
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (Rwezika, E, ED)             
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 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (Simbeye, 
Godfrey, CEO) 
           5 
Tanzania Ship Tally Association            1 
Tanzania Women Miners’ Association (Negele, 
Eunice) 
            
Tourism Confederation of Tanzania (Rugimbana, 
Richard, ED) 
           7 
Vibindo (Kikuwi, Gaston, Chairman)            4 
Zanzibar Chamber of Commerce, Industry & 
Agriculture (Omar, A, President) 
           1 
Zanzibar Clove Producers’ Organisation (Abubakar, 
A, ED) 
           1 
            88 
MDAs             
Better Regulation Unit (Lyimo, Bede, CEO)             
Ministry of Agriculture (Hango, D)             
Ministry of Agriculture (Mibava, Gungo)            1 
Ministry of Agriculture (Msambachi, A)            1 
Ministry of Agriculture (Muzawa, A.K)             
Ministry of Agriculture (Ohidi, S)             
Ministry of Home Affairs (Janabi, Haji, Director of 
Policy & Planning) 
           2 
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Ishibaba, Consolata, 
Director, SME Division) 
           2 
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Kilumile, Tawi, 
Economist) 
            
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 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Lugongo, Geoffrey, 
Trade Officer, Marketing) 
            
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Maru, J, Acting Director, 
SME Division) 
            
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Mashingo, Christopher, 
Assistant Director, Trade Promotion) 
           2 
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Massari, Christopher)             
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Mjengo, M, Director of 
Marketing) 
           1 
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Mwampeta, Hilda, 
Assistant Director, Trade Promotion) 
            
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Ngango, G)             
Ministry of Industry & Trade (Sekela, M)             
Ministry of Industry, Trade & Marketing (Lyatuu, J)             
Ministry of Industry, Trade & Marketing (Massawe, 
Desytant) 
           1 
Ministry of Industry, Trade & Marketing (Mbwasi, A)             
Ministry of Labour (Janabi, Haji)            1 
Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism            4 
Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism (Kimmage, Z, 
Director of Tourism) 
           1 
Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism (Mussa, 
Ibrahim, Director of Tourism) 
           3 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Kibogoyo, 
S, Principal Tourism Officer) 
            
National Bureau of Statistics (Sawe, J)            1 
Presidential Delivery Bureau            3 
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 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
Presidential Delivery Bureau (Kamugisha, G)            1 
Presidential Delivery Bureau (Nduguru, Neema)            1 
Presidential Delivery Bureau (Ting, D)            1 
Prime Minister’s Office            9 
Prime Minister’s Office (Laseko, Barney)            6 
Prime Minister’s Office (Lyimo, Bede)            1 
Prime Minister’s Office (Maponde, Ezamo)            1 
Small Industries Development Organisation (Laiser, 
Mike ED) 
            
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania 
(Kirenga, Geoffrey, CEO) 
           1 
Tanzania Revenue Authority (Maganga, Mary)            5 
Tanzania Tourist Board (Chitaunga, P)             
Tanzania Tourist Board (Malogo, D)             
Tanzania Tourist Board (Mdachi, D, Marketing 
Manager) 
           1 
Tanzania Tourist Board (Nzuki, Aloyce, CEO)            1 
Weights & Measures Agency (Tukai, A, CEO)             
            51 
Other             
Barclays Bank (Lubira, David, Commercial Director)             
East African Business Council (Nderitu, Agatha, CEO)            1 
Foundation for Civil Society            1 
Foundation for Civil Society (Ulango, John, CEO)            1 
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 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012a 2012b 2013a 2013b 2014 2015 2016  
Institute of Management & Entrepreneurship 
Development (Olomi, Donath, Chairman) 
           2 
Lyimo, Bede (Consultant)            2 
Mchau, Celina (Consultant)             
Pamona Ltd (Muchoki, A)            1 
Rex Attorneys (Sinare, H)            1 
Serengeti Advisers (Eyakuze, Aidan)            1 
Shamte, Mahmud (Consultant)             
Shimwela, Nicky (Consultant)             
TradeMark East Africa (Elago, Pauline, Country Director)            1 
University of Dar Entrepreneurship Centre (Charles, 
Goodluck) 
           3 
University of Dar Entrepreneurship Centre (Olomi, 
Donath, Director) 
            
            14 
            153 
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In Kenya, I am part of a team that holds the contract from Danish International 
Development Aid (DANIDA) to manage the Business Advocacy Fund. This is in its third 
five-year programme. During that time, I have met and supported more than 50 BMOs as 
well as meeting many of their stakeholders. I have not listed the meeting details, but have 
specifically listed the interviews that were undertaken to write the case study of the 
Kenya Chamber of Mines. 
Kenya Chamber of Mines 
 KCM policy position workshop, 24 March 2014 (facilitated by David Irwin) 
 Abdalla, Hon. Amina (Chairman, NA Departmental Committee on Environment and 
Natural Resources), 1 April 2015 (interviewed by Kariuki Waweru, using questions 
prepared by David Irwin) 
 Gichuhi, Monica (CEO, Kenya Chamber of Mines), 24 March 2014 
 Kimono, Shadrack (Chief Geologist & Acting Commissioner of Mines) and Mutiso, 
Raymond (Director of Mines), 30 January 2015 (interviewed by Kariuki Waweru, 
using questions prepared by David Irwin) 
 Mwakesi, Stephen (Acting CEO, Kenya Chamber of Mines), (a) 24 March, (b) 27 
March, (c) 10 September, (d) 9 December 2014, 18 February 2015 
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